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ABSTRACT 
MANAGING CATASTROPHIC RISK BY ALTERNATIVE RISK TRANSFER 
INSTRUMENTS 
Chieh Ou Yang 
Howard Kunreuther  
    Chapter 1 analyzes hybrid-trigger CAT bonds, a new CAT bond deal that can reduce 
basis risk and eliminate moral hazard simultaneously. It is the first research that provides 
analytical evidence on the condition under which the hybrid trigger has lower basis risk. 
Simulation results support my analyses. Major findings in this study provide insights to 
insurers who would proactively manage the basis risk of CAT bonds. Chapter 2 examines 
whether the parimutuel mechanism can hedge risk-averse people against catastrophic 
losses. Two optimal stake choice models are constructed. In the first model where the 
stakes of other players are exogenous, the optimal stake can be obtained by equating the 
marginal cost of a net payoff with the ratio of the expected marginal utilities in the payoff 
state and the no payoff state. The dynamic optimal hedge can be achieved if the odds, and 
the conditional probability of a hurricane hitting the target area, are available. In the 
second model, an optimal equilibrium stake is derived by maximizing the representative 
agent’s expected utility. Given no transaction fee and tax, we show that parimutuel 
insurance intrinsically leads to participants being underinsured due to basis risk. 
Although participants will be underinsured, parimutuel insurance guarantees no 
underlying risk borne by the issuer. We also derive the equivalent transaction costs of 
traditional insurance relative to HuRLOs. The actual transaction cost for traditional 
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insurance is found to be higher than the equivalent utility level implied by HuRLOs, 
suggesting that hedgers would be better off with HuRLOs than with traditional insurance.  
Chapter 3 analyzes the implications of climate change for catastrophic risk and examines 
the appropriateness of longer term insurance contracts to protect insurers against 
catastrophic losses and changes in risk estimates over time. Climate change essentially 
plays an important role in modeling catastrophic risks, especially in the tail of the loss 
distribution and for longer time scales. Mitigations can completely offset the impact of 
climate change. Longer term insurance contract may stimulate the incentive to invest on 
mitigation; however, risk capital required and annual premiums could increase 
significantly due to the additional premium risk faced by the insurers.   
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  1
General Introduction 
 
    Recent statistics of economic and insured losses caused by great natural disasters allow 
us to witness the rising pattern of hazard exposure to catastrophes. Figure 1 depicts 
economic and insured losses from natural disasters from 1950 to 2008 throughout the 
world. We can observe that the losses caused by great natural disasters increase 
dramatically in recent years, especially after 1990. Although the losses in 2000-2003 and 
2006-2007 were less severe than previous years, those in 2004, 2005, and 2008 picked up 
again. Similarly, catastrophes also have an escalated impact on insurers over the last 15 
years than in the entire history of insurance, as revealed in Figure 2. Before 1988, the 
worldwide insured losses from natural disasters are at most approximately $10 billion 
dollars. In contrast, after 1990, insured losses rise significantly. Insured losses increase up 
to $85 billion dollars when hurricane Katrina, Wilma, and Rita hit Gulf of Mexico in 
2005. Natural disasters not only take away lives of human but also have adverse impacts 
on economy by causing direct damage, such as property destruction, or indirect damage, 
such as business interruption and production losses. Representative extreme events in 
recent years demonstrated the nature of diversity and globalization on natural disasters. 
Eastern Coast and Gulf of Mexico in U.S. stroke by a series of hurricanes. In 2005, 
Hurricane Katrina inflicted $46.3 billion in insured losses and generated more than $100 
billion in federal aid. Hurricane Ike cost insurers 16 billion losses in 2008. In Europe, 
Germany suffered from Elbe floods in 2002; the 2003 heat wave caused 35,000 deaths; 
river floods annoyed UK in 2007; Greece was threatened by wildfires in 2008. In Asia, 
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tsunami in 2004 caused more than 283,000 deaths; a destructive earthquake in China 
killed 70,000 people in 2008.   
    Increased storm activities and rapid coastal development are the major sources that 
greatly elevate the risk of economic losses from natural disasters. Recent literature from 
scientific community suggests that global warming, primarily from human contributions, 
is likely to be responsible for changes in weather patterns, including the number, severity, 
and paths of storms and rainfall quantity, contributing to greater frequency and intensity 
of natural catastrophes1. Based on a study by National Oceanic & Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), in the most recent decade, more people moved to coastal area, 
especially the Atlantic coasts and Gulf of Mexico where hurricane threat is the greatest2. 
Although scientists seem to have different opinions in the assessments of the level and 
the nature of weather-related risk in coastal areas, the risk has been generally believed to 
increase worldwide. As indicated, economic and insured losses have increased 
substantially over the last 15 years, consistent with the elevated storm activities and the 
recent coastal development.  
                                                            
1 Emanuel (2005) exhibits that more intensified long-lived storms caused escalating power dissipation since 
mid-1970s, which in turn stimulates more destructive hurricanes. Webster et al. (2005) also provide 
evidence on an elevated pattern on frequency and severity of hurricanes in recent 30 years. Based on Hoyos 
et al. (2006), the substantially enhanced hurricane intensity may attribute to the rise in sea surface 
temperature, which is related to global warming. Human behaviors, including the burning of fossil fuels, 
deforestation, and other land use changes, contribute to the emission of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gasses, such as methane, which have accumulated in the atmosphere since late 19th century. 
Greenhouse gasses trap heat more easily, resulting in higher surface air temperature. IPCC predicts that 
global average surface temperatures will increase 1.1°C~2.9°C under a low emission scenario and 2.4°C 
~6.4°C under a high emission scenario. Stern (2007) also suggests that positive feedback mechanisms of 
climate change, such as releases of methane resulting from melting of permafrost and a reduced uptake of 
carbon that caused by shrinking Amazon forest, may amplify greenhouse gas concentrations and lead to 
global warming that is more severe than anticipated by climate models.  
2 During 1980 to 2003, 33 million residents are added to populations in coastal areas, posed an overall 28 
percentage increase, but the growth rate is higher in southern Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The study also 
projects an even stronger population growth in the area in the future. 
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    Encountering potential changes in frequency and severity of natural disasters, how to 
design mechanisms to transfer property exposures and ameliorate consequences of future 
catastrophes is a critical issue. Insurance is an efficient method to transfer risks. Insurers 
spread exposures by aggregating total risks into a relative larger risk pool to effectively 
reduce risk that can hardly handled by a single homeowner. However, catastrophic risks 
pose special challenges for insurers since risks faced by each individual are not 
independent and nature of catastrophic risks embarks obstacles in accurate estimation, 
especially the extreme tail of the loss distribution. Insurers are usually forced to raise 
insurance premiums to reflect their difficulties in diversifying potential risks 
geographically or over time or voluntarily retreat from the insurance market in hazard-
prone areas3. In addition to simply compensating damage, insurers can play a more 
proactive role in stimulating mitigation measures and enhancing economic resilience 
against natural disasters, with the assistance of public sectors. In this respect, insurers can 
regard these changes a new business opportunity instead of a future threat and further 
develop innovative products for addressing potential changes. 
      In order to managing catastrophic risks, insurers typically purchase reinsurance for 
hedging against loss exposures caused by natural disasters. Reinsurers can spread a 
proportion of losses exceeding some level on a larger geographical area or on a greater 
risk pool which contains other low-correlated risks. Nevertheless, the prices of 
reinsurance for catastrophic risks are usually significantly high and the coverage is often 
limited, especially in the aftermath of great catastrophes. Alternatively, insurers can 
                                                            
3 In early 2009, State Farm, the largest property insurer in Florida, withdrew from the Florida property 
insurance market because regulators disapproved its proposal on increase premiums to reflect higher 
hurricane risks.  
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access additional capitals by trading Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) instruments, such 
as industry loss warranties (ILW), CAT bonds, CAT options, CAT futures, and other 
innovations in capital markets. Due to the relative huge capacity of financial markets and 
the presence of many active investors in these markets, securitization of catastrophic risks 
seems to be a promising solution. ART instruments allow insurers to transfer part of their 
exposure directly to capital markets as well as provide complementary sources of capital 
to absorb the losses resulting from mega catastrophes. For investors, the principal merit 
of ART instruments is that they constitute a different class of assets that can enhance 
returns while controlling the variance of a portfolio.  
    To turn risk management into value creation, the accelerating trend of large-scale 
catastrophes should incentivize new services, new types of protection, and innovative 
new financial solutions. The ideal financial solution is aimed at hedging against future 
catastrophic risks for insurers while sustaining availability and affordability of insurance. 
This dissertation proposes three different financial mechanisms in transferring and 
spreading catastrophic risks for insurers: Hybrid-trigger CAT bonds reduce basis risk 
compared with single-trigger CAT bonds; parimutuel insurance, albeit with some basis 
risk, eliminates the underlying risk assumed by insurers; longer term insurance, rather 
than annually renewal contracts, stimulates mitigation measures, thus effectively reduce 
risks and maintain insurability, even in the presence of potential climate change and 
related uncertainties.  
    In spite of recent evolutions and innovations of ART instruments, securitization still 
represents just a small share of overall capital in the global insurance market. Future 
development of insurance securitization markets depends on resolving current challenges. 
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First, enhance more accurate assessments of catastrophic risks. This can be done by 
building up a high-quality and comprehensive database on weather-related quantities and 
by constructing reliable catastrophic loss models across risk-prone areas. Second, create 
transparent and objective indices on catastrophic risks worldwide4. At present, hedge 
funds, catastrophe funds, and private equity funds are the major traders in insurance-
linked security markets5. Clearly defined and regularly updated catastrophic-associated 
indices help to develop standardized products and derivatives, which further attract a 
broader range of investor base and enhance liquidity of the market. Third, customize 
insurance products that meet specific needs of investors. Tranching technique allows 
insurers to pool different risks and separate them into multiple layers based on their 
expected returns and offers investors a broad spectrum of tailored insurance options. 
Investor with various preferences on distinct risk-return profiles can purchase products 
with the appropriate layers of risks. In the long run, as long as these problems are 
ameliorated, these alternative financing devices will continue to bolster the supply of 
property insurance.   
    The reminder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 analyzes hybrid-
trigger CAT bonds, a new CAT bond deal that can reduce basis risk and eliminate moral 
hazard simultaneously. The analytical and simulated evidence on the condition under 
which the hybrid trigger has lower basis risk are also provided. Chapter 2 examines 
                                                            
4 In 1992, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) launched the first catastrophe futures and options after 
Hurricane Andrew. Due to thin trading volume, they failed to exist in the market. Initiate by the shortage of 
capital for insurance and reinsurance industry after 2005 hurricane season, the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) start to trade U.S hurricane-related 
futures and options in 2007. NYMEX contracts are calculated based on PCS index while CME contracts 
are settled based on parametric indices in six U.S regions. 
5 Based on Swiss Re (2007), these three types of investors represent 90% of the new issue volume of CAT 
bonds in 2006. 
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whether the parimutuel mechanism can hedge risk-averse people against catastrophic 
losses by constructing two optimal stake choice models, with stakes wagered by other 
individuals on the risk-prone areas exogenous and endogenous, respectively. The 
equivalent transaction costs of traditional insurance relative to HuRLOs are also derived 
to compare the effectiveness of hedging with traditional insurance and with parimutuels.  
Chapter 3 considers climate change and the associated uncertainties into catastrophic risk 
models. Statistical properties of catastrophic losses in the presence of climate change, the 
benefit-cost analysis of mitigation measures under conditions of climate change on a 
longer time scale, and the impact of cost of capital and Bayesian-updated serial 
correlation on risk capital and insurance premiums for short and long term policies are 
further explored. This chapter intends to analyze the potential implications of climate 
change for catastrophic risks and to design appropriate risk transfer instruments to protect 
insurers against catastrophic losses and changes in risk estimates over time. 
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Chapter 1 
Managing Catastrophic Losses for Insurers:  
Hybrid-trigger CAT Bonds and Basis Risk Analysis 
 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Catastrophic Losses for Insurers  
Catastrophic risks have been the focus of many property casualty insurers for the 
past two decades due to the dramatic surge in the frequency of catastrophe (CAT, 
thereafter) occurrence6. The representative events include Hurricane Andrew in 1992, 
Opal in 1995, Fran in 1996, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005, and the California 
earthquake in Northridge in 1994. The traditional hedging facilities that deal with the 
catastrophic risk applied by insurers are reinsurance contracts. Through reinsurance, 
insurers are compensated for partial or total losses incurred by catastrophic events. 
However, recent studies, including Cummins et al. (2002), Froot (1999, 2001), and 
Harrington and Niehaus (2003), have proposed that insufficient coverage is available in 
the reinsurance market for hedging against mega-CAT risks. Property liability insurance 
                                                            
6 As revealed in the Wharton Risk Center (2008), catastrophes have had a more devastating impact on 
insurers over the past 15 years than in the entire history of insurance. Before 1988, the worldwide insured 
losses from natural disasters were less than $10 billion dollars. In contrast, after 1990, there was a radical 
increase in insured losses. 18 among the 20 most costly insured catastrophes worldwide from 1970 to 
2006 occurred in the past 15 years.  
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companies have sought other funding sources to overcome this problem. Given that the 
US capital market is seventy-five times larger than the property insurance industry7, 
securitization of CAT risks offers a promising solution to the concern of insufficient 
capacity in the reinsurance industry to absorb the losses resulting from mega catastrophe 
in recent years. As a result, CAT-linked securities, such as Industry Loss Warranty 
(ILW), CAT options, and CAT bonds first appeared in the capital markets in the 1980s 
and 1990s. In addition to traditional reinsurance contracts, these securities together with 
Sidecars8 provide risk-transferring alternatives to ameliorate CAT shocks within the 
economy. 
1.1.2 Nature of CAT Bonds 
Among a variety of catastrophe-related securities, CAT bonds are the most popular. 
The CAT bond market, which first appeared in 1997, has become the major source of 
CAT risk transfer capacity in the capital market. According to newly published reports9, 
2007 was by far the most active year in the history of the CAT bond market, with almost 
$7 billion of issuance in 2007, another record established. In 2006, the issue volume, 
$4.69 billion, broke the record of the issuing amount of the CAT bond market with a 136 
percent increase over 2005’s record performance of $1.99 billion, and a 311 percent 
increase over the $1.14 billion placed during 2004. The popularity of CAT bonds is not 
surprising since their payoff structure benefits both issuers (insurers) and buyers 
(investors). From the viewpoint of insurers, CAT bonds are appropriate hedging facilities 
                                                            
7 Based on Froot (1999) 
8 Sidecars are financial structures which are created to allow investors to take on the risk and return of a 
group of insurance policies written by an insurer or reinsurer and earn the risk and return that arises from 
that business. 
9 McGhee, C., Clarke, R., Collura, J. (2006), McGhee, C., Clarke, R., Fugit, J., Hathaway, J. (2007), and 
Lane and Bechwith (2007b) 
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because they provide capital release whenever insurers need a huge capital capacity to 
reimburse the coverage of their clients if CAT events occur. For investors, purchasing 
CAT bonds enhances the performance of their portfolios. Investors usually hold 
portfolios consisting chiefly of bonds and equities. A CAT risk can be regarded as close 
to a nonsystematic risk10 (or a zero-Beta risk), which is orthogonal to the systematic risk 
of the portfolio. Based on the standard financial economic theory, adding close to zero-
Beta assets with a higher premium into a portfolio constructs a new portfolio with better 
performance compared to the original portfolio under the risk/return profile.  
CAT bonds distinguish themselves from traditional bonds in the specific provision 
of debt-forgiveness. The debt-forgiveness provisions are triggered whenever the 
contracted CAT event occurs prior to the maturity of the bond. If debt-forgiveness 
provisions are triggered, CAT bond issuers are obligated to return only partial interest 
payments or principal thereafter until maturity. The trigger point can be determined by 
the actual losses suffered by the insurer (an indemnity-trigger) or a pre-specified index (a 
non-indemnity trigger), while the extent to which interest payments or principal are 
forgiven can be total, partial, or proportional to the actual losses. Moreover, within a 
single transaction, the trigger point can be activated by more than one type of indices (a 
hybrid trigger).  
1.1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of CAT Bonds 
    CAT bonds have been the most popular substitute of reinsurance contracts. Default 
risk, presented in reinsurance contracts due to the limited capital capacity of reinsurers, 
can be avoided by trading CAT bonds. Default risk plays a less role for both insurers and 
                                                            
10 Cummins and Geman (1995), Cox and Pedersen (2000), and Lee and Yu (2002) 
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investors in CAT bond transactions. Insurers face no default risk since they have the 
option, not the obligation, to reduce the interest payments or principal repayment 
whenever the debt-forgiveness provision is triggered. CAT bond investors bear less 
default risk because a special purpose vehicle (SPV), acting as an intermediary between 
the insurer and the investor, is regulated to deposit the principal into a trustee. The trustee 
guarantees the regular interest payments and the principal return at maturity, thus 
eliminating the possible default that arises from the insolvency of insurers. However, 
investors of CAT bonds still face the potential default risk when the trustee declares 
bankruptcy. For instance, after Lehman Brothers fell into bankruptcy in the recent 
financial turmoil11, at least one CAT bond issue, Willow Re, has reportedly gone into 
default by missing interest payments to investors. Three other similar CAT bond deals 
managed by Lehman Brothers are approaching junk status and threaten to default. These 
CAT bond deals used a unit of Lehman Brothers as total return swap counterparty, 
contracted to ensure the collateral backing the bonds was sufficient to meet interest and 
principal payments, and to make up any shortfall. When Lehman Brothers collapsed and 
the collateral trust accounts were impaired by poor investments, investors were left with 
direct exposure to market losses on assets held as collateral. 
    The potential moral hazard problem and the basis risk of issuers are critical factors in 
determining the price of CAT bonds. As indicated in Doherty (1997), moral hazard 
behavior describes the insurers’ incentive to exert less effort in loss control in order to 
gain from debt-forgiveness as the trigger event is approaching. Basis risk is a feature of 
non-indemnity-based CAT bonds. When the specified catastrophe occurs, the timing of 
                                                            
11 Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008. 
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reducing the interest payment and principal depends on specified indices instead of the 
insurers’ actual losses. If the actual loss of the insurers is greater than the loss reflected 
on the index, the insurers’ cash flows received from CAT bonds cannot cover their actual 
losses. As a result, insurers have to absorb the discrepancy of losses, leading to basis risk. 
The impact of basis risk on the CAT bond price is exclusively for non-indemnity triggers. 
    Non-indemnity trigger mechanisms12 can be categorized into a parametric trigger, a 
PCS index trigger, and a modeled-based trigger. A parametric trigger evaluates losses 
based on certain defined physical parameters, like the wind speed or the magnitude of an 
earthquake (Richter magnitude scale). A PCS index trigger measures losses based on an 
aggregate industry index, estimated by Property Claim Services (PCS). A modeled-based 
trigger calculates the loss by inputting the physical parameters of actual catastrophes to a 
catastrophic risk modeling firm’s13 database to estimate the loss exposure of its own or 
the whole industry. CAT bonds with an indemnity trigger have potential moral hazard 
problems while those with a non-indemnity trigger carry basis risks. 
1.1.4 Hybrid-trigger CAT Bonds 
    Driven by the incentive to reduce basis risk and eliminate potential moral hazard 
behavior simultaneously, CAT bonds with a hybrid trigger, formed from the combination 
of two or more existing triggers, were introduced in the capital market in 2006. One 
                                                            
12 McGhee, C., Clarke, R., Collura, J. (2006) 
13 The scientific risk analysis and quantitative risk estimates of the catastrophe damage is developed by 
catastrophe-modeling firms. These firms build catastrophe models, which use meteorology, engineering, 
and insurance underwriting data to estimate damage in different areas. Input information is based on 
historical tropical storms, building construction, and the impact on various structures under different wind 
speeds. Today, the three leading proprietary catastrophe modeling firms are Risk Management Solutions 
(RMS), AIR Worldwide, and EQECAT. 
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example is the Calabash Ltd. Transaction14, which establishes the market share of losses 
by a model-based trigger, and the market share is then multiplied by the PCS-index to 
calculate the estimated loss. This version of CAT bonds combines a modeled-based and a 
PCS index trigger. In 2008, the Blue Coast, a unit of the insurer Allianz, issued a CAT 
bond with a similar trigger structure that allocates industry losses at the county level 
along the coastal areas of southeastern US. This $120 million issue is the first to bring the 
losses induced by hurricanes down to the county level. A hybrid trigger which combines 
state-level PCS industry loss estimates and modeled county-level losses predicted by AIR 
Worldwide is used to define the trigger event. This specific structure enables insurers to 
manage basis risk at a more granular level while provides investors a transparent index, 
the PCS index, to gauge the catastrophic loss.  
    This study focuses on the comparative analysis of basis risk when using the hybrid 
trigger and other triggers and measures basis risk by taking the difference between the 
fair value of non-indemnity CAT bonds and that of indemnity-based CAT bonds to verify 
our analytical results. The principal merit of the hybrid-trigger CAT bond lies in that it 
possesses lower basis risk than the other non-indemnity CAT bonds. At the same time, it 
avoids moral hazard problem, the primary drawback of indemnity-based CAT bonds. 
Note that the meaning of ‘hybrid trigger’ is distinct from “hybrid parametric triggers”. 
The latter is now considered to be a parametric trigger that uses modeled parameters in 
the absence of the actual measured parameters of an extreme event.   
                                                            
14 This deal is sponsored by ACE American Insurance Co. It contains five classes of perils and two levels 
of series. Five classes are US wind, California earthquake, Central and North West earthquake, US 
earthquake, and all of the above. Series 1 is on an occurrence basis and Series 2 is on an aggregate basis. 
The loss measure is a modeled portfolio. 
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1.1.5 Basis Risk of Hybrid-trigger CAT Bonds 
Basis risk measures the discrepancy between the actual loss of the insurer and the 
loss index specified to define trigger events. In the hybrid-trigger CAT bond deals we 
focus on in this paper, the loss index is determined by the modeled market share of losses 
and the PCS index. The hybrid trigger should naturally be compared with the PCS-index 
trigger and the model-based trigger in terms of basis risk since these two types of trigger 
involve the formation of ‘hybrid’ trigger. It has been claimed that lower basis risk is the 
primary advantage of hybrid-trigger CAT bonds over other non-indemnity CAT bonds15. 
However, no analysis has been conducted to illustrate this basic point. Intuitively, the 
hybrid trigger should produce less basis risk than the PCS index trigger. In the former 
deal, the market share of losses for the insurer reflects the most updated information, 
whereas in the latter deal, the market share of losses for the insurer is pre-determined at 
the inception of the contract. In contrast, the relative basis risk of the hybrid trigger and 
the model-based trigger is not straightforward. In the next section, basis risk will be 
defined and the conditions under which basis risk can be reduced for the hybrid trigger 
will be further explored. 
 
1.2 Basis Risk Analysis for an Individual Insurer 
Basis risk is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the losses used 
to define trigger events of CAT bonds and the actual losses for an insurer. Not only 
insurers but also investors of CAT bonds are concerned about basis risk because both 
                                                            
15 For instance, McGhee, Clarke, and Collura (2006) and Härdle and Cabrera (2009) stress this point to 
support the usage of hybrid-trigger CAT bonds. 
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counterparties could suffer from the potential losses of basis risk. Basically, it is a zero-
sum game for insurers and investors in terms of basis risk in CAT bond deals. Insurers 
bear basis loss while investors attain basis gain, and vice versa. In this section, basis risk 
is measured from the view of the society. It arises as long as the actual losses mismatch 
the losses index pre-determined in the contract.  
Li is defined as the actual loss of insurer i during a year while iL
~  represents the loss 
of insurer i reflected in the loss index that is used to define trigger events during a year. L 
denotes the actual industry loss during a year, such as PCS index. iLˆ and Lˆ  are the annual 
losses predicted by modeling firms for insurer i and for the insurance industry, 
respectively. ai is the market share of insurer i. BRj denotes basis risk in terms of different 
trigger types j, where j=PCS, M, or H. Based on these notations, basis risk= ii LL ~  and 
basis risks for different trigger types are set as follows: 
․Index trigger: LaL ii ~ , iiPCS LLaBR             (1.1) 
․Model-based trigger: ii LL ˆ
~  , iiM LLBR  ˆ           (1.2) 
․Hybrid trigger: L
L
LL ii  ˆ
ˆ~ , iiH LLL
LBR  ˆ
ˆ
          (1.3) 
Using hybrid-trigger CAT bonds may reduce basis risk and avoid moral hazard. 
Since the hybrid trigger is associated with two transparent and external triggers (the PCS-
index trigger and the model-based trigger), moral hazard should not be a problem. Thus, 
this study emphasizes the analyses on basis risk. More specifically, the conditions under 
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which hybrid trigger generates less basis risk than the other two types of trigger will be 
derived.  
1.2.1 Comparison of Basis Risk for the Hybrid Trigger and the PSC-index Trigger   
    Based on the definitions of basis risk, the hybrid trigger, and the PCS index trigger, the 
condition under which basis risk is less for a hybrid trigger than a PCS index trigger can 
be summarized as the following inequality:  
L
La
L
L
L
LBRBR iiiPCSH  ˆ
ˆ
          (1.4) 
As the modeled market share of losses borne by insurer i is closer to the actual market 
share of losses than the market share pre-determined in the contract, using the hybrid 
trigger leads to less basis risk compared to using the PCS index trigger. Consequently, the 
accuracy of modeling firms’ prediction regarding the market share of losses of the insurer 
is critical in evaluating the relative basis risk of the hybrid trigger and the PCS-index 
Trigger. Since PCSH BRBR  and PCSH BRBR   are complementary events, the conditions 
that satisfy one is simply the complementary of the whole space of the other. Further 
analysis on the conditions by separate the space of PCSH BRBR   into four disjoint 
situations is provided in section 1.5. Figure 1.1 depicts the areas of PCSH BRBR  and 
PCSH BRBR   using the actual market share of losses and the modeled market share of 
losses as x-axis and y-axis, respectively. The light areas stand for PCSH BRBR   while the 
shaded areas represent PCSH BRBR  .  
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    Take examples in Figure 1.1 to illustrate the analytical results. Suppose that the 
predetermined market share of losses for insurer i in the area is 20% according to the 
CAT bond contract, i.e., a=0.2 (the point A). As a catastrophe occurs and causes damage 
to properties with a proportion of only 15% compared to the industry loss, shown as the 
vertical line denoted with 15.0
L
Li . This proportion is lower than the contracted market 
share of losses. The insurer receives more indemnity from the deal while compensate less 
claims to its clients, causing the insurer to attain basis gain. In this case, the modeled 
market share of loss should be within the range of 10% to 20% for guaranteeing that 
hybrid-trigger CAT bonds are more favorable to PCS-index CAT bonds in terms of basis 
risk. In mathematical terms, PCSH BRBR   2.0ˆ
ˆ
1.0 
L
Li . In another case where a 
catastrophe strikes the same location but causes a more devastating damage for the 
insurer, which is equivalent to 40% of the total industry loss, i.e., 4.0
L
Li , shown as the 
other vertical dashed line. The insurer suffers from basis loss at this time because the cash 
flow from the deal can not cover the claims from insurance clients. However, if the 
insurer uses the hybrid trigger to cover catastrophic loss exposures, basis risk can be 
reduced compared to using the PCS-index trigger even when the modeling firm predicts a 
wider range on the market share of losses, 20%-60%. This result implies that the more 
the actual market share of losses deviates from the contracted market share of losses, the 
hybrid trigger can still dominate the PCS-index trigger in terms of basis risk even if the 
modeling firm provides less precise prediction on the market share of losses. 
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In general, modeling firms’ prediction on market share of losses for an individual 
insurer should be more accurate than the contracted market share of losses since 
modeling firms incorporate updated information and advanced approaches that combine 
various specialties, such as engineering, insurance underwriting, and meteorology or 
seismology. Based on this fact, along with the above analysis, trading based on the hybrid 
trigger essentially ameliorates basis risk rather than trading based on the PCS-index 
trigger.  
1.2.2 Comparison of Basis Risk for the Hybrid Trigger and the Model-based Trigger 
    Using the aforementioned definitions on basis risk, the hybrid trigger, and the model-
based trigger, the conditions under which basis risk is less for the hybrid trigger than a 
model-based trigger are illustrated as follows:  
iii
i
MH LLLLL
LBRBR  ˆˆ
ˆ
          (1.5) 
Detailed analyses on the conditions are also conducted in section 1.6. The results are 
summarized graphically in Figure 1.2. The shaded areas demonstrate MH BRBR  , and the 
light areas represent MH BRBR  . Note that the x-axis and y-axis are different from those 
in Figure 1.1. X-axis is the ratio of the modeled individual loss to the actual individual 
loss while the y-axis is the ratio of the modeled industry loss to the actual industry loss.  
    In contrast to the comparison of basis risk between using the hybrid trigger and using 
the PCS index trigger, the comparison of basis risk between using the hybrid trigger and 
using the model-based trigger in CAT bonds becomes more challenging in the sense that 
the analyses consider not only the relative market share of losses predicted by modeling 
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firms to the actual market share of losses, but also the precision of modeling firm’s 
prediction on individual losses and on industry losses.  
    Figure 1.2 can be separated into four areas by 1
ˆ
1
ˆ 
L
Land
L
L
i
i , which imply the 
perfect prediction of the modeling firm on individual losses and industry losses, 
respectively. Area (1) ((2)) stands for the case that losses of the insurer are over-predicted 
(under-predicted) and losses of the industry that are under-predicted (over-predicted) by 
the modeling firm while area (3) ((4)) represents the case that both losses borne by the 
insurer and losses of the industry are under-predicted (over-predicted) by the modeling 
firm.  
    In area (1) and area (2), the hybrid trigger never has less basis risk than the model-
based trigger due to the inconsistent prediction on individual losses and industry losses 
regarding the actual loss. The model-based trigger involves only the prediction of 
individual losses, but the hybrid trigger is influenced by the prediction of both individual 
and industry losses. The inconsistent predictions twist the estimate of loss, and thereby 
raise basis risk for the hybrid trigger. In area (3) ((4)), where both individual and industry 
losses are under-predicted (over-predicted), the hybrid trigger has less basis risk than the 
model-based trigger only if the difference of the actual market share of losses and the 
modeled market share of losses is small enough. Specifically, 



 
L
LL
L
L
L
Lor
L
LL
L
L
L
L iiiiiiii ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ
. 
    ‘Hybrid-trigger favorable range’ is defined as the length in the shaded areas in Figure 2 
given a specific ratio of modeled loss to actual loss, either the individual loss or the 
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industry loss. For example, given that the ratio of the modeled individual loss to the 
actual individual loss is 0.5, the range is 1/3; whereas given that the same ratio is 1.5, the 
range becomes 2. This range reflects the positive signal in favor of using the hybrid 
trigger rather than using other triggers, in this case, the model-based trigger. With 
‘hybrid-trigger favorable range’, two asymmetry phenomena that are found in the shaded 
areas in Figure 1.2 can be explained more explicitly. 
The first phenomenon is associated with the asymmetry between the individual loss 
and the industry loss. More deviation from the perfect prediction on the individual loss 
expands the ‘hybrid-trigger favorable range’; however, more deviation from the perfect 
prediction on the industry loss reversely contracts the ‘hybrid-trigger favorable range’. 
This means that compared to model-based trigger, the hybrid trigger can tolerate more 
imprecision in estimating individual losses than in estimating industry losses. Moreover, 
it is more difficult to accurately estimate the individual loss than the industry loss due to 
the uncertainty of catastrophic losses across different risk-prone areas. The imprecision of 
predicted individual losses can be taken as the idiosyncratic risk while the imprecision of 
predicted industry losses can be regarded as the systematic risk. According to financial 
theory, the systematic risk is easier to be measured than the idiosyncratic risk. Thus, 
accurately estimating industry losses should generally be easier than accurately 
estimating individual losses for the modeling firm. The better accuracy of the industry 
loss along with the asymmetry between the individual loss and the industry loss strongly 
supports the argument that the hybrid trigger substantially reduces basis risk. This is a 
critical insight for insurers who seek CAT bond deals to cover catastrophic losses and are 
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concerned about basis risk because it provides theoretical evidence to promote the usage 
of the hybrid trigger. 
The second asymmetry phenomenon is present by comparing the ‘hybrid-trigger 
favorable range’ in the over-predicted area and in the under-predicted areas. The range in 
the over-predicted area increases convexly while the range in the under-predicted area 
increases concavely if the individual loss parallel deviated from the perfect prediction16. 
Similarly, for the industry loss, the range in the over-predicted area declines convexly 
while the range in under-predicted area declines concavely. These findings indicate that 
compared to model-based trigger, the hybrid trigger can tolerate more imprecision for 
over-estimated losses than for under-estimated losses. Insurers who apply hybrid trigger 
should prefer a higher projection on the individual and industry by the modeling firm, 
even if it is not accurate, so as to better manage basis risk. This is not to say that the 
hybrid trigger performs worst than the model-based trigger if losses are under-estimated. 
The hybrid-trigger favorable area (the shaded area) is still larger in the under-predicted 
area compared with the hybrid trigger unfavorable area (the light area).  
1.2.3 Basis Risk Analysis for Public Insurance/Reinsurance Program 
    Public sectors have been considered the last resort to absorbing catastrophic risks 
because they play an important role in guaranteeing insurability and should be 
responsible to provide disaster relief and assistance to victims after disasters. They also 
have quick access to cheap debt and the ability to diversify risks over the entire 
                                                            
16The hybrid-trigger favorable range is 1/3 if the ratio of the modeled individual loss to the actual 
individual loss is 0.5 while the range is 2 if the same ratio is 1.5. When the ratio of individual loss changes 
to 0.4, the range is 0.75. Nevertheless, as the same ratio parallel moves to 1.6, the range turn out to be 3. In 
the case of over-predicted area, the growth rate for a 0.1 level increase (from 1.5 to 1.6) in the ratio is 1 
(from 2 to 3), whereas in the under-predicted area, the growth rate for the same level decrease (from 0.5 to 
0.4) in the same ratio is only approximately 0.42 (from 0.33 to 0.75). 
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population and over future generations. Due to the nature of correlated risks and 
uncertainty in estimating impacts of radical natural disasters, public-private partnerships 
have been proposed to cover catastrophic risks17. Public insurance/reinsurance program is 
such an example. Representative ones include National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP)18 and Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF)19. 
    Like private insurers, public insurance program can also seek other instruments, such 
as CAT bonds, to effectively transfer a proportion of the insured losses to capital markets 
and expand their financial capacity20. Can the hybrid trigger still diminish basis risk 
compared with the other triggers, such as PCS-index trigger and the model-based trigger, 
for public insurance program? 
    We supposed that the public insurance program can be simplified as the monopolistic 
insurer, whose market share of losses is one. In this case, the hybrid trigger is simply 
equivalent to the PCS-index trigger. This can be verified in Figure 1.1. The whole space 
in Figure 1.1 turns out to be the northeast corner point, indicating no basis risk is present 
                                                            
17 Kunreuther (2006) and Kunreuther and Pauly (2006)  
18 NFIP was established in 1968 for spreading flood risks nationally in US. It was originally designed as a 
voluntary partnership between federal government and communities: local governments enacted floodplain 
management regulations while property owners in participating communities were eligible for federal flood 
insurance. For setting premiums and designating flood risks through different flood zones, flood insurance 
rate map (FIRM) was created by NFIP. Furthermore, NFIP also run the Community Rating System (CRS) 
to promote mitigations by providing premium discounts for communities implementing mitigation 
measures. Florida represents the greatest proportion of NFIP coverage, with 40% of the policies in US. 
Refer to Chapter 4 of Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) and Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2009) for the 
history, statistics, and characteristics of demand on the program. 
19 FHCF was established in 1992 in response to the threat of insurability after Hurricane Andrew. It 
provides catastrophe reinsurance to primary insurers underwriting property coverage in the state. This 
mandatory coverage program will reimburse a fixed percentage (45%, 75%, or 90%) of a participating 
insurer’s losses from each covered event in excess of a per event retention and subject to a maximum 
aggregate limit for all events. The capacity of FHCF has been expanded to $27.8 billion since January 2007. 
A detailed descriptions, payout calculation, and funding arrangement of FHCF are provided in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 13 of Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009)  
20 In 2006, the Mexican government issued a parametric-trigger CAT bond to cover future earthquake 
losses up to three years to address escalated frequency of earthquakes in that areas, which could drain 
financial capacity of Mexico’s Fund for Natural Disasters.  
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when using either the hybrid trigger or the PCS-index trigger. Nevertheless, the 
comparison of basis risk between the hybrid trigger and the model-based trigger in this 
extreme case suggests that the industry loss and the individual loss are the same. As can 
be seen in Figure 1.3, the whole space is condensed to the 45 degree line. Since the line 
lies within the ‘hybrid trigger favorable area’ (the shaded area), compared with model-
based trigger, the monopolistic insurer who use the hybrid trigger bears less basis risk. In 
sum, for the public insurance program, which is assumed to be the monopolistic insurer, 
the hybrid trigger has the same basis risk with the PCS-index trigger but has less basis 
risk than the model-based trigger. 
 
1.3 Basis Risk and Fair Values of CAT Bonds 
After analyzing the basis risk of using a hybrid trigger versus using a PCS index 
trigger and using a model-based trigger under different scenarios, it is natural to 
investigate the relationship between basis risk and fair values of CAT bonds with a 
hybrid trigger and other trigger types. Since the indemnity-based CAT bond produces no 
basis risk for insurers, it can be regarded as the benchmark to compare the effect of basis 
risk. CAT bonds with a non-indemnity trigger could be priced lower or higher than 
indemnity-based CAT bonds depending on the setting of parameters. Hence, given the 
same payoff structure, the difference in the fair values of CAT bonds with a non-
indemnity trigger and those with an indemnity trigger simply proxy the basis risk of the 
CAT bond with a non-indemnity trigger. The setting of loss dynamics, the contingent 
payoff, and fair values of CAT bonds are presented in the subsequent subsections.  
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1.3.1 Loss Model 
Since default risks of CAT bonds are not the focus of this study, we postulate that 
asset dynamics of insurers do not affect the value of CAT bonds21. Moreover, we set the 
interest rate to be constant. For specifying CAT losses, consistent with previous studies22, 
we apply the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA), which assumes that loss frequency and 
loss severity are both identically independently distributed (i.i.d.) and mutually 
independent. Although dependence and correlations among aggregate loss models have 
been explored in recent research papers23, especially in the operational risk area, we 
adopt the typical LDA approach, which assumes no correlations within and between loss 
frequency and loss severity for stressing the basis risk and avoiding unnecessary technical 
difficulties.  
    For indemnity-trigger, PCS index-trigger, model-based-trigger, and hybrid-trigger 
CAT bonds, the loss indices for each year are as follows: 
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21 Lee and Yu (2002) analyze default risks on the price of CAT bonds and thus assume asset dynamic for 
insurers.  
22 Baryshvikov, Mayo, and Taylor (2001), Lee and Yu (2002), Burnecki and Kukla (2003), and Härdle and 
Cabrera (2009) 
23 Recent papers include Frachot, Roncalli, and Salomon (2004), Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts, Neslehova 
(2006), and Lindskog and McNeil (2001). 
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i is the actual market share of losses for insurer i while iˆ  denotes the market share of 
losses for insurer i estimated by the CAT modeling firm. tN denotes the actual 
frequencies of hurricanes and is governed by Homogenous Poisson Process (HPP) with 
intensity  . jj YY ˆ,  stand for the actual and estimated loss severities from hurricane j, 
respectively. Here we assume that the basis risk essentially comes from the bias in 
estimating loss severity rather than the loss frequency for the modeling firms. 
1.3.2 Payoff of CAT Bonds 
    Contingent payoff of the coupon-paying CAT bond is supposed to be as follows. 
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K is the trigger point specified in the debt-forgiveness provisions of the CAT bond. tiL ,
~  
denotes the aggregate loss index of insurer i at time t. If the trigger type is a PCS 
index, LaL ii ~ , where ai is the contracted market share of losses for insurer i (typically 
set as the market share of insurer i in the insured area), and L is the PCS index (the actual 
industry losses); if the trigger type is model-based, ii LL ˆ
~  , which is the estimated loss of 
insurer i forecasted by the CAT modeling firm in the insured area; if the trigger type is a 
hybrid-trigger, L
L
LL ii  ˆ
ˆ~ , where Lˆ  is the estimated aggregate loss of the insurance 
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industry provided by the CAT modeling firm in the insured area. The face value or the 
principal of the CAT bond is F; c denotes the coupon rate; f is the fraction of coupon or 
principal payment if the forgiveness provision is triggered. The CAT bond matures at 
time T.  
1.3.3 Fair Values of CAT Bonds 
The fair value of CAT bonds can be derived by taking the discounted expectation of 
the contingent payoffs. In the case of zero-coupon CAT bonds, which pay no coupon 
before maturity, the implied coupon rates (or “default risks”) are reflected in the initial 
CAT bond prices. Higher “default risks” mean higher likelihood that the CAT bond is 
triggered, which drive down the price of the CAT bond. In other words, zero-coupon 
CAT bonds with lower prices are compensated with higher risk premiums. In contrast, 
since coupons are attached in the coupon-paying CAT bonds, prices are influenced by 
current level of interest rate and can not simply reflect potential “default risks” that are 
driven by trigger events. 
Given the payoff specified above, based on Cox and Pedersen (2000), the risk-
neutral price of CAT bonds can be presented as equation (1.11). 
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B (k) is the zero-coupon bond with maturity k, where k=1,…,T. τ is the first time 
that the trigger event occurs, τ=1,…,T.  kP   measures the probability that the trigger 
event does not occur during the first k periods while  kP   is the probability that the 
trigger event happens exactly at time k. In this study, the trigger event is defined as when 
the pre-determined loss proxy exceeds a threshold.  
        For specifying the trigger types, the prices of CAT bonds with different trigger types 
are shown as equation (1.12): 
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HMPCSI VandVVV ,,  HMPCSI and  ,,  represent fair values (the first time that the 
trigger event occurs) of CAT bonds with an indemnity trigger, with a PCS index trigger, 
with a model-based trigger, and with a hybrid trigger, respectively. The probabilities 
exhibited in the pricing formula are associated with the loss indices in the manners of 
(1.13) and (1.14): 
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It is worthwhile to note that CAT bonds have not been traded continuously in capital 
markets. Instead, they are traded by matching issuers and investors in the primary market. 
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The fair values presented here could be regarded as a reference in trading CAT bonds 
with different triggers despite the fact that CAT bond are empirically24 overpriced.  
1.3.4 Settings for Simulation 
    Monte Carlo Simulation can be conducted by setting a 1-in-100 year catastrophe, i.e. 
the annual probability of a catastrophe is 0.01. Thus, tN  is set to be a HHP with intensity 
rate 01.0 . Suppose ai denotes the market share of insurance business for an insurer i. 
Once a catastrophe strikes a target area, it causes the insurer an insured damage that is 
equivalent to a proportion of αi compared to the whole industry loss. Let actual share of 
the damage follows uniform distribution with mean 0.05, i.e.,  06.0,04.0~ Ui . The 
modeling firm’s prediction on the loss share is uniform distributed with mean i , which 
is different from the actual market share, i.e.     iii U  2.1,8.0~ˆ . Moreover, the 
actual loss and the estimated loss predicted by the catastrophic risk modeling firm for the 
whole industry is correlated by setting  jj YY ˆ,  to be bivariate lognormal distribution25 
with parameters 







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, where μ1=2 and σ=1. The correlation coefficient 
of the actual loss and the modeled loss, ρ, varies from 0.1 to 1.0 with an increment of 0.1. 
Suppose the face value of the CAT bond is $100, with coupon rate 0.05, and will mature 
                                                            
24 Lane and Maheul (2008) empirically examine the extent to which the catastrophic risk is overpriced 
based on 247 insurance-link securities issued after 1997. They found that the capital market generally 
estimates catastrophic risk premium to be 2 to 3 times the expected loss with and without conditioning on 
the market cycle. 
25 Bivariate g-and-h distribution could be another potential candidate to model the severity of losses. G-
and-h family of distributions, introduced by Tukey (1977), has been extensively used in finance field to 
model return on equity, including Badrinath and Chattejee (1988), Mills (1995), and Badrinath and 
Chatterjee (1991), interest rates and interest rate options, like Dutta and Babbel (2002, 2005), and 
operational risks, such as Dutta and Perry (2007). The attractiveness of this distribution is that it can span 
over almost all areas of skewness and kurtosis dimensions. In other words, it can fit almost all parametric 
distributions up to fourth moments. Loss severities show heavy-tailed shapes empirically. Thereby, g-and-h 
distribution seems to be the ideal model for aggregate losses. 
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in 5 years. The forgiven provision of the CAT bond will be triggered if the loss is greater 
than L . L takes values from 0.2 to 2.0 with an increment of 0.2. The trigger event causes 
the payments of coupon and principal being reduced to 20% of the original level.   
1.3.5 Simulation Results 
1.3.5.1 PCS-index CAT Bond and Hybrid-trigger CAT Bond 
    According to the analysis in section 1.2.1, PCS-index CAT bonds possess less basis 
risk than hybrid-trigger CAT bonds if the contracted share of loss is accidently more 
close to actual share of loss for the insurer than the market share of loss projected by the 
modeling firm. For conducting the simulation, two cases are considered: (1) the 
discrepancy between the contracted share of loss and the actual share of loss is greater 
than the discrepancy between the modeled share of loss and the actual share of loss. 
Specifically,  07.0,02.0  iia   (2) the discrepancy between the contracted share of loss 
and the actual share of loss is smaller than the discrepancy between the modeled share of 
loss and the actual share of loss. Specifically, 08.0,07.0  iia  . To simplify the 
comparison, the actual industry loss is assumed to have the same mean with the modeled 
predicted industry loss, i.e., 221   .  
    Table 1.1(1.2) exhibits the simulation results of case (1) ((2)). Panel A, B, and C shows 
the fair values of indemnity-based, PCS-index, and hybrid-trigger CAT bonds, 
respectively while Panel D (E) presents the price differential between the indemnity-
based CAT bond and the PCS-index (hybrid-trigger) CAT bond. The quantities in Panel 
D and Panel E are the most critical results in these tables. The comparison of the absolute 
values of the quantities in Panel D and in Panel E reflects the relative basis risk using 
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PCS-index CAT bonds and hybrid-trigger CAT bonds. The absolute values of the 
numbers in Panel D of Table 1.1(1.2) are greater (less) than those in Panel E, meaning 
that the insurers who apply PCS-index CAT bonds to transfer their exposure to 
catastrophic risks bear more (less) basis risk than if they issue hybrid-trigger CAT bonds. 
Generally, the projection of the modeling firm should be more precise than the contracted 
market share that is determined at the initiation of CAT bond deals because modeling 
firms dynamically update information on catastrophic risks. The situation of case (2) may 
occur simply by luck or due to the mismatch of actual loss and the modeled loss. These 
results are essentially consistent with the analytical results in section 1.2.1. A comparison 
of basis risk resulted from using hybrid-trigger CAT bonds and PCS-index CAT bonds 
basically depends on the market share of loss projected by catastrophic risk modeling 
firms and the market share of loss pre-determined in the contract. If the actual market 
share of loss turns out to be closer to the projected market share than the pre-determined 
market share, hybrid-trigger CAT bonds is favorable over PCS-index CAT bonds, and 
vice versa. Figure 1.4 (1.6) shows the difference of prices between indemnity-base CAT 
bonds and PCS-index CAT bonds while Figure 1.5 (1.7) demonstrates the difference of 
prices between indemnity-based CAT bonds and hybrid-trigger CAT bonds in case (1) 
(case(2)).   
1.3.5.2 Model-based CAT Bond and Hybrid-trigger CAT Bond 
    In order to verify the analytical results derived in section 1.2.2, the setting of μ2 and 
i are based on the four cases: (3) The pair  08.0,8.12  i  corresponds 
to        LELELELE ii  ˆ,ˆ . (4) The pair  02.0,2.22  i  corresponds 
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to        LELELELE ii  ˆ,ˆ . (5) The pair  02.0,8.12  i  corresponds 
to        LELELELE ii  ˆ,ˆ . (6) The pair  08.0,2.22  i  corresponds 
to        LELELELE ii  ˆ,ˆ .  
    The prices of CAT bonds with different triggers are shown in Figure 1.8-1.11. Since 
the basic patterns are similar for the four cases, only the case (3) is illustrated.  
Table 1.3-1.6 report parts of the simulation results in four cases. Fair values of 
indemnity-based, model-based, and hybrid-trigger CAT bonds are presented in Panel A, 
B, and C, respectively. Panel D (E) provides the difference of prices between the 
indemnity-based CAT bond and the model-based (hybrid-trigger) CAT bond. A higher 
value on the absolute value of the quantities in Panel D compared to the absolute value of 
the corresponding quantities in Panel E indicates that model-based CAT bonds have 
higher basis risk than hybrid-trigger CAT bonds. As anticipated, hybrid-trigger CAT 
bonds have more basis risk because the predictions on individual losses and industry 
losses of catastrophic risk modeling firm show inconsistency (overestimate one while 
underestimate the other) for most simulation samples in case (3) and (4); however, 
holding hybrid-trigger CAT bonds is more likely to diminish basis risk in case (5) and 
(6). In addition, the reduction of basis risk for hybrid-trigger CAT bonds is more 
pronounced in case (6) than in case (5), concordant with the second asymmetry 
phenomenon in section 1.2.2. The ability of diminishing basis risk for hybrid-trigger 
CAT bonds is stronger if losses are over-predicted than if losses are under-predicted. 
Take the case where the correlation coefficient is 0.5 and the threshold is 1 as an 
example. In Table 1.5, the measure of basis risk of a hybrid-trigger CAT bond is 0.0835, 
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lower than that of a model-based CAT bond, which takes value 0.091. In contrast, in 
Table 1.6, the measure of basis risk of a hybrid-trigger CAT is 0.0862 while that of a 
model-based CAT bond is 0.1394. Thus, a much greater reduction in basis risk can be 
observed if most simulation loss samples are overestimated (case (6)) than 
underestimated (case (5)).  
    The discrepancies of the prices of model-based (hybrid-trigger) CAT bonds and 
indemnity-based CAT bonds are important measures of basis risk, so they are exhibited 
separately for four cases in Figure 1.12-1.19. A crucial finding through these figures is 
that prices of CAT bonds and basis risk are more responsive to the threshold than the 
correlation. Basis risk can be greatly reduced in the presence of a higher threshold, 
meaning that insurers who hedge catastrophic risk by means of the model-based or 
hybrid-trigger CAT bonds can substantially reduce basis risk by raising the threshold at 
the inception of the deal rather than focusing on the precision of the projected industry 
loss provided by the modeling firms. Another finding can be observed by making two 
pairs of comparisons: the comparison between case (3) and case (5) and the comparison 
between case (4) and case (6). Basis risk is higher in case (4) (case (5)) than that in case 
(6) (case (3)) if the threshold of CAT bonds is low. This implies that a lower threshold 
tends to raise basis risk when the modeling firm under-predicts the market share of 
individual loss compared to when it over-predicts the market share of individual loss. 
When the threshold is set to be low, insurers will bear more basis risk if the modeling 
firm projects market share of loss that is lower than actual share of loss. These 
implications are important for insurers to manage basis risk when they use CAT bonds as 
a hedging instrument to transfer catastrophic risks to capital markets. It is a best situation 
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for insurers if they can issue CAT bonds with higher thresholds; however, if markets 
prefer CAT bonds with lower thresholds, insurers who issue those bonds have to alert the 
prediction of the individual loss. In terms of basis risk, it is more detrimental for insurers 
as the catastrophic risk modeling firm tends to under-predict rather than over-predict their 
shares of losses within the industry. 
 
1.4 Conclusions and Discussion 
    Moral hazard and basis risk are two major problems that impede the development of 
CAT bond markets. Investors are concerned about moral hazard when they trade 
indemnity-based CAT bonds while insurers may face basis risk when they issue CAT 
bonds with triggers determined by an external index. Both create dead-weight-loss to the 
social welfare26. A product that can ameliorate these two problems at the same time will 
create value. Because hybrid trigger is constructed by two external indices, investors 
would unconcern about moral hazard if it is used to determine the loss in CAT bond 
deals. Nevertheless, insurers may hesitate to issue this type of CAT bonds due to the 
inherent basis risk. Less basis risk will reduce the hedging cost to insurers. Insurers can 
thus focus on their core businesses without paying too much attention on hedging basis 
risk. But it is not clear when the hybrid trigger will reduce basis risk compared with other 
                                                            
26 More specifically, for moral hazard, if the trigger can be controlled by insurers, as in the case of 
indemnity-based CAT bonds, when the loss is less than but close to the threshold, insurers will take 
advantage of investors by inputting less effort in loss control in order to trigger the CAT bond. Investors 
know that insurers will behave in this way so would purchase less CAT bonds. For basis risk, investors 
may want insurers to use CAT bonds as a hedge because CAT bonds not only may provide a higher return 
but also have low correlations with the existing asset classes. However, insurers may be less willing to 
issue CAT bonds due to their concern with basis risk. Investors will be worse off than if insurers issues 
CAT bonds as a new asset class. In both cases, CAT bond deals will transfer less risk than the optimal level 
when the market is efficient (no moral hazard and no basis risk). 
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triggers. (e.g. PCS index and modeled-based triggers.) The hybrid trigger is determined 
by the market share of loss predicted by the catastrophic risk modeling firms and the PCS 
index. The principal advantage of hybrid-trigger CAT bonds is that it is claimed to avoid 
moral hazard and diminish basis risk simultaneously, but no analysis has been conducted 
with respect to its basis risk. This is the first paper that provides analytical results along 
with simulation evidence on the conditions that the hybrid trigger effectively reduces 
basis risk for insurers. Based on my analyses, the accuracy of the modeled loss relative to 
the actual loss at the industry level and at the individual level is critical in determining the 
relative performance of hybrid trigger in terms of basis risk.      
    Two types of triggers that involve the formation of hybrid trigger are eligible for the 
comparison: the PCS-index trigger and the model-based trigger. The analytical results 
shows that the hybrid trigger has lower basis risk than PCS-index trigger as long as the 
market share of loss predicted by the modeling firm is more accurate than the pre-
determined market share of loss. However, the hybrid trigger never produces less basis 
risk than the model-based trigger if the industry loss and individual loss exhibit 
inconsistency for the actual loss and the predicted loss by the modeling firm 
(overestimate one while underestimate the other). In the case of consistency between the 
actual loss and the modeled loss, when the projection on the industry loss is more precise 
than the projection on the individual loss, the hybrid trigger could substantially reduce 
basis risk compared with the model-based trigger. Moreover, insurers should prefer 
overestimated losses to underestimated losses.  
    Due to the absence of basis risk for the indemnity-trigger CAT bonds, they are taken as 
the benchmark to gauge the basis risk of CAT bonds with different triggering structures. 
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The proxy of basis risk for the non-indemnity CAT bonds is simply the difference 
between fair values of non-indemnity CAT bonds and indemnity-based CAT bonds.  
    The simulation results support our analyses on the basis risk of the hybrid trigger in 
comparisons with both the PCS-index trigger and the model-based trigger. These results 
are robust with respect to different thresholds and correlations between the actual loss 
and modeled loss. Additionally, the proxy of basis risk is more sensitive to the threshold 
than the correlation. This suggests that the insurers who use hybrid-trigger CAT bonds 
should pay attention to the level of threshold rather than the accuracy of the modeled 
industry loss. In the case of CAT bond deals with a lower threshold, insurers will 
encounter more basis risk if modeled losses are under-estimated than if they are over-
estimated.  
    In this study, we analyze the basis risk of different triggers in terms of the discrepancy 
between the realized loss and the losses implied by different triggers. However, the 
realized losses cannot be observed until the loss. Prior to the losses being realized, we can 
only estimate the modeled loss and the actual loss by loss distributions. Like in 
simulations, we can only specify the expected modeled losses being greater than the 
expected actual losses, but cannot guarantee that all modeled loss samples exceed actual 
loss samples. Thus, the simulations only provide general results regarding the analyses on 
basis risk. In order to explore the statistical properties that will a trigger lower basis risk, 
we need to assign loss distributions to the modeled loss and the actual loss and define 
basis risk as the expected value of the discrepancy between these two losses. We can then 
start to analyze practical problems such as the impact of the correlation of actual losses 
and modeled losses on the basis risk with different triggers, the impact of volatilities of 
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industry losses and individual losses on the basis risk with different triggers, and the 
optimal conditions under which a specific trigger will have less basis risk.  
    Even with this drawback, my analysis provides valuable information for financial 
institutions who hedge catastrophic risk through CAT bonds. Under some circumstances, 
hybrid-trigger CAT bonds provide a better hedge choice among the existing CAT bonds 
against basis risk. First, if an insurer is considering hedge with PCS-index CAT bonds 
and believes that the market share of losses predicted by the modeling firms is more 
likely close to the actual market share of losses than what the contract indicates, hybrid-
trigger CAT bonds will be a better choice. Second, if an insurer wants to hedge with 
modeled-based CAT bonds and believes that the modeling firm will estimate the industry 
loss very well and will overestimate (or underestimate) the industry loss and the 
individual loss at the same time, he will be better off to choose hybrid-trigger CAT 
bonds. But, if the insurer believes that the modeling firm will overestimate 
(underestimate) industry losses but underestimate (overestimate) individual losses, he 
should stick to the modeled-based CAT bonds.   
    The major results and findings in this study are useful for insurers and financial 
institutions involving the transactions of CAT bonds. Especially, they provide insights to 
insurers who would like to proactively manage basis risk when issuing CAT bonds with 
hybrid trigger or other triggering structures. However, the simulation results may not 
robust with respect to different settings of loss distributions. Further analysis on the basis 
risk using different loss distributions would be helpful to clarify that under which 
statistical property will the hybrid trigger has lower basis risk. 
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Appendix 
1.5 Analysis on the Conditions where the Hybrid Trigger Has Less Basis 
Risk than the PCS Index  
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The shaded areas Figure 1.20 depict the conditions under which basis risk is lower for the 
hybrid trigger compared to the PCS-index trigger in the case where a=0.2. Areas (1)-(4) 
are corresponding to the four areas we described above. These areas are divided by two 
intersected lines, 2.0ˆ
ˆ  a
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1.6 Analysis on the Conditions where the Hybrid Trigger Has Less Basis 
Risk than the Model-based Trigger  
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Figure 1.21 shows the conditions under which basis risk is lower for hybrid-trigger CAT 
bonds compared to mode CAT bonds in the shaded areas. Areas (1)-(4), as defined 
above, are divided by the two lines: 1
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L . Note that the areas (1)-(4) 
defined here are not consistent with the four areas in the context and in Figure 1.2 and 
Figure 1.3. The aim for defining the areas here is simply for calculation convenience. 
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Chapter 2 
Parimutuel Insurance for Hedging against Catastrophic 
Risk 
 
2.1 Introduction 
    People and firms can insure against catastrophes such as hurricanes in the United 
Sates. However, for various reasons, this market does have limited capacity. This 
limitation is due to many factors; the high geographic concentration of insured risk; state 
regulatory strategies that constrain prices, and various types of transaction costs. To 
supplement the insurance market, a very different type of financial instrument has 
recently emerged for taking positions on hurricane landfalls; this is a parimutuel market 
place and the new instruments are knows as HuRLOs (Hurricane Risk Landfall Options). 
While this structure resembles parimutuel horse race betting, the reasoning behind the 
opening of the HuRLO market was to provide further hedging capacity to those exposed 
to risk.  
    The new HuRLO instruments can be classified as an Insurance Linked Securities 
(ILS’s), thus supplementing the existing instruments such as industry loss warranties, 
catastrophe options, and catastrophe bonds. These existing ILS’s are targeted at insurance 
companies and large investors. Insurers use ILS’s to provide hedge capacity 
(supplementary to reinsurance), and for portfolio diversification. And investors, such as 
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hedge funds, are now treating natural catastrophe risk as a new asset class that has a 
potential for high returns and which has low correlations with existing asset classes.  
What is very different about the HuRLOs, is that while they can be used by similar 
stakeholders (insurance companies and large investors), they is now being made available 
to smaller players such as individual householders and small businesses. The reason for 
targeting these smaller players is to supplement existing insurance protection which may 
be limited. Such limitations can occur in various ways such as large deductibles, the 
effects of regulatory cross subsidies built into premiums, or the failure of business 
interruption insurance to make payments unless the policyholder’s own property is 
damaged.  
    On its face, a parimutuel does not seem an ideal instrument for hedging since it has 
inbuilt basis risk. Payments do not depend on whether the individual suffers a financial 
loss, only on a hurricane landfall occurs in the location chosen. However, we will show 
that, for quite reasonable parameters, these parimutuel “bets” might sometimes offer 
higher expected utility to risk-averse householders or small business owners, than 
traditional insurance. The issue boils down to a trade-off between basis risk and 
transaction costs. We will show that, for individuals with rather representative levels of 
risk aversion, HuRLOs might offer higher expected utility than traditional insurance, 
when the insurance transaction costs exceed 20-25%.  
The parimutuel mechanism was invented by Pierre Oller in 1865 as a betting system 
which guarantees a fixed profit for bookmakers. Nowadays, the parimutuel wagering 
system is adopted in at least 37 nations worldwide with trading volume up to $100 billion 
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per year. Since 2002, various investment banks27 have also employed the parimutuel 
mechanism in trading options on economic statistics, such as the US non-farm payroll 
report, Euro-zone harmonized inflation, and speed at which the Fannie Mae mortgage 
pool receives prepayment. Most recently, on October 7th, 2008, an innovative commodity 
option that applies the parimutuel was launched by Weather Risk Solutions, LLC (WRS); 
it is called Hurricane Risk Landfall Options (HuRLOs)28. The HuRLO market provides 
individuals the opportunity to hedge against, or speculate on, the risk that a specific 
region in the Gulf of Mexico and on the East Coast of the U.S. between the Mexican and 
Canadian borders will either be first hit by a hurricane or no hurricane will occur during a 
year. The HuRLOs market opened in early January 2009, continues into the hurricane 
season, and closes when a hurricane makes landfall or no hurricane makes landfall before 
the middle of December among the covered regions29. As a hurricane approaches so close 
to a specific region that the National Hurricane Center (NHC) issues a hurricane warning, 
trading will be suspended until the hurricane makes landfall or the imminent threat of the 
hurricane landfall abates. The risk pools are separated for different series of a hurricane’s 
landfall. For example, participants in Series 1 (2) HuRLOs involve the risk of the landing 
of the first (second) hurricane.  
                                                            
27 Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs introduced the first Parimutuel Derivative Call Auctions of options 
on economic data releases, including employment, industrial production, economic growth, inflection, etc.  
28 In 2008, HuRLOs trade via the WRS electronic trading platform on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
Alternative Marketplace, Inc.’s (CME AM) exempt board of trade (EXBOT) and are cleared by the CME. 
Their prices are determined first based on the historical hurricane risk database and then interact 
dynamically by trading decisions made by all participants via a mathematical adaptive control algorithm 
that adjusts in a way that makes the selected outcome in the last trade more expensive and other outcomes 
less expensive. Detailed procedures of the algorithm are presented in Meyer et al. (2008).  
29 In 2008, HuRLOs market began in the latter part of the hurricane season.  
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In order to facilitating the transaction of HuRLOs, WRS also provides market-based 
and forecast-based landfall probabilities for each covered region on its website30. Market-
based probabilities that reflect the price for a single option will change with each 
purchase in a particular risk pool. Forecast-based probabilities are estimated based on 
historical data and current weather conditions. When no current hurricane is identified, 
these estimates simply reflect historical information; otherwise, these probabilities are 
based on current NHC forecast data.  
Both hedgers who possess assets in the hazard-prone areas, and speculators who would 
like to bet on which covered area will first be hit by a hurricane, may be interested in 
trading HuRLOs. The participation of speculators enhances the market liquidity and 
expands risk pools. While, in this paper, we only address hedgers, a paper by Meyer et al. 
(2008) examines the parimutuel market with only speculators. They test empirically the 
HuRLO market in a controlled laboratory experiment, where participants are allowed to 
buy HuRLOs to maximize their profits in a simulated hurricane season. With limited 
trading experience, market prices converge quickly to objective probabilities of hurricane 
landfalls, suggesting that these trades act efficiently. Most potential investment 
anomalies31 are not empirically verified. However, the boomerang bias, where the “no 
                                                            
30 http://www.weatherrisksolutions.com/ 
31 Investment anomalies examined include procrastination biases, distorted beliefs about probabilities, 
speculative bubbles, and false-alarm biases. Procrastination represents investors’ preference for purchasing 
HuRLOs until a storm is formed and threatens a specific area. This bias could decrease the size of a 
mutualized risk pool and increase the uncertainty to returns. Although the HuRLO market provides 
objective landfall probability for each area, a distorted belief about probabilities could arise due to the 
perception bias of investors. Speculators believe that the higher price of HuRLOs in a specific area relative 
to its objective probability could reflect the private information held by other investors, further raising the 
option price and creating bubbles to the price. False-alarm bias describes the situation where no landfall in 
a specific area that was thought to be likely would discourage later investment in that area.  
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landfall” option is overpriced immediately after a hurricane passes through a specific 
region, is observed according to the experimental results.  
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the introduction of the parimutuel 
mechanism. Section 2.3 compares parimutuels with traditional insurance. In Section 2.4, 
given that stakes from others are exogenous, we formulate a model for a risk-averse 
individual who would like to hedge against potential hurricane risk by parimutuels and 
analyze his optimal stake choice. Section 2.5 considers the case in which a risk-averse 
representative hedger uses parimutuels to insure his potential loss from a hurricane. The 
equilibrium of parimutuel stake and the comparative static analysis are provided. Section 
2.6 summarizes the pros and cons of parimutuel insurance. Section 2.7 discusses the role 
of speculators. Section 2.8 estimates the equivalent transaction costs of traditional 
insurance relative to HuRLOs. Section 2.9 concludes. 
 
2.2 The Parimutuel Mechanism 
The parimutuel mechanism is a betting system where bettors wager on one of the 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive possible outcomes before the race begins. As the 
outcome of the race is realized, the total stakes of bettors are distributed among the 
bettors who wager on the winner of the race, in proportion to the initial stakes. Bettors 
who wager on other horses lose their stakes. In practice, bookmakers usually deduct a 
certain percentage of the total amount of stakes as taxes and transaction fees, called the 
track take. Suppose there are S exhaustive and mutually exclusive outcomes with ms 
wagers on outcome s, where s=1, 2…, S. As outcome k turns out to be the winner, each 
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bettor who wagers on outcome k receives k
S
s
s mm
1
 for each dollar he wagered; while 
bettors who wager on outcomes other than k receive nothing. To put it differently, the 
winning bet is refunded with his original stake and an extra return stemming from equally 
sharing the stakes of the losers. This extra return, k
ks
s mm

, also known as odds, shows 
the net return that will be paid out to the bettor, should he win, relative to his stake.  
A framework of the mathematical principles of parimutuel pricing and their 
implications is presented in Baron and Lange (2007). These include the arbitrage-free and 
the self-hedging principles. The arbitrage-free principle describes two conditions under 
which parimutuel participants can not profit without taking any risk: the price of each 
state is positive, and the prices of all states are summed to be one. The former condition 
precludes the possibility of making profit by wagering on any single state, whereas the 
latter rules out the possibility of making profit by wagering on all states simultaneously. 
The self-hedging principle states that all payouts of the parimutuel game come from the 
initial wagers. Without a transaction fee and tax, the parimutuel mechanism is a zero-sum 
game for participants. This feature appeals to market makers, who bear no risk. By these 
two principles, the price of the state s claim (or the implied probability of state s) is the 
proportion of stakes wagered on the state s relative to the stakes wagered across all states. 
Given that the total stakes across all states are the same, the relative stakes wagered on 
these states reflect the relative prices of the state claims. More stakes wagered on one 
state relative to another represent a higher price of the state relative to the other. This 
property is referred to as the relative-demand pricing since the stakes wagered on a state 
claim just reflect its relative demand.  
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Because horse racing was the earliest and the most popular wagering system to adopt 
the parimutuel mechanism, we demonstrate the general procedures on horse racing. The 
wagering period begins 20 to 30 minutes before the upcoming race starts and closes as 
soon as the race starts. During that period, bettors submit their target horse and wagers to 
bet. Payoff to the winning bet is announced after the race is finished and the official 
results are finalized. The odds, standing for the bettor’s net returns on the specific horse, 
are inversely related to the state prices (or implied probability of that state). If all other 
conditions remain constant, the more wagers there are on one horse, the lower the odds 
are against that horse, but the higher the odds are against the other horses. Typically, the 
odds are exhibited on the track tote board in the form of odds to 1. During the wagering 
period, odds change over time with incoming wagers on different horses. Only the final 
odds, revealed at the end of the wagering period, reflect the net returns of the bets on 
horses. In this sense, bettors do not exactly know the claim price (or payoff) when they 
place their bet, and only find out when the wagering period closes.  
In addition to wagering on a horse to win, bettors can wager on a horse to place or to 
show, where the bettors win the game if their target horse ends up in the top two or three 
positions, respectively. In practice, the win, place, and show wagers are pooled 
separately. This separate pooling creates arbitrage opportunities and reduces liquidity. As 
a result, extensive studies have been devoted to searching for systematic strategies to beat 
the parimutuel game32.  
                                                            
32 With a high track take, approximately 15-25% of aggregate wagers, making a profit based on the odds 
and information inside the wagering pools seems to be a daunting task. However, Hausch, Ziemba, and 
Rubinstein (1981), Hausch and Ziemba (1985), and Ziemba and Hausch (1987) discovered profitable 
strategies, widely known as the “Dr. Z system”, based on their finding that horses likely to win are underbet 
in place and show wagers. Asch, Malkiel, and Quandt (1984, 1986) and Asch and Quandt (1986) developed 
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Like capital markets, wagering markets contain a large number of participants and a 
variety of information sources. In addition, they have a well-defined termination point 
where eventual payoffs are determined. This feature offers economists an ideal 
environment to examine market efficiency and to observe human behavior under 
conditions of uncertainty. In contrast, security prices in capital markets change 
continuously and are affected by various uncertain factors, such as the future cash flow of 
firms and relative demand/supply structure in the markets.  
Several market anomalies33 have been observed in examining the market efficiency 
hypothesis of wagering markets. The most common one is the favorite-longshot bias, in 
Griffith (1949) and subsequent papers34. This bias is characterized by favorites (horses 
with short odds to win) that win more frequently than the odds predict and longshots 
(horses with long odds to win) that win less frequently than the odds predicts. 
Consistent with the convex empirical utility function constructed by Weitzman (1965) 
and Ali (1977), the favorite-longshot bias reflects the risk-seeking behavior of 
participants in wagering markets. Since the expected returns on the favorites are higher 
than those on the longshots, bettors could make profits by wagering on favorites rather 
than on longshots. Although recent papers35 do not empirically support the favorite-
longshot bias in the US and other countries, a great number of theories have been 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
another strategies based on their finding that late bets contain information about the horses’ eventual 
ranking. The more informed bettors tend to make wagers at the end of the wagering period since an early 
bet would adversely affects the parimutuel odds. In recent years, the frequent use of those strategies has 
reduced the effectiveness significantly. 
33 Three empirical regularities are summarized in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2005c): the puzzle of early 
betting, late informed betting, and favorite-longshot bias. 
34 Hausch, Lo, and Ziemba (1994) summarized the empirical articles that provide evidence for favorite-
longshot bias. 
35 Busche and Wall (2000), Busche and Hall (1988), Busche (1994), Gandar, Zuber, and Johnson (2001), 
Bjorkman and Bukszar (2003) are such examples. 
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formulated to explain this phenomenon36. Basically, these theories can be categorized as 
two sets: risk-loving utility functions and misperceptions of probabilities. Based on the 
empirical tests of Snowberg and Wolfers (2007), the favorite-longshot bias is more likely 
driven by the misperceptions of probability, as suggested by the Prospect Theory, rather 
than by risk-loving utility.  
 
2.3 Comparing Parimutuels and Traditional Insurance  
  Parimutuels aggregate purchases into a mutualized risk pool and reallocate risks among 
all participants; as indeed does insurance. In order to compare the cash flows of 
parimutuel participants and those of traditional insurance policyholders, we divide the 
event space into four disjoint outcomes:  
(1) No hurricane occurs  
(2) A hurricane hits areas outside the target area  
(3) A hurricane hits the target area but causes no damage to the policyholder’s asset  
(4) A hurricane hits the target area and destroys the policyholder’s asset 
  Cash flows of traditional policyholders and cash flows of parimutuel participants in 
these disjoint outcomes are depicted in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, respectively. Premium 
                                                            
36 Griffith (1949) ascribed to individuals’ systematic undervaluation of favorites and overvaluation of 
longshots. Ali (1977) suggested that risk-seeking bettors are willing to accept lower returns for longshots. 
Hurley and McDonough (1995) proposed that a considerable track take reduces informed bettors’ arbitrage 
opportunity, leading to few bets on favorites. Shin (1991;1992) argued that fixed-odds-betting bookmakers 
would prevent losses of the informed bettors. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2005c) noted that with a large 
number of bettors possessing some private information, posterior odds are more extreme than market odds, 
resulting in the bias. This paper also compared the merits and drawbacks among the theories described 
above. 
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denotes the premium of the traditional insurance; L is the potential loss; x* is the 
parimutuel stake; I represents the indemnity. Thus, net indemnity is simply (I-x*).   
  For outcomes (1)-(4) of Figure 2.1, the net cash flows of traditional insurance are the 
same if I=L. The indemnity is received by policyholders only when the actual loss is 
incurred (i.e., outcome (4)), but the indemnity offset the actual loss37. Thus, cash flows 
for policyholders of traditional insurance are negative (i.e., the insurance premiums) 
across four outcomes.  
  Cash flows of parimutuels are summarized as follows. 
 In outcome (1), the cash flow is zero.  
Stakes are returned to participants if no hurricane occurs.  
 In outcome (2), the cash flow is a negative parimutuel stake.  
Parimutuel stakes are paid out; no indemnity is obtained by the participants since the 
hurricane does not hit the target area.  
 In outcome (3), the cash flow is the net indemnity, or the indemnity minus the 
parimutuel stake.  
Parimutuel stakes are paid out; the indemnity is received since the hurricane hit the 
target area; no loss is incurred because the hurricane did not destroy the participant’s 
asset.  
 In scenario (4), the cash flow is net indemnity minus the loss. 
                                                            
37 Based on Mossin’s theorem, if proportional insurance is available at a fair price, without loading factor 
and default risk, full insurance is optimal for a risk-averse individual. 
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Parimutuel stakes are paid out; the indemnity is received since the hurricane hit the 
target area; the loss comes from the hurricane’s destruction of the participant’s asset.  
  A comparison of cash flows between parimutuel participants and insurance 
policyholders indicates that in outcomes (1) and (3), parimutuels are better than 
traditional insurances, but in outcomes (2) and (4), there is no monotone relation. For 
outcomes (1) and (3), this result is straightforward. The cash flows of parimutuel 
participants are zero in outcome (1) and positive in outcome (3) 38, respectively, whereas 
the cash flows of insurance policyholders are both negative. For outcome (2), the net cash 
flow depends on the relative size of the parimutuel stake and the insurance premium. If 
the insurance premium is greater than the parimutuel stake, parimutuels are better. For 
outcome (4), parimutuels are better whenever the insurance premium is greater than the 
loss minus the net parimutuel indemnity, i.e.,  *xILpremium  . We use the 
following two examples to illustrate the comparison of cash flows in outcomes (2) and 
(4). In the first example, suppose that the probability of a hurricane’s occurrence is very 
small and the insurance premium is less than the parimutuel stake39. The parimutuel is 
worse than the traditional insurance under outcomes (2) and (4). In the second example, 
suppose the probability of a hurricane’s occurrence is high enough so that the insurance 
premium is greater than the parimutuel stake40; the parimutuel is better than the 
traditional insurance under outcome (2). Furthermore, if the probability of a hurricane’s 
                                                            
38 Net indemnity is positive; otherwise, nobody has the incentive to purchase insurance. 
39 As shown in Section 4, parimutuel stakes are not affected by the probability of a hurricane’s occurrence, 
but the insurance premium decreases with the lower probability. 
40 Similar to footnote 14, parimutuel stakes are not affected by the probability of a hurricane’s occurrence, 
but the insurance premium increases with the higher probability 
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occurrence is higher such that the insurance premium is greater than the loss minus net 
indemnity, i.e.,  *xILpremium  , the parimutuel is better in all outcomes.  
 
2.4 Optimal Parimutuel Stakes  
Suppose a risk-averse individual participates in the parimutuel mechanism to hedge 
against his potential loss from a hurricane in area s without transaction fees and taxes. We 
will refer to such hedging as “parimutuel insurance”. W is the initial wealth of the 
individual, L is the loss that the individual will bear if a hurricane hits area s where his 
asset is located, ph is the probability of the occurrence of a hurricane, ps is the conditional 
probability of a hurricane hitting area s given that it actually occurs, pi is the conditional 
probability the hurricane destroys the individual’s asset in area s given that it hits area s. 
Here, all probabilities and conditional probabilities are assumed to be objective and are 
known to the individual. “x” is the stake that the individual places to hedge against the 
potential damage of his asset in area s under the parimutuel mechanism. ms(x) is the total 
stakes collected from those who purchase parimutuel insurance on area s while M(x) 
represents the total stakes of individuals across all areas.  
Parimutuels define the payout over an exhaustive set of outcomes. To satisfy this 
property, the event space is defined to include a set of counties where the first landfall 
may occur, plus a null event where no hurricane occurs in any of the counties. If the 
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hurricane does not occur, the stakes gathered are distributed proportionally to each 
participant based on the initial stake41.  
We further define the odds and their relation with the payoff to parimutuel participants 
if the hurricane hits area s. The final odds against area s and the total stakes on areas 
outside area s over the total stakes on area s are denoted as )(xOs  
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price of parimutuel insurance in area s, which is a function of x since the price alters as 
the individual places his stake. Furthermore, given the individual’s stake on area s, x, the 
net indemnity of the parimutuel stake if the hurricane hits area s, is denoted as NIs(x). The 
relations among the net indemnity, the odds, the payoff, and the price of parimutuel claim 
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41 This setting is different from that in the HuRLO market, where the exhaustive and disjoint outcomes 
include 78 regions with a potential hurricane threat and one “no landfall” outcome. Participants can also 
place stakes on the “no landfall” outcome. If the no hurricane makes landfall during a year, participants 
who place stakes on “no landfall” share all stakes based on their initial stakes.  
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Our goal is to obtain the optimal parimutuel stake that the individual chooses during 
the wagering period. In this section, when an individual places this stake, the stakes of 
other participants across all areas are assumed to have been revealed to the public so that 
the individual has perfect information on odds across all areas prior to his decision. This 
assumption is equivalent to a situation where the individual places his stake at the end of 
the wagering period after all other participants have placed their stakes. Although this 
assumption seems to be unrealistic, we start with a simple case. The functional forms of 
ms(x) and M(x) are further specified as ms(x)=m0+x, M(x)=M0+m0+x, where m0 denotes 
the total stakes on area s placed by other participants, and M0 denotes the total stakes 
outside area s. In order to derive the optimal stake, the individual maximizes his own 
expected utility function:  
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It is straightforward to confirm that the second order condition is negative42, and that x* 
satisfying F.O.C. is a global maxima, and hence, the optimal parimutuel insurance stake 
for the individual. The F.O.C. can also be presented as: 
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where Wns is the individual’s wealth when a hurricane hits an area outside area s, and Ws 
is the individual’s wealth when a hurricane hits area s no matter whether it causes 
damage to the individual’s asset in area s or not. If the individual’s stake does not 
influence the odds against area s43, the left hand side of the F.O.C. represents the 
reciprocal of odds against area s (or the ratio of the conditional probability of a hurricane 
hitting area s to the conditional probability of a hurricane not hitting area s), i.e. 
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. Replacing the left hand side of F.O.C. with 
the relative conditional probabilities, the F.O.C. becomes: )()]([ nssi WUWUE  . 
   The result shows that the optimal stake will equate the marginal cost of a net payoff in 
state “s”, 
)(xNI
x
s
 , with the ratio of the expected marginal utilities in the “payoff” state, 
“s” and the “no payoff” state, “ns”. The net indemnity in state s depends on the odds 
against area s. If the impact of the individual’s stake on area s is trivial, or equivalently, if 
the odds against area s are hardly influenced by the individual’s stake, the relative 
marginal utility is simply the reciprocal of the odds against area s, or the ratio of the 
conditional probability of a hurricane hitting area s and the conditional probability of a 
hurricane not hitting area s. In this case, the optimal stake can be solved by equating the 
                                                            
42 The signs of the first and the second derivatives of the net indemnity if the hurricane hits area s with 
respect to the parimutuel stake are proven in section 2.10. 
43 Generally, this condition is true if the market is comparatively well developed or the mutualized risk pool 
is relative large. 
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expected marginal utility in the payoff state, “s”, with the marginal utility in the “no 
payoff” state, “ns”.  
  Basis risk is reflected in the expected marginal utility when a hurricane hits area s, 
i.e., )]([ si WUE  , of the F.O.C. If the conditional probability of a hurricane destroys the 
individual’s asset in area s, given that it hits area s, is further set to be one, or 
equivalently, when a hurricane hits the target area, all assets in the area will be destroyed, 
the optimal stake choice for the individual in the parimutuel is the same as the optimal 
amount of insurance in traditional insurance. Thus, parimutuel insurance can be 
differentiated from traditional insurance by the basis risk that the individual will 
encounter.     
The optimal parimutuel stake derived by the F.O.C. for the individual is determined by 
six factors, i.e., x*(W, m0, M0, ps, pi, L):  
 The initial wealth of the individual, the stakes on area s by other bettors  
 The stakes outside area s 
 The conditional probability of area s being hit by a hurricane if the hurricane 
should occur 
 The conditional probability of the individual’s asset being destroyed if a hurricane 
hits area s 
 The potential loss  
It is of interest that the probability of a hurricane’s occurrence, ph, does not have any 
impact on the optimal parimutuel stake. The rationale is intuitive: the redistribution of 
parimutuel stakes among participants occurs only when a hurricane hits one of the S 
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areas. If no hurricane occurs, these stakes are given back to the participants without any 
transaction fee or tax. Moreover, the final odds against area s play a key role in 
determining the optimal stake. In parimutuels, odds, which are crucial to determine the 
payoff, fluctuate through time until the close of the wagering period. As an additional 
stake is placed on one area, the odds against all areas change accordingly. The individual 
thus has an incentive to postpone his stakes until more information about the odds are 
revealed to decide his optimal stake44.  
The above optimal decision is treated as a static problem. However, the parimutuel 
market evolves over the year with the odds changing. Thus, this should be a dynamic 
hedging problem. The static optimal hedge will be achieved when trading closes based on 
available information. Furthermore, how to use our results to implement dynamic 
hedging in the HuRLOs market is shown as follows. If the impact of an individual stake 
on odds is negligible, the optimal stake can be determined by the following equation: 
)(
))(())(()1(
)(1
**
*
xO
LxxOWUpxxOWUp
xWU
p
p
s
sisis
s 
 , which is 
modified from the F.O.C. As can be seen, the optimal parimutuel stake is a function of 
several parameters, including the odds and the conditional probability of area s being hit. 
In trading the HuRLOs, the investors know the odds, Os(x)45 (from market-based 
                                                            
44 The timing of bettors’ wagers, as indicated in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2005c), is determined by two 
opposing forces: the bettor’s market power and the bettor’s concern about information revelation. In a 
simultaneous-move game, bettors holding sizeable wagers and common information would bet early to 
prevent from adverse impact on odds while many small bettors with private information would place a late 
bet to conceal their private information and to grasp more information on the odds from other bets. Under 
the parimutuel mechanism, informed bettors prefer to postpone their wager until the last minutes because 
all bets are executed at the same final price. 
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 , spˆ is the market-based probability of the first hurricane 
making landfall in region s, nhpˆ is the market-based probability of no hurricane making landfall in any of 
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probabilities) and the conditional probabilities, ps46 (from forecast-based probabilities) at 
any point in time. Both market-based probabilities and forecast-based probabilities in all 
covered regions are public information for investors and are available on the WRS 
website. Thus, given the optimal stake rule, hedgers can actually determine their hedging 
position with available information.  
 
2.5 Equilibrium of Parimutuel Stakes 
In this section, we analyze a risk-averse representative agent’s optimal stake decision 
under the parimutuel mechanism. In this special case, S areas are at risk to be hit by a 
hurricane. Suppose all residents participate in the parimutuel insurance and own assets 
with the same market value in one of the S areas. There are n residents in each area. The 
hurricane hits each area with an equal probability. An individual in area s is taken to be a 
representative agent who has W dollars for his initial wealth, places the stake worthy of x 
in parimutuels, and losses L dollars if a hurricane hits his asset in area s. Since ps are the 
same across all areas, Sps 1 . When a hurricane hits area s, the payout to the 
representative agent is the ratio of the total stakes to the number of residents in the area, 
i.e.,   xSnxnS  . If no hurricane occurs, the total stakes are returned proportionally 
to the initial stake. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the covered regions. The market-based probabilities for all covered regions are available on the WRS 
trading website.   
46 
nh
s
s p
pp  1
, where sp  is the forecast-based probability of the first hurricane making landfall in 
region s, nhp is the forecast-based probability of no hurricane making landfall in any of the covered regions. 
The forecast-based probabilities for all covered regions are available on the WRS trading website.   
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The objective is to maximize the expected utility of the representative agent:  
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Differentiating the objective function with respect to x yields the F.O.C.: 
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For the F.O.C. to hold with 0&0*  UxS , then 0*  LxS , (or 
equivalently, SLx * ), must be satisfied. Thus a parimutuel will, in general, provide a 
payout to the representative agent that is less than the potential loss. This result rests on 
the presence of basis risk. The parimutuel pays on the occurrence of loss in area s. 
However, conditional on area s being hit, the probability that the stakeholder suffers a 
loss, pi , is less than one. Thus, the parimutuel provides a windfall gain to an individual 
even if he/she suffers no loss. In effect, the parimutuel introduces background risk. We 
know, in general, that the presence of background risk will upset the normal optimality 
condition for full (actuarially fair) insurance. Only in the special case where pi=1; 
(equivalently n=1 or only one stakeholder in area s,) will the F.O.C. show that a full 
                                                            
47 The negative sign of the second derivative is easily verified. 
  58
indemnity, SLx *  is optimal, consistent with Mossin’s theorem48. Thus, parimutuel 
insurance intrinsically leads to underinsurance even in the case of no transaction fee or 
tax. 
However, for the general case where 1ip , the parimutuel offers a payout on the 
hurricane hitting the target area s whether or not the individual actually has a loss. In 
contrast, the mutual insurance rules out the possibility of the windfall gain, and hence the 
policyholder’s decision only depends on balancing marginal utilities in two states: when 
the hurricane hits area s and when the hurricane hits other areas, i.e., 
))1(()( ** xSLWUxWU  . A risk-averse mutual insurance policyholder will 
choose full insurance, i.e., SLx * , since the insurance premium genuinely reflects the 
expected insured losses.  
We further explore the comparative statics on the equilibrium of the parimutuel stake 
regarding the underlying four parameters;  LppWx is ,,,* 49. The summary of our analysis 
is as follows. The sensitivities of the equilibrium of the parimutuel stake with respect to 
the loss caused by a hurricane, with respect to the conditional probability of a hurricane 
hitting the target area given that it occurs, and with respect to the conditional probability 
of an individual’s asset being destroyed given that the hurricane hits the target area, are 
all positive, i.e., 0,0,0 ***  is pxandpxLx .  
                                                            
48 Mossin’s Theorem is often considered the cornerstone result of insurance economics. It is attributed to 
Mossin (1968). 
49 For the same reason as was stated in section 2.4, the likelihood of the occurrence of a hurricane does not 
affect the equilibrium of stake. The redistribution of overall stakes is only triggered by a hurricane’s hitting 
one of the S areas. 
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The relation between the parimutuel stake and the conditional probability of a 
hurricane hitting area s suggests that the sensitivity of the equilibrium of the parimutuel 
stake with respect to the number of hurricane-prone areas is negative, i.e., 0*  Sx . 
The basic logic is simply balancing between the expected marginal utilities for two states: 
when a hurricane hits the target area and when a hurricane hits areas outside the target 
area. First, ceteris paribus, an increase in the number of hurricane-prone areas decreases 
the expected marginal utility when a hurricane hits the target area by increasing the 
payoff to the target area. The equilibrium parimutuel stake is then reduced, not only to 
decrease the payout when a hurricane hits areas outside the target area, but also to reduce 
the net indemnity when a hurricane hits the target area. Through this adjustment, the 
expected marginal utilities in these two states are equalized.  
Similar to the previous analysis but with a reverse direction, an increase in the 
potential loss (or the conditional probability of the asset being destroyed by a hurricane 
given that it hits the insured area), ceteris paribus, raises the expected marginal utility 
when a hurricane hits the target area. In order to balance off the relative expected 
marginal utilities, the equilibrium of the parimutuel stake moves upward both to enhance 
the net indemnity when a hurricane hits the target area and to reduce the stake payout 
when a hurricane hits the areas outside the target area.  
Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the equilibrium parimutuel stake with respect to the 
initial wealth is ambiguous. We derive the condition under which the sign of the 
sensitivity is positive: 
))1(())1(()1()(0 ***
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The rationale for this result is also similar. As the initial wealth increases, expected 
marginal utilities in both states decline accordingly. If the above condition holds, the 
marginal utility when a hurricane hits areas outside the target area is reduced for a greater 
amount than the expected marginal utility when a hurricane hits the target area. To 
balance between expected marginal utilities in these two states, the equilibrium of the 
parimutuel stake has to adjust upward. Section 2.11 provides the detailed derivations of 
the comparative statics and the determination of their signs for reference. 
 
2.6 Pros and Cons of Parimutuel Insurance 
Parimutuels have several merits that can potentially ameliorate or even overcome the 
recent obstacles that are encountered by insurers. Here is our summary:  
 The insurer takes no risk. 
This is the most critical advantage of parimutuels. The insurer acts as a bookmaker 
and redistributes money among policyholders. Parimutuels add no financial capacity 
constraints to insurers.  
 Liquidity is enhanced. 
In trading catastrophe-linked derivatives50, traders have to find a counterparty who is 
willing to take the underlying risk on the other side. If trading parties do not match in 
a market, high bid-ask spreads or thin trading volume will appear. Catastrophe 
                                                            
50 CAT-linked securities, such as Industry Loss Warranty (ILW), CAT options, and CAT bonds first 
appeared in the capital markets in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to traditional reinsurance contracts, 
these securities together with Sidecars50, provide risk-transferring alternatives in ameliorating CAT shocks 
within the economy. 
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futures51 are such an example. However, in parimutuels, policyholders can bet on any 
adverse outcome in the risk pool without insurers’ matching offers.  
 There is less default risk. 
In parimutuels, all indemnity payouts come from the stakes of the participants. Since 
all stakes are collected before adverse events and insurers simply redistribute the 
stakes, policyholders and insurers have less incentive to default on the transaction.  
 Windfall gain is possible in parimutuels.  
Parimutuels pay out when a hurricane hits the target area whether or not the 
policyholder actually has a loss. When the hurricane hits the target area without 
destroying the participant’s asset, the participant shares the total stakes with other 
target bettors, even if he does not bear any loss.  
 Costs are reduced for insurers 
Traditional insurers must have expertise to estimate the probability of a hurricane’s 
occurrence, the probability of a hurricane hitting each area, and the potential losses 
for policyholders. Large insurers usually hire hurricane modeling firms52 or build a 
team of experts from different fields53 to approximate and hedge the risk they take. 
However, parimutuel insurers bear no risk, thus they are not required to manage the 
catastrophic risk.  
                                                            
51 Catastrophe Futures were introduced by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1992 after Hurricane 
Andrew. 
52 The scientific risk analysis and quantitative risk estimates of the catastrophe damage is developed by 
catastrophe-modeling firms. Those firms build catastrophe models, which use meteorology, engineering, 
and insurance underwriting data to estimate damage in different areas. Input information is based on 
historical tropical storms, building construction, and the impact on various structures under different wind 
speeds. Today, the three leading proprietary catastrophe modeling firms are Risk Management Solutions 
(RMS), AIR Worldwide, and EQECAT. 
53 Include meteorology, engineering, and insurance underwriting. 
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 The contracts are more flexible. 
Traditional insurance generally specifies a fixed period, like annual or semiannual, as 
the insured period so that the premiums collected are enough to cover the potential 
indemnity. Parimutuels have more flexibility in setting insured periods. For instance, 
we can specify the insured period to be hurricane-prone seasons based on historical 
data. Policyholders do not have to pay premiums for the whole year.  
 Parimutuels ameliorate information asymmetry. 
In order to deal with adverse selection, insurers have to design mechanisms54 to 
distinguish clients with different risk types. In parimutuels, however, payouts depend 
only on the area hit by the event not upon participant characteristics. Similarly, 
payouts are independent of actions of participants (other than choice of stake). Thus 
moral hazard is avoided.  
  On the other hand, parimutuel insurance has several drawbacks.  
 Parimutuel participants are underinsured. 
In response to basis risk, parimutuel participants would naturally choose the optimal 
parimutuel stake that provides less than full coverage should the participant suffer a 
loss.55 In contrast, policyholders of traditional insurance would choose full insurance.  
 Participants do not know the payoffs (or prices) when placing stakes. 
                                                            
54 The self-selection mechanism, in which insurers offer a menu of insurance contracts with various prices 
and quantities so that insurers can distinguish the risk types of policyholders by observing their choices. 
Related literature include Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Spence (1978), Dionne (1983), Kunreuther and 
Pauly (1985), Dionne and Doherty (1994), etc. 
55 The indemnity is insufficient to pay for the actual loss. 
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The potential payoffs are determined by the final distribution of the total stakes, 
which will not be revealed until the end of the wagering period. This feature can be 
abated by postponing the wager as late as possible before the wagering period closes, 
but can not be eliminated.  
 Late Information 
Transactions are not allowed during the period between the end of the wagering 
period and the eventual outcome is realized. When adverse events against an 
individual’s bets occur after the wagering period, it is impossible to withdraw his 
stakes. If the underlying risk is highly sensitive to updated information over time, 
participants could not react to incoming information immediately, thus having a lock-
in risk. However, it is unlikely that insurer would underwrite at this time. Participants 
also have incentives to postpone the timing of purchasing parimutuel insurances in 
order to wait for the most updated information to be revealed56. There is an offsetting 
effect, if there is secondary trade in parimutuel stakes after the wagering period 
closes. Since secondary trades will reflect new risk, then hedging strategies are 
possible at this late time. 
 Basis Risk 
When the probability of hurricane occurrence is low, the parimutuel stake could be 
higher than the traditional insurance premium. In addition, cash flows of parimutuels 
are less than traditional insurance when the hurricane hits areas other than the target 
area and when the hurricane destroys the assets of the participants.  
                                                            
56 The late informed betting phenomenon, as described in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2005c): late bets contain 
a great deal of information about the horses’ eventual ranking in the parimutuel game. Also documented in 
Asch, Malkiel, and Quandt (1982), Gandar, Zuber, and Johnson (2001), and Ottaviani and Sorensen 
(2005a). 
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 Parimutuels can only be applied to mutually exclusive events. 
Parimutuel pricing principles restrict the outcomes to be collectively exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive. Collectively exhaustive property can be relaxed by including a no 
hurricane state, but a mutually exclusive condition can not be violated. In applying 
parimutuels, it is important to define the insured events to be mutually exclusive. In a 
HuRLOs scheme, although a hurricane could hit more than one of the covered areas, 
the trigger event is defined as the covered area first hit by a hurricane during a year.  
 
2.7 The Role of Speculators 
    A useful of parimutuels is that one purchase on one outcome will improve liquidity for 
all other outcomes. Thus, adding speculators to our model may enhance liquidity. 
Speculation could play a somewhat neutral role in our analysis if the speculators placed 
their bets across counties in direct proportion to the stakes placed by hedgers. But it is 
difficult to see what advantage speculators would derive from such a passive strategy. 
More likely, they would take advantage of perceived mispricing by placing bets on 
outcomes where the objective probabilities differ from market-based probabilities. This 
would, reduce (increase) the payoffs to hedgers in counties where speculators take net 
long (short) positions.  
    In our previous analysis, we assume that hedgers use the objective probability to 
estimate the likelihood that a hurricane makes landfall in a county. Laypersons have 
difficulty in predicting the probability that a hurricane makes landfall and have to resort 
to the objective probability that provided by meteorologists. The aggregate subjective 
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probability of the first landfall should thus approach the corresponding objective 
probability, supporting our usage of the objective probability instead of subjective 
probability in optimizing the utility. Moreover, the market-based probability simply 
reflects the relative demand in that county. Relative higher demand in the target county 
compared to the objective probability will raise the market-based probability of the target 
relative to other counties. In this case, the market-based probability of the target is higher 
than the objective probability of the target, whereas the market-based probability of other 
counties is lower than the objective probability of other counties. Speculators would thus 
arbitrage on the discrepancy between the objective probability and the market-based 
probability by placing more stakes in other counties except for the target. This behavior, 
through parimutuels, will decrease the market-based probability of the target and increase 
the market-based probability of other areas until reaching the equilibrium, where the 
market-based probability equals the objective probability for all counties. Thus, in the 
presence of speculators, our results in section 2.4 will be approaching the equilibrium.  
    If the market is in equilibrium, an additional stake on a specific outcome placed by a 
speculator will drive down the payoff of that outcome while push up the payoff of all 
other outcomes. Nevertheless, the expected payoff on each outcome is still kept at the 
same level as prior to the additional stake thanks to the parimutuel mechanism. 
Speculators can not make any profit by placing any bet that deviates from the 
equilibrium. Since speculators would not participate in the equilibrium, the assumption 
on the absence of speculators in our models is then justified.   
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2.8 Equivalent Transaction Costs of Traditional Insurance Relative to 
HuRLOs   
    If there were no transaction costs, the optimal hedge with a HuRLO would not provide 
full insurance because of the inherent basis risk. In contrast, with traditional (indemnity) 
insurance with no transaction cost, it is optimal to fully insure. However, with transaction 
costs, the choice between hedging with a HuRLO or with insurance, essentially boils 
down to a trade off between transaction costs and basis risk. Although we do not have 
estimates of the transaction costs of HuRLOs, we believe these to be very low relative to 
traditional insurance, and probably in the order of a 1-2%. In this section we would like 
to provide rough estimates of the tradeoff between transaction costs and basis risk. We 
will do so by estimating the optimal HuRLO stake for an assumed level of transaction 
cost. We will then estimate the transaction cost for a traditional insurance contract that 
equates the expected utility with optimal insurance to the expected utility yielded by the 
optimal HuRLO stake. If, this actual transaction costs for traditional insurance are higher 
(lower) than the utility equivalent level, it follows that the individual will be better 
(worse) off with the HuRLO than with traditional insurance.   
    Suppose that an individual possesses total assets with $1,000,000 in value, including a 
house that is worth $500,000. If hurricane strikes the area where the house located and 
destroys the house, he will suffer a loss of $500,000. The utility of the individual can be 
represented by a simple power utility function with a constant relative risk aversion 
coefficient, a, i.e., aW
a
WU 
1
1
1)(  , where a is assumed to be 0.71. This risk aversion 
estimate should be reasonable based on the reviews of empirical findings in Chetty 
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(2006) and Cardenas and Carpenter (2007). The former summarizes 33 sets of estimates 
of labor supply elasticities and calculates the implied coefficients of relative risk aversion 
ranging from 0.15 to 1.78 with mean 0.71 while the latter review coefficients from risk 
experiments in various countries and finds estimates between 0.05 and 2.57. Palm Beach 
and Monroe, both located in Florida, are the two target areas that we will focus on to 
illustrate the equivalent transaction cost relative to HuRLOs. For each area, there exist 
two sets of probability: one is forecast-based probability and the other is market-based 
probability. From actual trading data on a specific date in 2009, the two sets of 
probabilities are (ph=0.0395, ps=0.0228, pi=0.1) and (pmh=0.2454, pms=0.0595, pi=0.1) in 
Palm Beach and (ph=0.0395, ps=0.0734, pi=0.1) and (pmh=0.2454, pms=0.0717, pi=0.1) in 
Monroe. If a hurricane hits an area, we suppose that there is a one-in-ten chance that 
houses within the area will be destroyed (pi=0.1). Thus, the optimal stake and the 
maximal expected utility in the HuRLOs market can be obtained by first collecting the 
probability of hurricane occurring (ph) and the conditional probability of hurricane 
striking a specific area (ps) from the HuRLOs market, inputting them into the expected 
utility of the individual, and then exercising optimization. The expected utility is similar 
to that is shown in section 2.4 with the odds derived by the conditional probability of 
hurricane striking the area, Os=(1/ps)-1.  
    The maximal expected utilities empirically obtained from HuRLOs are used to derive 
the equivalent transaction cost of the traditional insurance contract by assuming the 
individual is fully-insured and partially-insured, respectively. If the individual is fully-
insured, the equivalent transaction cost simply reflects the basis risk of the specific 
HuRLO; however, if the individual is allowed to be partially-insured, the equivalent 
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transaction cost balances the synthetic effects of the basis risk of the HuRLO with the 
individual’s incentive to buy less than full insurance when insurance is costly.  
    Figure 2.3 shows the comparisons of the expected utilities for an individual between 
HuRLOs and traditional insurance in four cases with two dimensions, the area (Palm 
Beach/Monroe) and the type of probability (forecast-based/market-based), assuming no 
transaction cost in HuRLOs. For the same case, the left hand side exhibits the HuRLOs 
and the right hand side demonstrates the traditional insurance. Take the HuRLO in Palm 
Beach using forecast-based probabilities as an example. The optimal stake is $1,785.1 
and the maximal expected utility is 189.4939. In order to achieve this expected utility in 
traditional insurance contracts given the constraint that the individual is fully-insured, the 
equivalent transaction cost is 20.91%. Thus if the actual transaction cost for insurance is 
greater than 20.91%, the individual will be better off accepting the basis risk of the 
HuRLO than full indemnity insurance. But, of course, full insurance is sub optimal with 
transactions costs. When being partial-insured is allowed (the optimal amount of 
insurance and the equivalent transaction cost are determined simultaneously), the optimal 
amount of insurance is 33.55% and the equivalent transaction cost is 33.2%. This 
equivalent transaction cost is higher than that of the full-insured case because the 
individual would choose to purchase less insurance in the presence of transaction costs.   
    According to the statistics of premiums and losses of 2009 top 25 companies in 
property and casualty insurance industry, collected by NAIC (National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners), the ratio of losses to premiums is approximately 60% (See 
Table 1, this ratio is between 59.27% to 60.94% by different definitions of losses). 
Empirical transaction costs of traditional homeowners multiple peril insurance are 
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approximately 67% ((1/60%)-1) of the expected loss, which include administrative, 
marketing and claims processing costs, taxes, and cost of capital. The equivalent 
transaction costs relative to HuRLOs in the four cases range from 33.2% to 43.2%, 
depending on transaction costs in HuRLOs (0%-2%). Thus, the actual transaction costs 
for traditional insurance (67%) are higher than the utility equivalent level (33.2%-43.2%). 
This result suggests that HuRLOs, in spite of the inherent basis risk, provide a more 
effective hedging mechanism than traditional insurance for homowners because the 
transaction cost of HuRLOs is very low (less than 2%) relative to traditional insurance.   
 
2.9 Conclusions 
  This paper compares parimutuels to insurance contracts in a market where risk-averse 
people seek to hedge. We construct two models where an individual places a parimutuel 
stake to hedge against potential catastrophes. In the first model, an optimal stake choice is 
obtained when the total stakes on the target area placed by other participants, and the total 
stakes outside the target area, are exogenous. The optimal stake can be obtained by 
equating the marginal cost of a net payoff with the ratio of the expected marginal utilities 
in the payoff state and the no payoff state. When the odds and the conditional probability 
of a hurricane hitting the target areas are available, we derive the dynamic optimal hedge 
rule by the first order condition. In the next model, the equilibrium of the parimutuel 
stake is derived based on a representative agent’s optimal choice. If there is no 
transaction fee and tax, parimutuel insurance intrinsically leads to underinsurance due to 
the basis risk, a result that is inconsistent with traditional insurance where the decision 
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maker has background risk. Furthermore, the sensitivities of the equilibrium of the 
parimutuel stake with respect to the potential loss, the conditional probability of a 
hurricane hitting the target area if it occurs, and the conditional probability of an 
individual’s asset being destroyed if a hurricane hits the target area, are all positive; 
however, the sensitivity of the equilibrium with respect to the initial wealth is ambiguous. 
    WRS invented an option, called HuRLOs, which embodies the concept of parimutuel 
insurance. Issuers of HuRLOs act as a bookmaker and do not bear the underlying risk, 
but participants who intend to hedge will have inbuilt basis risk compared to traditional 
insurance with no transaction cost. However, in the presence of transaction costs, the 
choice between hedging with a HuRLO or with insurance, essentially boils down to a 
trade off between transaction costs and basis risk. We derive the equivalent transaction 
costs such that the expected utility with optimal insurance equates the expected utility 
yielded by the optimal HuRLO stake. The actual transaction cost for traditional 
homeowners multiple peril insurance is approximately 67%, higher than the utility 
equivalent level (33.2%-43.2%) implied by the HuRLOs with minor transaction cost. 
This empirical result suggests that homeowners who would like to hedge against 
hurricane risk would be better off with HuRLOs than with traditional insurance because 
in practice, the transaction cost of HuRLOs is very low relative to traditional insurance.  
    In this paper, the parimutuel market is analyzed focusing on hedgers. Speculators 
simply arbitrage on the discrepancy between the forecast-based probability and the 
market-based probability, and thus have no role to play in equilibrium. However, 
speculators could deviate from this simple arbitrage, because of irrational behaviors 
affected by psychological factors, or because they have different belief about the 
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objective probability. Empirical anomalies, such as the favorite-longshot bias, may result 
from these behaviors of speculators. Taking the actions of speculators into consideration 
may change the optimal stake choice for hedgers in parimutuels.  
 
Appendix 
2.10 The Derivatives of the Net Indemnity with Respect to the 
Parimutuel Stake 
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2.11 The Comparative Statics of the Equilibrium Parimutuel Stake  
Rearranging from the F.O.C., we have the following formula: 
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Implicitly differentiating f with respect to the x*, pi, S, L, and W yields the following 
equations with their signs: 
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Since the sign of 
W
x

 *  can not be determined, we further analyze under the following 
condition the sign is positive. 
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Chapter 3 
Mitigating Losses from Climate Change through 
Insurance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
    Natural disasters have caused more severe insured losses to property in recent years 
than in the past. The losses caused by great natural disasters have increased dramatically 
in recent years, especially after 1990. Based on the recent book57, catastrophes also have 
a more devastating impact on insurers over the past 15 years than in the entire history. 
Before 1988, the worldwide insured losses from natural disasters are rarely greater than 
$10 billion dollars. Nonetheless, after 1990, there is a radical increase in insured losses. 
The representative catastrophe events lead to those losses include Hurricane Ike in 2008, 
which lead to insured losses of $16 billion, Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which cost 
insurers $23.2 billion, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which caused up to $46.3 billion in 
damage. Higher population density along the coast and increasing development in 
hazard-prone areas further exacerbate the situation58. These facts manifest a radial change 
in the scale and rhythm of catastrophes, which in turn forecast that the future catastrophic 
losses could rise dramatically.  
                                                            
57 For more detailed figures, refer to Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009)  
58 Based on Changnon (2003), Muir-Wood et al. (2006), Miller et al. (2008), and Crompton and McAneney 
(2008), the major source of rising damages caused by natural disasters comes from the concentration of 
human settlements and wealth in hazard-prone areas.  
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    Climate change also potentially amplifies catastrophe risks and challenge current risk 
management strategies by raising the magnitude and frequency of certain extreme events. 
This phenomenon is pronounced in the highly exposed areas, such as US Gulf Coast and 
the Caribbean, rising hazards are likely to reduce the effectiveness of current risk 
mitigation and threaten insurability. Based on the conclusion of Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC (2007)), increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, 
primarily human-induced, are the major source to warm the atmosphere and oceans59. 
The elevated temperatures raise sea level by expanding ocean water, increasing the rate at 
which glaciers and ice sheets melt ice into the oceans60. The number, track, rainfall 
quantity, and intensity of tropical cyclones might also change with global warming, 
driving more intense and frequent natural disasters. Sea level rise and potential stronger 
storms pose a more intensive threat to the economy, particularly in the coastal areas. The 
recent report61 on coastal flooding management suggests that over the next 100 years, 
higher sea level provides an elevated base for storm surges to build upon and diminishes 
the rate at which low-lying areas drain, thereby extending coastal inundation from 
rainstorms. Greater flood damages are also driven by increases in shore erosion, 
                                                            
59 Human behaviors, including the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and other land use changes, 
contribute to the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses, such as methane, which have 
accumulated in the atmosphere since late 19th century. Greenhouse gasses trap heat more easily, resulting in 
higher surface air temperature. IPCC predicts that global average surface temperatures will increase 
1.1°C~2.9°C under a low emission scenario and 2.4°C ~6.4°C under a high emission scenario. Stern (2007) 
also suggests that positive feedback mechanisms of climate change, such as releases of methane resulting 
from melting of permafrost and a reduced uptake of carbon that caused by shrinking Amazon forest, may 
amplify greenhouse gas concentrations and lead to global warming that is more severe than anticipated by 
climate models.  
60 IPCC (2007) predicts that sea level may rise 0.2~0.6 meter by 2010. Although the procedures may take 
several centuries, an irreversible melting of Greenland ice or collapse of the West-Antarctic Ice Sheet gives 
rise to a substantial increase in global sea level rise, about 5 to 12 meters, as indicated in Rapley (2006) and 
Wood et al. (2006).   
61 U.S. Climate Change Science Program “Coastal Sensitivity to Sea-Level Rise: A Focus on the Mid-
Atlantic Region” 
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removing protective dunes, beaches, and wetlands and thus leaving previous protected 
properties closer to the water’s edge.  
    Climate change alters the catastrophic risks by increasing existing risk over time. A 
crucial feature of climate change lies in its irreversibility62: once the climate regime in an 
area has change, it is unlikely to restore to the original state. Failure to take the potential 
of climate change into account would lead insurers to underestimate insurance premiums 
and reserves for catastrophic risk exposures, causing higher possibility of bankruptcy or 
financial distress, which in turn affect insurability. The best way to handling effects of 
climate change for insurers is incorporating possible changes in weather extremes to 
assess and manage future catastrophic risks. Even through the nature of low-probability 
and uncertainties of theses events leads to difficulties in estimating the impact of climate 
change on natural disasters and their resulting damage63, it is critical to establish a 
reasonable catastrophic risk model considering potential climate change and the 
associated uncertainties in order to help insurers enhance the accuracy of risk assessment, 
improve risk management, and further strengthen long-term sustainability against the 
rising trend of natural disasters.  
    Implementing mitigations can effectively reduce the potential risk and maintain 
insurability, protecting lives and properties64. These measures prevent or limit damage 
                                                            
62 The irreversibility feature of climate change is further analyzed in Heal and Kristrom (2002). 
63 IPCC (2007) and Botzen (2009) 
64 According to IFRC (2001), worldwide investments of $40 billions in disaster preparedness, prevention, 
and mitigation have reduced global economic losses for $280 billion during the 1990s. Kreibich et al. (2005) 
analyzed the impact of building precautionary measures for the Elbe flood of Germany in 2002. They found 
that use of buildings and interior fitting adapted to flooding reduced damage to building by 46% and 53%, 
and damage to contents by 48% and 53%, respectively. Moreover, Kunreuther et al. (2009) model 
hurricane damage in New York, Texas, South Carolina, and Florida in situations with and without 
mitigations according to recent building code standards, The results for a 100-year hurricane indicate that 
mitigation could reduce potential losses by 61% in Florida, 44% in South Carolina, 39% in New York, and 
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against future natural disasters. For example, houses can be retrofitted or reinforced to 
withstand hurricanes, rising floods, or storm surges. However, these measures can have 
high up-front costs and the probability of a catastrophe seems to be remote and is often 
underestimated by many house owners. Investment on mitigations will only be 
worthwhile if the cost, which incurred in the short term, is less than the net expected 
benefits, which accrue over the long term. Thus, mitigations are more likely to be 
worthwhile when there is a risk in the near future, when people are concerned more about 
the future, or when the returns continue over longer terms. Due to uncertainty in the 
timing and magnitude of impacts, and difficulties in quantifying projected benefits and 
costs, it is often difficult to decide whether one should implement a specific adaptation to 
prepare for climate change. These uncertainties are incorporated into our model to justify 
the result of the benefit-cost analysis. The discount rate also matters when one would like 
to assess the value of implementing adaptations because it reflects people’s attitudes 
toward the future and the degree of risk aversion. Individuals who have higher risk 
aversion or are more concern about the future tend to set a lower discount rate. As 
indicated by Kunreuther et al. (2009), extensive experimental evidence has shown that 
‘hyperbolic’ temporal discounting has been applied by humans, meaning that even the 
next year has a very high discount rate. The implication lies in that homeowners tend to 
undervalue a mitigation investment, which requires high upfront cost but delayed 
expected benefits over time.  
    Mitigation measures can reduce the loss distribution and maintain insurability in the 
long term. Insurance can also effectively share and transfer the risk among a risk pool and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
34% in Texas. Saving in Florida alone due to mitigation would result in $51 billion for a 100-year and $83 
billion for a 500-year event. 
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thus help individuals to manage the residual risk that can not be eliminated by installing 
mitigations. With insurance, individuals can reduce financial exposures to catastrophes 
by speeding the recovery, maintaining business continuity, and reducing individual 
suffering. For example, Luechinger and Raschky (2009) estimated the utility losses 
caused by flood disasters in 16 European countries between 1973 and 1998 and 
empirically proved that insurance indeed enhance people’s welfare. Based on this study, 
the presence of flood insurance almost fully mitigates the decline in the levels of life 
satisfaction resulting from flood disasters. In order to encourage mitigations, setting 
premiums at a level that reflects the underlying risk is very important. This principle 
allows insurers to provide lower premiums to homeowners who implement mitigations in 
their properties. In return, insurers can reduce the frequency and severity of claims. While 
some researches support the annually renewal contract65, long term insurance has been 
proposed to be a way to stabilize insurance premiums for house owners in coastal areas. 
With potential climate change, it is vital to explore this issue more in depth and see how 
the price of multi-year policies will be affected by climate change and its associated 
uncertainties.   
    Scientific evidence shows that weather patterns are changing over the last century, 
causing sea level rise and intensifying the frequency and severity of future catastrophes66. 
                                                            
65 Vellinga et al. (2001) and Bouwer and Vellinga (2005) contend that allowing insurers to sign short term 
contracts and to adjust premiums and coverage over time ensures the solvency of the insurers against 
impacts of climate change 
66 Stern Review (2006) and IPCC (2007) provide more details on the scientific evidence of climate change 
and its impacts. According to IPCC (2007), global temperatures have increased approximately 0.76°C and 
sea level has risen about 20 centimeters since 1900. In addition, heat waves, heavy precipitations, and 
intensified tropical cyclones have emerged more frequently during late 20th century worldwide. Emanuel 
(2005), Webster et al. (2005), and Hoyos et al. (2006) suggest that an increased intensity and frequency of 
hurricanes are more likely to be induced by climate change through rising sea surface temperatures. 
Saunders and Lea (2008) further specify that 0.5°C increase in sea temperature is associated with 40% 
increase in hurricane frequency and activity.  
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The consequences for many coastal areas could be devastating. Homeowners in these 
areas can purchase property insurance to prepare for and recover from natural disasters. 
However, the availability and affordability of insurance will be diminished in the 
presence of climate change. Mitigation measures help to maintain the availability of 
affordable insurance for coastal properties, and thus are essential to provide better 
protection against losses in a long time scale. Due to myopia, underestimation of the risk, 
failure to learn from experience, interdependencies and budget constraints, homeowners 
are usually hesitate to pay the high cost of adaptations and receive the relative lower 
premium discount that reflect the reduction in expected annual losses67. If adaptations are 
not installed, insurance price will keep rising and become less available in the next 
decades. Policymakers must consider these problems and incentivize homeowners to 
implement mitigations. These measures not only reduce the levels of potential damages 
but also help to maintain insurability in the long term. As pointed out in Mill (2007), 
insurers can regard climate change as a threat as well as a new business opportunity by 
developing innovative insurance products to stimulate adaptations. Confronting the rising 
trend of catastrophic risks associated with potential climate change, public and private 
sectors are suggested to cooperate to cope with the problem.     
    This study intends to analyze the implications of climate change for catastrophic risk 
and to examine the appropriateness of longer term insurance contracts to protect insurers 
against future catastrophic losses and changes in risk estimates over time due to climate 
change. Specifically, three major research questions have been raised and possible 
answers to them would be proposed in this study.  
                                                            
67 Behavioral reasons why homeowners tend to delay or deny to install adaptation measures are explained 
in  section 12.5 in Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) 
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 Insurance markets functions well when loss distributions have certain statistical 
properties; well defined, low correlation both cross-sectional and inter-temporal, 
with thinner tail, etc. Are these properties preserved in a regime of climate 
change? How can we model the evolutions of losses under climate change?  
 Weather losses can be mitigated by actions of the policyholder; however, the 
private returns from many mitigation investments may not be sufficient to warrant 
such investments on a short time scale. Climate change threatens to increase the 
level of risk and possibly also the returns from mitigation. How do we choose the 
optimal mitigation under conditions of climate change on a longer time scale?  
 Given that climate change can impact both the demand for, and supply of, 
insurance, we may need to re-think the design of policies. In particular, it has 
been suggested that long term contracts might be appropriate both for the ability 
to facilitate mitigation and because they provide risk protection against future 
insurance availability and premium volatility. What is the difference between 
short and long term insurance contracts under climate change? What is the likely 
impact of cost of capital and Bayesian-updated serial correlation on risk capital 
and insurance premiums for short and long term policies? 
    The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I will investigate the 
statistical properties of the loss distribution in the regime of climate change and examine 
whether insurance market still function well given this properties. In section 3.3 and 
section 3.4, benefits and costs of mitigation measures on catastrophic losses for short and 
long time scales will be analyzed both by simulations and by using loss data in St Lucia, 
respectively. In particular, benefit-cost analysis on simulated losses and empirical losses 
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in St Lucia will be conducted both in the presence and in the absence of climate change 
for different time scales and discount rates. In section 3.5, historical storm activity will be 
used to measure the statistics of climate change factor in the near future. I will fit these 
statistics into two models to estimate annual insurance premiums for a longer contract 
and then compare the insurance prices between these two models. Finally, cost of capital 
and Bayesian-updated serial correlation will be taken into account in section 3.6 to 
estimate annual premiums for short term and long term catastrophe insurance contracts. 
Section 3.7 concludes.  
 
3.2 Statistical Properties in the Regime of Climate Change 
    The insurance market functions well in a stable world, where loss distributions are 
well-define (predictable), with low cross-sectional and inter-temporal correlations, and 
with thinner tail. In the presence of climate change, will these statistical properties still be 
preserved? In this section, I will explore this issue by developing a simple catastrophic 
risk model with potential climate change and illustrate the evolution of risk in a 
representative property for different features of climate change. These features include a 
climate change factor, the average level of risk changes over time, and the associated 
uncertainties regarding the factor. 
3.2.1 A Simple Catastrophic Risk Model with Potential Climate Change  
    As indicated in section 1, climate change could play a critical role in estimating 
catastrophic risk. In order to highlight the impact of climate change on the severity of the 
catastrophic loss rather than that on the likelihood of a catastrophe, the model I construct 
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is based on the settings where a catastrophe68 occurs with an annual probability p for a 
total T years and climate change influences only the catastrophic losses but not the 
frequency of the catastrophe. Timing of climate change is set to be a discrete uniform 
distribution69 during the T years. That is, for each year, climate change may occur with 
possibility 1/T. The occurrence of a catastrophe and the occurrence of climate change are 
mutually independent. Without climate change effect, the loss resulting from a 
catastrophe is assumed to be a constant, L70. As climate change occurs in year τ 
(1<=τ<=T), the potential catastrophic loss increases gradually with an annual growth rate, 
“a”, until year T. The annual growth rate, or the climate change factor, “a”, can be 
directly associated with an external index, such as the rise in the sea level. The higher the 
sea level, the greater the loss caused by a flood should a storm with heavy rain strike the 
hazard-prone area. The impact of the uncertainty of climate change on the potential loss 
works as follows, if climate change occurs in year τ and a storm hits the area after climate 
change in year t (>τ), the loss caused by the storm becomes (1+a)t-τL. In contrast, the loss 
remains L if climate change occurs later than a storm. The simulation is executed by three 
steps: First, assume that climate change occurs in year τ, τ could be 1,…, or T. The 
potential loss caused by a catastrophe is then specified as L(s), s=1,…,T, where L(s)=L 
for s<= τ and L(s)=(1+a)s-τL for s> τ. Next, the occurrence of a catastrophe is randomly 
simulated with an annual probability p during the T years for n times. n denotes the 
number of simulations. Given that climate change occurs in year τ, if a catastrophe occurs 
                                                            
68 This simplest model assumes that catastrophes are only likely to occur once each year. 
69 Based on the results of our simulation, if the climate change time follows exponential distribution with 
the parameter 1/T, the tail of the simulated distribution is very close to the worst case scenario, where 
climate change occurs in the first year. In addition, the mean losses are greater if climate change time is an 
uniform distribution than if it is an exponential distribution for all scenarios. Thus, the setting of uniform 
climate change time is more practical and more close to the real scenario.  
70 This is a simplified model. In section 3, this assumption will be relaxed and use the real data/empirical 
distribution of losses to substitute L.  
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in a year s, a catastrophic loss L(s) specified above is assigned; otherwise, no loss is 
incurred. Finally, τ is supposed to follow discrete uniform distribution [1,T]. The 
statistics of the simulated losses will be collected. The parameters of the benchmark case 
of this simulation are as follows: a=0.05, p=0.01, L=1, T=20, n=105.  
3.2.2 Exact Distribution of the Catastrophic Loss 
    In the case of no climate change, i.e., a=0, assuming other parameters are the same in 
the benchmark case, the aggregate loss is simply the sum of the annual loss for 20 years. 



20
1
~
i
iLL , where     20,,1,99.00,01.01  iLPLP ii . It is easy to deduce that 
the aggregate loss follows a Binomial distribution with parameters n=20, p=0.01. The 
probability density function of the aggregate loss is given below.  
      20,,1,0,99.001.020~ 20   kkkLP kk . 
The statistics of the aggregate loss, such as the expected value, standard deviation, 
skewness, kurtosis, and VaR (Value at Risk) at different confidence levels of the 
aggregate loss can be expressed as follows. 
  2.0~  npLE  
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    7505.71163~  pnpnLkurtosis  
  2,1 99.0975.095.0  VaRVaRVaR   
    In the benchmark case, where a=0.05, the aggregate loss can be separated into two 
components: the aggregate loss prior to the occurrence of climate change and the 
aggregate loss following the occurrence of climate change, i.e., 
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, where     ,,1,99.00~,01.01~ 1,1,  iLPLP ii , 
     20,,1,99.00~,01.005.1~ 2,2,    jLPLP jjj . 
    Given the time that climate change occurs, τ, the conditional aggregate loss prior to 
climate change follows a Binomial distribution with parameters n=τ, p=0.01, i.e., 
 01.0,~~
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; however, the conditional aggregate loss posterior to climate 
change, 



20
1
2,
~
i
iL , can not be identified as a well-known distribution due to the cumulative 
effect of climate change on the potential losses. Nevertheless, given that the climate 
change could occur uniformly during 20 years, the expected value of the aggregate loss 
can be calculated. The general form of the expected aggregate loss with potential climate 
change can be presented as (3.1). The detailed derivations are available in section 3.8. 
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    In the benchmark case, where a=0.05, p=0.01, L=1, T=20, the expected value of the 
aggregate loss is equal to 0.2422. Due to the complication of the aggregate loss, higher 
moments are difficult to be attained. The moment generating function of the aggregate 
loss with climate change is given as (3.11) in section 3.8. Although higher central 
moment of the distribution can generally be obtained by several times differentiating the 
log of the moment generating function of the aggregate loss with respect to the parameter 
θ and setting the value with θ=0, the derivation in this case involves differentiation of a 
product with up to T terms and complicates the procedures. The derivation of the 
variance of the loss distribution by double expectation theorem is also available in section 
3.8. The variance can be expressed in (3.18), but it is not an explicit formula since the 
term  |~ 22LE  can not be derived. Thus, we have to resort to simulations to explore the 
statistical properties of the aggregate loss in the presence of climate change. 
3.2.3 The Impact of Climate Change on Catastrophic Losses with a Certain Climate 
Change Factor 
    In this subsection, I will apply the catastrophic risk model constructed in section 2.1 to 
quantify the impact of climate change on catastrophic losses by setting a certain value to 
the climate change factor, “a”. Table 3.1 reports the statistics of the simulated losses for 
the case of no climate change factor (a=0) and the benchmark case (a=0.05) to compare 
the effect of climate change. These statistics include the expected value, the standard 
deviation, the skewness, the kurtosis of the losses, the VaR (Value at Risk), and the ES 
(Expected Shortfall). For VaR and ES, the values with confidence level of 95%, 97.5%, 
and 99% are presented. VaR and ES are indicators of the tail of loss distributions. In 
comparison of two distinct distributions, the greater the value of VaR or ES for the same 
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confidence level, the fatter tail the loss distribution. Value at Risk with confidence level α 
(VaRα) simply denotes the α-percentile of the loss distribution. The proportion of the loss 
greater than VaRα is at most (1-α). The formal definition of VaR is shown in (3.2).  
VaRα=inf{l:P(L>l)<=1-α}    (3.2) 
Expected Shortfall (ESα) is defined as (3.3), which is the expected value of the tail of the 
loss distribution with the loss threshold VaRα. 
ESα=E(L|L>=VaRα)             (3.3) 
The advantage of ES over VaR lies in that it is a coherent risk measure. The axiom of 
coherence was proposed by Artzner et al. (1997, 1999). VaR violates the axiom of 
subadditivity, thus is not a coherent risk measure. In the case of no climate change, the 
statistics from simulations are quite close to the corresponding values derived from the 
exact loss distribution. The expected loss from simulations is 0.2018 while the expected 
loss from exact distribution is 0.2. For the exact distribution of the aggregate loss with 
climate change, almost all statistics, except for the expected value, are not available to be 
compared with. The exceedance probability (EP) with a specific threshold is bounded by 
the Chernoff bounds71 which are based on the probability theory.  
    As shown in Table 3.1, in the presence of climate change (“a” increases from 0 to 
0.05), the simulated expected loss increases only 20.32% while the tail statistics, such as 
                                                            
71 These bounds give exponentially decreasing bounds on tail distributions of the sum of independent 
random variables. It is better than the first or second moment based tail bounds such as Markov's inequality 
or Chebyshev inequality, which only yield power-law bounds on tail decay. The Chernoff bound of the 
distribution of the aggregate loss with climate change is presented in section 3.9. The lowest Chernoff 
bound is obtained by choosing the optimal parameter θ such that the bound is minimized. Figure A-1 in 
section 3.9 shows the plot of Chernoff bounds versus various thresholds for different time horizons.   
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VaRs and ESs, increase at least 26.60%. (The only exception is VaR99%, which increases 
only 16.57%. This may be due to too few samples in the extreme tail.) This result means 
that the climate change factor generally has more impact on the tail of the loss 
distribution rather than on the expected loss.  
    Figure 3.1 depicts the EPs for different climate change factors (a=1, 0.05, and 0.1). It 
indicates that climate change and its associated uncertainties are critical in modeling 
catastrophic risks and cannot be ignored, especially when the tail of the loss distribution 
is the focus of insurers or reinsurers. Climate change brings in higher inter-temporal 
correlations, which in turn lead to a fatter-tail loss distribution over time. The impact of 
climate change on the loss cannot be measured accurately, leading to unstable loss 
distributions, which create challenges to estimate the loss distribution with reliable 
parameters. These statistical properties could increase risk capital required and depress 
the supply or even the availability of insurance.   
3.2.4 Uncertainty of Climate Change Factor 
    In section 3.2.3, the impact of climate change is certain (with a constant annual growth 
rate “a”). However, the impact of uncertain climate change should be of more concern for 
the insurance industry because the uncertainty is directly associated with the pricing and 
risk management of insurance contracts and insurance-linked instruments. This section 
further introduces the uncertainty of climate change factor into the simple catastrophic 
risk model. In particular, climate change factor, “a”, follows a discrete uniform 
distribution.  
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    Table 3.2 reports the statistics of simulated losses for different settings on the 
uncertainty of the climate change factor. Column (1) is the case of a certain climate 
change, where “a”=0.05. Column (2) shows the statistics in the case of an uncertain 
climate change, where “a” takes three possible values: “a”=0.025, 0.05, or 0.075, each 
with probability of 1/3. Column (3) exhibits the statistics in the case of a more uncertain 
climate change, where “a” takes five possible values: “a”=0, 0.025, 0.05, 0.075, or 0.10, 
each with probability 1/5. Column (4) ((5)) shows the impact of the uncertainty on the 
statistics in term of percentage: percentage changes from column (1) to column (2) ((3)). 
Among all statistics, the tail probabilities are affected by the uncertainty of climate 
change factor to the greatest extent. As can be seen in Table 3.2, the contribution of 
uncertainty of climate change on the statistics of simulated losses most ranges from 
0.62% to 4.62%. Nevertheless, the tail probabilities with threshold greater than the value 
of the house will increase substantially to over 9%.       
    Figure 3.2 exhibits the EP curves for different settings on the uncertainty of the climate 
change factor. The EP curve of “a=0.025~0.075” is quite close to the EP curve of 
“a=0.05”. The EP curve of “a=0.00~0.10” demonstrates a slightly fatter tail than the EP 
curve of “a=0.05”. However, a certain change of “a”, from 0.05 to either 0 or to 0.1, will 
cause a large shift of the EP curve, compared with the “uncertain” change 
(a=0.025~0.075 or 0~0.1). As demonstrated in Figure 3.3, the EP curve of “a=0.00~0.10” 
matches well with the EP curve of “a=0.06”. That is to say, the impact of the uncertainty 
(from “a=0.05” to “a=0~0.1”) is equivalent to the impact of a small certain change (from 
“a=0.05” to “a=0.06”). To sum up, the uncertainty of climate change factor leads to a 
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fatter-tail loss distribution, but its impact is small but positive, equivalent to a small 
certain increase in climate change factor.  
 
3.3 Climate Change, Optimal Mitigations, and Time Scales 
    Catastrophic losses can be mitigated by investment on mitigation measures, which 
reduce both the expected value and the tail of the loss. The benefit comes from the 
reduction of potential losses while the cost is reflected in the price of the mitigation 
measures. For a short time scale, policyholders may hesitate to make the investment since 
short term benefit can not cover the cost. However, the threat of potential climate change 
stimulates us to consider risk from a longer term perspective as well as enhances the 
returns of mitigations. In this section, the optimal mitigation under conditions of climate 
change on a longer time scale will be explored.  
3.3.1 Model Setting for Benefit-Cost Analysis 
    Without relevant scientific and engineering data and professional knowledge72, an 
empirical evaluation of mitigation costs and benefits is a daunting task. In this section, we 
conduct benefit-cost analysis by simulations rather than by empirical evaluations. The 
mitigation level is defined as the reduction of losses when a catastrophe destroys a 
property. For example, if a hurricane hits a house with a reinforced roof, the damage to 
the house will reduce 10% compared to the damage to the same house with no reinforced 
roof, the mitigation level is set to be 0.1. Mitigation cost should be an increasing and 
                                                            
72 With these data at hand, the most extensively used approach to determine the appropriate mitigation 
measure is by applying benefit-cost analysis. Smyth et al. (2009) employ benefit-cost analysis on various 
seismic retrofitting measures to mitigate losses arise from earthquakes in Istanbul area. 
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convex function of the mitigation level because homeowners have to pay higher price for 
a higher level of protection and the marginal cost of mitigations should increase with 
mitigation levels. In particular, mitigation cost is set to be 32 05.01.005.0 mmm  , 
where m stands for the mitigation level. Once a catastrophe strikes an area, it will give 
rise to catastrophic cost, which includes the direct cost and the indirect cost. The direct 
cost is simply the expected loss caused by the catastrophe. The indirect cost, such as 
suspension of normal operations, interruption of public transportation, and costs of 
human lives, is linked to the tail of the catastrophic loss. When many homes are mitigated 
there is an added benefit to the insurer in the form of lower catastrophic losses and lower 
capital costs in addition to the reduction in claims from each individual policy. This 
additional benefit will be considered the reduction of the indirect cost. Suppose the 
indirect cost is proportional to tail probabilities and is set to be the weighted sum of the 
EPs with different thresholds. Specifically, the cost of catastrophe=E[L]+Tail factor (L).  
Tail factor (L) =  


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i
iLLPiweight               (3.4) 
,       11.015.0)(  iiweight , i=1,…,9, and )1(5.01  iLi . 
This setting allows the tail factor to assign more weights on extreme losses rather than 
moderate losses. For example, the weight on  5LP  is 2.7 while the weight on 
 0.15.1  LP  is only 0.5. The rationale of assigning more weight on a more extreme 
loss lies in that insurers will encounter a great deal of claims after an extreme disaster, 
causing them more likely to default on claims or even declare bankruptcy. In order to 
avoid the consequences of a larger loss, insurers would reserve more capital in advance. 
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The more capital reserved, the higher the cost of capital, thus the more weight to place in 
the extreme loss. 
3.3.2 Issues on Discount Rates 
    The conclusions of benefit-cost analysis on a specific project are quite sensitive to the 
discount rates, especially when the project involves long time scales. The most popular 
debate which drew great attentions among economists on the global warming policy is 
the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate change, published in 2006 by the U.K. 
government. The Stern Review urges that prompt and sharp actions should be undertaken 
to abate potential catastrophic damages caused by greenhouse gas emissions. The major 
controversy on the results of Stern Review stems from the choice of very low discount 
rate. A large collection of comments on the Stern Review focuses on the discount rate 
issues, including Gollier (2006), Nordhaus (2007), Weitzman (2007), Dasgupta (2007), 
Heal (2009), and Mendelsohn (2008). The determination of the proper discount rate is 
associated with the pure rate of time preference, the measure of relative risk aversion, and 
the consumption growth over time, as established in the Ramsey equation. Based on 
Ramsey F. (1928), the equilibrium of real return on capital is governed by (3.5). 
gr           (3.5) 
r denotes the interest rate; δ is the pure rate of time preference; η stands for the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of consumption, or a measure of relative risk aversion; g represents 
the consumption growth rate. The choice of the appropriate discount rate involves ethical 
judgments on preference for intergenerational utility, preference for equality within the 
whole society, and concern about the balance between economic development and 
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environmental protection. Our simulations do not make a subjective judgment and thus 
specify various possible discount rates for analyzing the cost and benefit with optimal 
mitigation for different time scales.  
3.3.3 Benefit-Cost Analysis by Simulations 
    The optimal mitigation level is determined by two opposite forces: A higher mitigation 
level costs more, but it reduces the expected losses and tail probabilities by abating the 
damage caused by a catastrophe. Thus, the optimal mitigation level can be achieved by 
minimizing the total cost, the sum of the price of mitigation measures and the damage. 
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the simulation results in the case of 20-years and 10% discount 
rate. The optimal mitigation level is 25%.  
    In order to analyze the benefit and cost of mitigations, I define optimal mitigation cost, 
benefit from optimal mitigation, net benefit from the optimal mitigation, and relative net 
benefit (RNB) from optimal mitigation as follows. Optimal mitigation cost is simply the 
price of mitigation measures at the optimal level of mitigation. Benefit from optimal 
mitigation reflects the reduction of losses resulting from the optimal mitigation. Net 
benefit from the optimal mitigation is the difference between benefit from optimal 
mitigation and optimal mitigation cost. Relative net benefit (RNB) from optimal 
mitigation is the ratio of net benefit from optimal mitigation to the total cost of no 
mitigation. The purpose to derive this quantity is to compare the relative magnitude of net 
benefit from mitigations among different time scales. Table 3.3 reports the summary of 
the cost/benefit of optimal mitigation for different time scales with different discount 
rates (0% and 5%). No matter which discount rate is specified, the optimal mitigation 
cost increases with time scales. For instance, if discount rate=0%, when the time scale 
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increases from 1 to 20, the optimal mitigation cost increase from 0 to 0.00563. This is 
because the longer time scale we are considering, the higher mitigation level will 
optimize the welfare (benefits minus costs). Cost reduction from optimal mitigation also 
magnifies with the time scale and with a higher speed, causing the net benefit (and the 
RNB) from optimal mitigation increases with time scales. In the case of 0% discount rate, 
RNB monotonically increases with the time scale from 0% to 45.44%.  Based on the 
analysis, for a longer time scale, net benefit for all parties involved in catastrophic risk is 
more enhanced by investing in the mitigation measures.  
    Moreover, by comparing the optimal mitigation levels and net benefits from the 
optimal mitigation with various discount rates, there are two findings. First, the minimal 
time horizon that makes the investment on mitigation worthwhile increases with the 
discount rate. When the discount rate is 0%, the minimal time horizon that generates a 
positive optimal mitigation level is 2 years. As the discount rate rises to 5%, the minimal 
time horizon increases to 6 years. Second, for a given time scale, RNB from optimal 
mitigation always declines with discount rate. For instance, given time scale of 10 years, 
as the discount rate rises from 0% to 5%, RNB decreases from 32.49% to 4.73%. These 
findings suggest that a higher discount rate impedes the incentive to invest on mitigation 
measures, consistent with the first argument on the relationship between equity and 
climate change in Heal (2009): “We are less future-oriented—the CDR (consumption 
discount rate) is higher—and so we place less value on stopping climate change.” In sum, 
as human beings care more about the future, no matter in terms of setting a low discount 
rate or a longer time scale in modeling catastrophic risk, investing more on mitigation 
facilities will boost their utilities.  
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    Climate change and mitigations have opposite effect on the total cost in the analysis. 
Climate change will increase total cost while mitigations will reduce total cost. Which 
effect dominates the other and how large is the aggregate effect? In order to answer these 
questions, Table 3.4 reports the total cost in four scenarios: (1) no climate change, no 
mitigation (2) no climate change, with mitigation (3) climate change, no mitigation (4) 
climate change, with mitigation. Climate change effect measures the increase of total cost 
due to climate change and is reflected in the discrepancy between scenario (3) and 
scenario (1) (or scenario (4) and scenario (2)). Mitigation effect gauges the decline of 
total cost due to mitigation measures and can be captured by the difference between 
scenario (2) and scenario (1) (or between scenario (4) and scenario (3)). Aggregate effect 
combines both effects and is measured in terms of the difference between scenario (4) 
and scenario (1). Table 3.5 shows climate change effect, mitigation effect, and aggregate 
effect by calculating the percentage change described above. 
    As expected, the total cost magnifies with climate change factor but declines with 
mitigations. In Table 3.4, if discount rate=0%, T=5, total cost of no mitigation no climate 
change is 0.0729, which is less than 0.0733, total cost of no mitigation with climate 
change but greater than 0.0509, total cost of optimal mitigation no climate change. In 
some cases, especially those with a long time scale and low discount rate, mitigation 
effect dominates climate change effect. This shows that the implementation of mitigation 
measures plays a very important role to reduce catastrophic losses even in the presence of 
climate change. Based on the observation in Table 3.5, climate change effect is generally 
more significant for discount rate=5%, but aggregate effect is more substantial for 
discount rate=0%. For example, in the case of T=15, if 5% discount rate is specified, 
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climate change increases total cost for 13.71% while mitigations decrease total cost for 
11.82%; however, if 0% discount rate is specified, climate change increases total cost for 
6.17% while mitigations decrease total cost for 38.23%. In addition, mitigation effect 
dominates for a longer time scale. In the case of 0% discount rate, if we increase the time 
scale from 10 years to 20 years, mitigation effect rises from 32.48% to 45.43%. These 
results justifies the fact that returns of mitigation measures will be sufficient to warrant 
such investment for longer time scales and for individuals who care more about the 
future.  
 
3.4 Simulations on Catastrophic Risk using Empirical Loss Data: 
Hurricane Risk in St. Lucia 
    World Bank recently issues a report, which is a work collaborated with IIASA, RMA 
(Risk Management Solutions), and Wharton Risk Center, aiming to analyze the impact of 
cost-effective mitigation measures on the reduction of losses caused by natural disasters. 
This report contains several case studies, which quantitatively estimate the potential 
losses and implement cost-benefit analysis on various mitigation measures across 
different areas, including hurricane risk in St Lucia, flood risk in Jakarta, earthquake risk 
in Istanbul, and flood risk in Uttar Pradesh. In this section, we focus on the case study in 
St Lucia. EPs, losses, mitigation costs and the impact of four different mitigation 
measures (no mitigation, roof upgrade, opening protection, and roof & opening 
mitigations) on losses for different building types in various areas are provided by RMS. 
Because wood frame buildings in Canaries are proven to be the most effective one from 
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mitigations, we use this case as an example. The empirical data are incorporated into our 
simple catastrophic risk model to simulate the situation where climate change could occur 
in the next 20 years. The impact of climate change and mitigation measures will also be 
explored for various time scales.  
3.4.1 Impact of Climate Change and Mitigation Measures 
    The first step is using Monte Carlo Simulation and interpolation to randomly generate 
EP curve that matches data points of the loss in St. Lucia in the World Bank Report. 
Next, the EP curve is incorporated into our simple model described in section 3.2.1 to 
estimate the impact of climate change on hurricane risk. Figure 3.5-3.8 depict the EP 
curves for the wood frame building in Canaries in 20 years for four different mitigation 
measures and different climate change factors. A comparison of these four mitigation 
measures indicates that the impact of climate change declines with more or stronger 
mitigation measures. As can be observed, the discrepancy between “a=0.1” and “a=0” 
narrows down to a great extent in the presence of mitigation measures. In addition, the 
tail of the EP curve with the same climate change factor becomes significantly thinner 
with roof & opening mitigations (AB) (Figure 3.8) than with roof mitigation (A) (Figure 
3.6) or opening mitigation (B) (Figure 3.7). These findings can also be confirmed by 
comparing the quantities in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. Table 3.6 (corresponding to Figure 
3.5) reports the statistics of simulated losses for three climate change factors (a=0, 0.05, 
and 0.1) and no mitigation measure in 20 years, whereas Table 3.7 (corresponding to 
Figure 3.6) exhibits the same statistics with roof reinforcement (A). All statistics are 
reduced due to the roof mitigation, especially the tail statistics. For example, in the case 
of “a=0.05”, expected loss reduces from 1.01 to 0.74, and VaR95% also declines from 2.18 
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to 1.71 if roof mitigation is installed. Tail probability with threshold 2 also decreases 
from 0.07 to 0.02.  
   What is the effect of these mitigation measures in the St. Lucia case for different time 
horizons? Figure 3.9 (3.10) shows the EP curves for the wood frame building in Canaries 
with different mitigation measures in the absence of climate change, “a=0” (in the 
presence of climate change, “a=0.05”) when time horizon is 10 years. Figure 3.11 (3.12) 
depicts similar EP curves but with T=20 years. By comparing these EP curves, there are 
three findings: 
1. The relative performance among the four mitigation measures is as follows. Roof 
& opening mitigation (AB) outperforms opening mitigation (B), which in turn 
outperforms roof mitigation (A), which follows by no mitigation.  
2. As anticipated, the longer time scale, the greater the risk exposure, thus the fatter 
tail the loss.  
3. The mitigation measures are more effective in the presence of climate change than 
in the absence of climate change. This suggests that the awareness of climate 
change will stimulate the investment on mitigations.  
3.4.2 Benefit-Cost Analysis on Mitigations  
    Based on the statistics and tail probabilities of simulated loss obtained by inputting 
losses of St. Lucia for four different mitigation measures for the wood frame building in 
Canaries in the absence of climate change or in the presence of climate change, benefit-
cost analysis can be conducted. Consistent with the World Bank Report, benefit from 
mitigation is defined as the reduction in the expected loss with a specific mitigation 
  99
measure compared with the expected loss with no mitigation. Benefit-cost ratio (B/C 
Ratio) is simply the benefit from mitigation divided by the cost of mitigation. According 
to the World Bank Report, a standard wood frame building in Canaries of St. Lucia has 
the value of $100,000. Roof upgrade (A) costs $9,200, opening protection (B) costs 
$6,720, and roof & opening mitigation (AB) costs $15,920. With this information and our 
simulation results for different time horizons, B/C Ratios for different mitigation 
measures can be easily derived.  
    Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 summarize benefits, costs and the B/C ratios of three different 
mitigation measures and various time scales for the wood frame building in Canaries of 
St. Lucia in the absence of climate change and in the presence of climate change, 
respectively. Based on numerical results in these two tables, the findings regarding to 
time scales are listed in the following.  
1. Benefit from mitigation rises with the time scale and benefit from roof & opening 
mitigation (AB) is greater than benefit from opening mitigation (B), which in turn 
is greater than benefit from roof mitigation (A). When “a”=0 and T=10 years, 
benefit from roof & opening mitigation is 0.2014, benefit from opening mitigation 
is 0.1284, and benefit from roof mitigation is 0.1071. 
2. As anticipated, B/C Ratio also rises with the time scale.  
3. B/C Ratio of opening mitigation (B) is greater than B/C Ratio of roof & opening 
mitigation (AB), which in turn is greater than benefit from roof mitigation (A). 
The reason why B/C Ratio of opening mitigation (B) is with the highest value lies 
in that its cost, $6,720, is relative low compared with it benefit (the reduction in 
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expected loss). In addition, B/C Ratios in the absence of climate change are 
consistent with the B/C Ratios in the World Bank Report. 
4. The minimal time scale that makes the investment in mitigation worthwhile (the 
minimal time scale such that B/C Ratio >1) reduces one year for roof mitigation 
(A) and opening mitigation (B) if climate change is present while it stays the same 
for roof & opening mitigation (AB). Specifically, in the absence of climate 
change, roof mitigation (A) is worthwhile to be implemented for at least 9 years; 
opening mitigation (B) is worthwhile for at least 6 years; roof & opening 
mitigation (AB) is worthwhile for at least 8 years. In contrast, in the presence of 
climate change, the minimal time horizon for roof mitigation (A) is 8 years; for 
opening mitigation (B) is 5 years; for opening mitigation (AB) is still 8 years. 
This implies that the presence of climate change will increase the return from 
mitigations.  
    Impact of climate change on the B/C Ratios can be observed by comparing Figure 3.13 
and Figure 3.14. These two figures show the change of B/C Ratios for different 
mitigation measures over different time scales in the absence of climate change and in the 
presence of climate change, respectively, when discount rate=0%. As one would 
expected, B/C Ratios increase with the time horizon in both scenarios. However, they 
grow faster in the presence of climate change than in the absence of climate change. This 
phenomenon is more significant for longer time scales. For the time scale=20 years, B/C 
Ratio is above 4.5 in the presence of climate change while it is slightly below 4 in the 
absence of climate change. This indicates that the potential climate change and a longer 
  101
time scale enhance the relative benefits of cost-effective mitigation measures and thus 
encourage human to invest in mitigations.    
    Figure 3.15 summarizes the aggregate effects of climate change and mitigation. The 
most upper line is the EP curve with no climate change and no mitigation while the other 
three lines are EP curves with climate change and different mitigation measures (A, B, 
and AB) when time horizon is 20 years and discount rate=0%. This figure shows that the 
mitigation effect dominates the climate change effect. The impact of climate change on 
the EPs can be completely offset by implementing mitigation measures. This 
phenomenon is robust for all cases, no matter which discount rate is specified and how 
long time scales we are considering.  
3.4.3 Uncertainty of Climate Change Factor in the Case of St. Lucia 
    Section 3.2.4 explored the impact of uncertainty of climate change factor on the tail 
statistics and on the tail of the simulated loss in the simple model. Here, we conduct 
similar sensitivity analyses of uncertain climate change factors. In order to introducing 
uncertainty of climate change factor, “a” is set to be a discrete uniform distribution and 
has five possible values: 0, 0.025, 0.05, 0.075, and 0.1. For each value of “a”, it occurs 
with an equal probability, 1/5. Due to the fact that the expected value of these possible 
climate change factor is 0.05, the case of “a=0.05” is taken as the benchmark case. 
Introducing uncertainty of climate change factor is anticipated to result in a fatter tail of 
the loss distribution since a greater value of climate change factor will have more 
significant impact on the tail of the loss.  
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    The EP curves for the wood frame house in Canaries of St Lucia for T=20 years are 
presented in Figure 3.16. As expected, the uncertain climate change factor (“a=0~0.1”) 
has fatter tail than the certain climate change factor (“a=0.05”). However, the impact of 
the uncertainty is minor compared to the certain shift of the climate change factor. Based 
on the tail statistics and tail probabilities in Table 3.10, the uncertain climate change 
factor (“a=0~0.1”) is equivalent to a slightly higher climate change factor “a=0.06”. This 
empirical result is consistent with the simulating one in section 3.2.4. Moreover, Figure 
3.17 shows the EP curves of certain (“a=0.05”) and uncertain climate change factor 
(“a=0~0.1”) for T=10 years and T=20 years. For T=10 years, EP curves of certain and 
uncertain climate change factor almost match with each other, whereas for T=20 year, EP 
curve with the uncertain climate change factor exhibits a slightly fatter tail than EP curve 
with the certain climate change factor. This indicates that uncertainty in climate change 
factor has more impact for a long time scale. For a shorter time horizon, such as less than 
10 years, the effect of uncertainty could be negligible. If one is thinking of 5 or even 10 
year guaranteed renewability insurance polities the impact of uncertainty on “a” will not 
play a key factor in setting premiums.  
3.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Annual Premiums  
    In this section, we use data from the case of St. Lucia and the simple catastrophic risk 
model to estimate insurance premiums and conduct sensitivity analysis on the patterns of 
the premiums across time scales.  
Annual Premium=((1+λ)E(LT)+k σL,T)/T                                    (3.6) 
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    Annual insurance premiums are estimated based on (3.6), where E(LT) is the expected 
loss for T years; σL,T denotes the standard deviation of the loss for T years; k is the 
indicator of hard/soft market for insurance industry. In hard market (k=0.7), premiums 
are relatively more responsive to the volatility of losses than premiums in soft market 
(k=0.4); λ reflects cost of capital for insurers; and T is the term of the insurance contract. 
Since insurers aggregate a risk pool to allocate the risk among policyholders, the cost of 
capital of insurers should be related to the tail probability of losses. Specifically, we 
suppose  TLLPm  , where m denotes a factor that reflects the financial 
vulnerability of the insurer. If the insurer is more financially fragile and has to charge a 
higher premium loading avoid potential bankruptcy, m is set to be higher. Because risk 
exposure for a longer time horizon should be higher, causing a fatter tail of the loss 
distribution, a higher threshold should be set to the loss of longer time horizons.  In this 
section, m is set to be either 1 (a financially sound insurer) or 5 (a financially fragile 
insurer). In addition, 25.1,1,75.0,5.0,25.0 20151051  LLLLL . In the subsequent 
subsections, a series of sensitivity analysis will be conducted regarding the insurance 
premium. The parameters of the benchmark case are as follows: “a”=0.05, d=0 (discount 
rate=0), m=5, k=0.4, and no mitigation. A wood frame building in Canaries of St. Lucia 
is assumed to be worth $100,000. 
    The loss distribution is assumed to be the same in each year. In the case of no climate 
change, no mitigation, and a fixed cost of capital (cost of capital is not associated with the 
tail probability), the expected loss is proportional to the corresponding time horizon while 
standard deviation of the loss distribution is proportional to the square root of the 
corresponding time horizon. As a result, the annual premiums are predicted to be 
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decreasing with time horizons since the standard deviation of the loss grows slower than 
the time horizon. This is the rationale for proposing long term insurance. However, based 
on the settings, cost of capital for different time horizons rises with tail probabilities. 
Climate change will have a greater impact on the tail probabilities for longer time 
horizons, which will push up annual premiums. Thus, it is anticipated to observe a 
slightly declining or even a rising pattern of annual premiums for higher climate change 
factors.  
3.4.4.1 Adaptations  
    Figure 3.18 demonstrates the patterns of insurance premiums across time horizons for 
different adaptations (no mitigation, roof upgrade (A), opening protection (B), and roof & 
opening mitigation (AB)). As can be observed, with no adaptation, annual insurance 
premiums generally rise with time horizons. The rising trend of the premium will be 
compromised if adaptations are installed. In the case of roof & opening mitigations (AB), 
premiums turn to decline with time horizons. Moreover, the adaptations significantly 
reduces annual premium, especially for longer time horizons. When roof & opening 
mitigations are installed, annual premiums decrease more than half of the original price. 
For instance, the annual premium for T=5 becomes one-third of the original price ($3,851 
with adaptations compared to $11,308 without adaptation), and it plummets to one-fourth 
of the original price for T=20 (from $15,859 to $3,748). These findings support the 
proposition that long term insurance should be coupled with adaptations to incentivized 
policyholders’ willingness to invest in mitigation measures. 
    Based on the pricing formula, insurance premiums are determined by three factors that 
are related to loss distributions: Expected losses per year, standard deviations of the loss 
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distribution per year, and tail probabilities. Further analysis on the contribution of these 
factors to the pattern of annual premiums indicates that, standard deviation per year, as 
predicted, declines with time horizons; however, due to the impact of climate change, 
expected losses per year and tail probabilities increase with time horizons. The level of 
increase in the tail probabilities is substantially reduced with more mitigation measures, 
causing the patterns of annual premiums shift from rising to slightly declining with time 
horizons.  
3.4.4.2 Climate Change Factors  
    Figure 3.19 exhibits the patterns of annual premiums across time horizons for different 
climate change factors. As expected, in the absence of climate change (“a”=0), premiums 
slightly decline with time horizons. In contrast, in the presence of climate change, 
premiums show a rising trend. The rising trend is more substantial for a higher climate 
change factor. For the highest climate change factor (“a”=0.1) in Figure 3.19, the annual 
premium more than doubles from $12,096 for T=5 years to $26,226 for T=20 years. For 
the same increase in time horizon, the premium slightly decreases from $10,387 to 
$10,152 with no climate change. Thus, the impact of climate change on annual premiums 
is more significant for longer time horizons. The same as predicted in the beginning of 
the section. Considering climate change makes insurers raise the insurance price, 
especially for longer time horizons. This finding also highlights the importance of 
diversifying risk to reduce the likelihood of catastrophic losses. 
    Further analysis has been conducted on the contribution of expected losses per year, 
standard deviations per year, and tail probabilities to the pattern of annual premiums, 
respectively. In the case of no climate change, expected losses are stable, standard 
  106
deviations decline with time horizons, and tail probabilities concavely rise with time 
horizon. Consequently, annual premiums show a slightly declining pattern. In contrast, in 
the presence of climate change, expected losses exhibit an increasing trend. Although the 
patterns of standard deviations and tail probabilities are similar to the case of no climate 
change, introducing climate change alleviates the decreasing pattern of standard 
deviations as well as exacerbates the rising pattern of tail probabilities (from concavity to 
a little bit convexity). All the combination of these effects substantially pushes up the 
insurance price, especially for longer terms.   
3.4.4.3 Discount Rates, Hard/Soft Market, and Financial Vulnerability of Insurers 
    The sensitivity analysis of annual premiums with respect to discount rates, hard/soft 
market, and financial vulnerability of insurers can be conducted in the same manner. I 
will only summarize principal results as follows.  
    A higher discount rate applied by insurers implies that the insurers do not care about 
future losses, giving rise to a large reduction of annual premiums. This phenomenon is 
more pronounced for a longer time horizons. For T=20 years, the annual premium 
decreases significantly to less than one-third of the original price (from $15,859 to 
$4,857) when the discount rate increases from 0% to 5%.  
    Annual premiums should be higher in hard market than in soft market. This effect is 
more substantial for short time horizons than for high time horizons. For instance, the 
price climbs 25% for T=5 (from $11,308 to $14,108) but it only rises 15% for T=20 
(from 15,859 to $18,231). The rational is associated with standard deviation since 
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standard deviation decreases with the time horizon, which in turn reduce the impact of 
hard/soft market. 
    Financially sound insurers will charge much less premiums because the cost of capital 
and risk capital reserved are much less than financially vulnerable insurers, especially for 
longer time horizons. For T=20 years, the annual premium can be saved for almost half 
of the original price (from $15,859 to $8165). However, for T=5 years, policyholder only 
save 35% of the annual premium (from $11,308 to $7,428). Thus, the benefit of long 
term insurance is greater if more financially sound insurers are willing to sell long term 
contracts. 
3.4.5 Impact of Adaptations on Sensitivities of Annual Insurance Premium  
     Since implementing adaptations can reduce annual insurance premiums for a great 
amount, we will further explore the change in patterns of premiums from the case of no 
adaptation to the case of with adaptations. Roof and opening mitigations (AB) in St. 
Lucia is taken as the representative case of adaptations because it has the greatest impact 
on annual premiums. Figure 3.20 (3.21) shows the pattern of annual premiums across 
time horizons when adaptations and climate change factor (financial vulnerability of 
insurers) change simultaneously. A comparison of these cases indicates these findings:  
1. The reduction in premiums due to adaptations dominates the reduction in premiums 
due to other factors. This result indicates that adaptations are the key factor for 
insurers to offer low annual premiums.  
2. With no adaptation, premiums across time horizons mostly show a rising pattern, 
except for the case of no climate change. Nevertheless, with adaptations, premiums 
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across time horizons generally exhibit a flat or a declining pattern unless a extreme 
high climate change factor is specified (“a=0.1” in Figure 3.20). This implies that 
with adaptations, insurers are more willing to provide lower or flat premiums for 
longer term contracts.  
3. With adaptations, the sensitivities of annual premiums across time horizons with 
respect to other parameters decrease substantially. The most obvious example is the 
sensitivity of premium with respect to the financil vulnerability of insurers in Figure 
3.21. As adaptations are installed, the difference of annual premiums between a 
financially sound insurer and a finanacially fragile insurer is very small. Thus, the 
implementation of adaptations will reduce total risk exposures, thus causing 
insurance premium less responsive to other risk-related factors. 
 
3.5 Calculating Insurance Premiums Using Estimated Losses from 
Historical Storm Activities for Hurricane Risks in St. Lucia 
    In this section, storm activity statistics73 are available for us to estimate climate change 
factor, “a”. Alternatively, we can use lognormal loss model to fit the loss statistics 
derived by those storm activity statistics. The aim is to calculate insurance premiums for 
different timescales with and without mitigation. 
                                                            
73 Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE) provided the estimates for future hurricane-associated loss distributions of St. Lucia. 
  109
3.5.1 Data Descriptions74 
    The storm activity statistics are estimated by developing scenarios of storm activity 
over 5-year time scales using a simple model and estimating the probability and level of 
storm activity rate based on historical storm activity rate. Figure 3.22 provides the basic 
concept of the simple model. The next 5-year rate is predicted based on the mean over the 
past 5 years and the historical time series of the number of named storms and Cat 3-5 
storms. ‘Upper’, ‘Middle’, and ‘Lower’ simply reflect different estimates of percentiles. 
For example, ‘Upper’ is 95% percentile, ‘Middle’ is the Median, and ‘Lower’ is the 5% 
percentile. Figure 3.23 and Figure 3.24 presents the annual number of named storms and 
Cat 3-5 storms in the Atlantic basin from 1950 to 2005. Based on these historical data 
and the simple model, the statistics of variability in storm activity over successive 5-year 
period can be shows as in Table 3.11. This tells us, for example, that on average, there is 
a 12% increase in the number of Cat 3-5 storms between any two successive 5-year 
periods; however, 35% of the time we will see a decrease in activity of at least 12%, and 
35% of the time we will see an increase in activity of at least 22%.  
    These activity rates are used to adjust the frequencies of individual events in the RMS 
Caribbean Hurricane model and are converted into expected 5-year losses and standard 
deviation of losses, as exhibited in Table 3.12. These quantities are losses for 5 years. By 
assuming a simple constant growth rate, the annual growth rate can be derived. The 
climate change factor, “a”, is equivalent to the annual growth rate we obtained here.  
                                                            
74 The descriptions are based on “Note on calculation of 5-year growth rates in hurricane wind-related 
losses and extension to longer time periods” by Nicola Ranger 2009. 
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3.5.2 Models and Methods 
    With the estimated annual growth rate of losses induced by hurricane risk in St. Lucia 
and EPs that are provided by RMS, two broadly defined models are candidates for 
calculating insurance premiums: the potential growth model and the lognormal loss 
model. The simple model we constructed in section 3.2.1 is the form of the potential 
growth model with exponential growth rate. However, since EPs of the present-day losses 
are available, we simply use these EPs along with the growth rate (or the climate change 
factor), “a”, obtained in section 3.5.1. The lognormal loss model assumes that the 
conditional loss follows lognormal distribution when a hurricane occurs. 
3.5.2.1 Potential Growth Model 
Hazard rate of climate change occurrence is defined as:        1011 

tP
tPPtP t 

  
After iterations and normalization, the occurrence of climate change is summarized in 
Table 3.13.  
    Lt are randomly generated by Monte Carlo simulation based on the EPs. The 
distribution of ‘a’ is transformed from the 5 climate scenarios and are summarized in 
Table 3.14. For example, -0.085 and -0.0178 are point estimates of VaR5% and VaR35%. 
Because the middle percentile is 20%, we assign 20% to the value of -0.085. By the same 
token, the middle percentile of VaR35% and VaR50% is 42.5%, thus we assign 22.5% 
(=42.5%-20%) to the value of -0.0178.   
    Different growth patterns, potential growth model can be divided into the following 
three models. 
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(1) Step Model  
 
 
(2) Linear Model 
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(3) Exponential Model 
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3.5.2.2. Lognormal Loss Model 
    In this model, if a hurricane occurs, losses are assumed to be governed by a lognormal 
distribution, i.e.,   ,log~,
1
normalLL t
t
t

. Based on the EPs, prob(Lt=0)=0.5. 
Transformed conditional EPs can be obtained from the original EP curve. Since the 
estimates of  and of the lognormal distribution can be derived by fitting EPs or the 
expected losses and standard deviation of losses, this model is also separated into two 
approaches: fit EPs and fit expected losses and standard deviation of losses. 
(1) Fit EPs 
     and of the lognormal distribution are estimated by conditional EPs.  
 
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T
t
t
t
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~1


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    LandLFL ln1  can be derived from the EPs. By minimizing the sum of the 
distances between RHS and LHS, these two parameters are estimated to be 
077.1,1867.8    
(2) Fit expected losses and standard deviation of losses 
    Data supply unconditional means and standard deviations. Let L be the unconditional 
loss, and l be the conditional loss. Given prob(L=0)=0.5, the transformation between L 
and l is summarized as follows.           225.05.0,5.0 lElVarLVarlELE  . Then, 
 and  can be estimated by        2ln,1ln
2
2
 

  lE
lE
lVar .  
5-year catastrophic losses are simulated based on (i) EPs of present-day losses (ii) 
expected loss and standard deviation of present-day losses (iii) expected losses and 
standard deviations of losses of 5 potential climate scenarios. Annual insurance premiums 
are calculated by the formula,      TkLEemiumAnnual
TLT
/1Pr    
, where  5.0 LPm . 
3.5.3 Simulation Results 
    Table 3.15 reports statistics, tail probabilities, and annual premiums for 5-year losses 
in different models. As can be seen, different assumptions on potential growth models 
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with empirical losses do not have great impacts on annual premiums. The step model 
produces the lowest premium while the exponential model estimates the highest 
premium. If the size of loss is set to be lognormal-distributed when a catastrophe occurs, 
the lognormal loss model with potential climate scenarios predicts a higher insurance 
price than the potential growth models. However, as shown in Table 3.16, the lognormal 
loss model does not fit empirical data well. This phenomenon becomes more pronounced 
in the extreme tail of losses (Percentile greater than 99.9%). Another limitation of 
lognormal loss model lies in that we can estimate the premiums only when the statistics 
of losses for the time horizon are available. If we only have expected losses and standard 
deviation of losses for 5 years, insurance premiums for 20 years can not be calculated.   
    Table 3.17 and Table 3.18 exhibit statistics, tail probabilities, and annual premiums 
under four different scenarios in the potential growth model and in the lognormal loss 
model, respectively: BCS represents Best Case Scenario, MLS denotes Most Likely 
Scenario, WCS corresponds to Worst Case Scenario, and UCS is Uncertain Climate 
Scenarios. Since UCS calculates the expected losses by assigning a distribution to five 
potential climate scenarios, it contains the most information on the empirical data 
compared to other scenarios and thus is the best estimate based on the data at hand. 
Lognormal loss model captures standard deviations of losses for each climate scenario, 
which are not used by potential growth model. Thus, lognormal loss model will estimate 
a higher insurance price than potential growth model. This phenomenon will be 
highlighted in the presence of different scenarios. Even through insurance prices are very 
close to each other for both models under MLS (potential growth model predicts $5,438 
while lognormal loss model estimates $5,427), lognormal loss model shows greater 
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discrepancy between BCS and WCS (a higher premium in WCS and a lower premium in 
BCS). Under BCS, the annual premium estimated by lognormal loss model is $3,515, 
much lower than that predicted by the potential growth model, $5,091; however, under 
WCS, the annual premium of lognormal loss model is projected to be $8,975, much 
higher than that simulated using potential growth model, $6,002. Thus, it is not surprising 
that, under UCS, lognormal loss model, which incorporates the variance of ‘a’, estimates 
a higher annual premium. It simply reflects more uncertainties that will be encountered 
by the insurer in the future.    
    The choice between lognormal loss model and potential growth model lies in the 
availability of data. It would be more appropriate to assume the loss follows a lognormal 
distribution if one has sufficient data. For example, we have five different climate 
scenarios (ranging from 5% to 95%) as well as average annual losses and standard 
deviations of losses. The potential growth model uses only average annual losses but not 
standard deviations of losses. In order to extract more information from the data, fitting 
loss statistics to lognormal loss model is a better way to conduct the analysis. It is also 
worthy to note that lognormal loss model does not fit empirical data well in the extreme 
tail of losses, especially for percentiles greater than 99.9%. This is a disadvantage of all 
parametric distributions with few parameters. However, if one uses a generalized 
parametric distribution with more parameters, he will have higher variances of 
parameters, which could lead to imprecise estimates and higher type II errors. 
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3.6 Impact on Insurance Premiums in the Presence of Correlated 
Catastrophic Losses and Cost of Capital 
    In the previous section, we calculate the insurance premiums based on (3.6) by 
assuming that catastrophic losses are independent and that cost of capital is simply 
proportional to standard deviation of losses divided by the time horizon. In this section, 
the assumption on independence of losses over time will be relaxed and cost of capital 
will be reexamined based on Modigliani-Miller theorem. In addition, the expected loss 
for the next periods could adjust upward or downward based on the difference between 
the prior anticipated loss and the realized loss. This adjustment leads the losses to be 
Bayesian updated serial correlated. These impacts on insurance premiums will be 
illustrated quantitatively. Furthermore, the concept of risk capital proposed by Merton 
and Perold (1993) will be introduced to compare risk capitals required in two one-period 
contracts and a two-period contract.   
3.6.1 Losses Are Correlated over Time  
    Assume Lt follows a T-variate unspecified distribution with parameters (μ, σ, ρ). 
Annual premiums will be associated with the variance of the aggregate loss. Based on the 
derivation of section 3.10,    2
1
11  



TTLVar
T
t
t . The pattern of annual 
premium across time scales will depend on the correlation coefficient, ρ. Thus, except for 
the case of perfect correlation (ρ=1), annual premium will be decreasing across time 
scales. If Lt is assumed to be autoregressive (AR(1)) and stationary, i.e., Lt=c+φLt-1+εt, 
εt~N(0,σ2), |φ|<1, the variance of the aggregate loss will be 
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 , as calculated in section 3.10. We have a similar 
result: Unless losses over time are perfect correlated (φ=1), annual premium will be 
decreasing across time scales. Moreover, if we assume losses are independent while they 
are actually positively correlated, annual premiums will be underestimated because the 
variance is underestimated. 
3.6.2 Cost of Capital 
3.6.2.1 Modigliani-Miller theorem  
    The Modigliani-Miller theorem, proposed by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, 
forms the basis for modern thinking on capital structure (how much capital is allocated 
between debt and equity), though it is generally viewed as a purely theoretical result 
since it assumes away many important factors in the capital structure decision. These 
other reasons include bankruptcy costs, agency costs, taxes, information asymmetry.  
    Assume a perfect capital market (no transaction or bankruptcy costs; perfect 
information); firms and individuals can borrow at the same interest rate; no taxes; and 
investment decisions are not affected by financing decisions. The value of a company is 
independent of its capital structure (how a firm is financed is irrelevant to its value).  
    The analysis can be extended to take the effect of taxes into account. Under a classical 
tax system, the tax deductibility of interest makes debt financing valuable; that is, the cost 
of capital decreases as the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases. The 
optimal structure, then, would be to have virtually no equity at all.  
    Furthermore, bankruptcy cost is allowed to exist. In this case, there is an advantage to 
financing with debt (namely, the tax benefit of debts) and that there is a cost of financing 
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with debt (the bankruptcy costs of debt). The marginal benefit declines as debt increases, 
while the marginal cost increases, so that a firm can optimize its value by choosing the 
optimal ratio of debt and equity to use for financing. 
3.6.2.2 Estimating Cost of Capital 
    Catastrophe insurance premiums should also consider cost of capital to insurers. Dollar 
cost of capital to insurers in our catastrophe risk model can be measured by multiplying 
cost of capital and expected total capital. In the benchmark case, we propose that cost of 
capital=2%. Bankruptcy cost is reflected in the dollar cost of capital that is required to 
maintain credit rating for insurers.  
The procedures to estimate expected total capital (KT) at initial for issuing T-year 
catastrophe insurance are shown as follows:  
Set Kτ,T as the total capital that is required in year τ to maintain its credit rating for 
issuing T-year catastrophe insurance.  
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1 , C is the critical percentile 
of Value at Risk (VaRC%). For example, C=99.9 represents the case that the capital is 
sufficient for 1-in-1000 years event.  r denotes the discount rate. 
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that nσ(L) is equal to the distance between VaRC%(L) and E(L). 
The expected total capital that is required at initial of the contract to maintain its credit 
rating for issuing T-year catastrophe insurance is denoted as KT. 
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Cost of capital is simply (2%)*KT 
3.6.2.3 Annual Premium for T-year Catastrophe Insurance  
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, where X1 is the administrative cost of marketing a policy, X2 is the upfront cost to 
insurer of marketing a policy.  
Inputting KT derived in section 3.6.2.2, total premium 
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Annual premium is simply the total premium divided by T. 
Thus, annual premium 
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If we further set r=0, X1=0, and X2=0, the annual premium derived here can be compared 
with that estimated by (3.6’): 
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standard deviation of aggregate losses 
Thus, using (3.6’) to price insurance will underestimate annual premiums.  
3.6.3 Annual Premiums with Correlations over Time and Cost of Capital 
    Taking climate change into account will introduce correlation of losses over time into 
the catastrophe model through the cumulative and uncertain effects of climate change.  
In addition, the annual premium of catastrophe insurance would be increased when 
considering cost of capital by using (3.7) compared with using (3.6’). Table 3.19 (3.20) 
and Figure 3.25 (3.26) depict annual premiums of catastrophe insurance with no cost of 
capital and with cost of capital for a house with the value of $1 million with no climate 
change (with climate change). As can be seen, the pattern of annual premiums changes 
because of cost of capital: with no cost of capital, annual premiums decline with the term 
of contracts; however, with cost of capital, annual premiums rise with the term of 
contracts. In addition, the presence of climate change increases the insurance premium. 
For example, with no climate change, if the term of the contract increases from 1 year to 
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5 years, the annual premium with no cost of capital declines from $48,300 to $44,500 
while the annual premium with cost of capital rises to $52,900. In contrast, in the 
presence of climate change, annual premiums for a 5-year contract are $45,200 with no 
cost of capital and $53,700 with cost of capital, respectively.  
    Table 3.19 and 3.20 also provide the sensitivity analysis on the cost of capital. The 
equivalent cost of capital shows the cost of capital such that a potential policyholder is 
indifferent between purchasing a multiple-year contract or sequential 1-period contracts.  
A cost of capital of 2% for the one-year contract is set as the benchmark. As can be seen, 
the cost of capital declines with the terms of contract indicating that a lower cost of 
capital is required to ensure that the annual premium will not increase for longer term 
contracts. For example, in Table 3.19, the equivalent cost of capital such that the annual 
premium is the same as an annual renewal contract decreases from 1.56% for a 2 year 
contract to 1.18% for a 5-year contract.  
3.6.4 Bayesian-Updated Serial Correlation 
    Suppose that the realized catastrophic loss in the past year is underestimated compared 
with the anticipated loss one year ago, one would adjust the expected loss of the next year 
upward based on the realized loss. Through this yearly updated Bayesian process, the 
expected loss of the next year depends on both the long term trend of catastrophic risk 
and the realized losses of prior years. If it is the case, annual premiums could further rise 
due to the Bayesian-updated correlation because more capitals are required to be reserved 
for the uncertainty of updated expected losses in the subsequent periods.  
  121
    The volatilities of no Bayesian-updated correlated process and Bayesian-updated 
correlated process in the presence and in the absence of growing trend of catastrophic 
losses have been derived in section 3.11. The results show that in either case, with 
Bayesian-updated correlation, the volatility will be higher. In addition, the annual 
premiums and capital reserves for insurers will also be greater compared with the case 
predicted by (3.6’), where Bayesian-updated correlations are considered. In particular, the 
annual premiums show a rising trend with respect to the time scale. As can be seen in the 
variance of Bayesian-updated process, the increment volatility of Bayesian-updated 
correlation ((3.25)-(3.24) in section 3.11), 
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, is positively proportional to the weight put on the realized loss in each period (w), the 
growth rate of catastrophic losses (a), and the time horizon (T). Thus, Insurers’ updating 
their estimates of future losses based more weight on the revealed losses, potential 
climate change, and a longer term contract, will raise the annual premiums and the capital 
reserves that are required for insurers to support a given credit rating.   
3.6.5 Comparison of Risk Capital in a 1-period Contract and a 2-period Contract 
    Based on Merton and Perold (1993), risk capital is defined as the smallest amount that 
can be invested to insure the value of the firm’s net assets against a loss in value relative 
to the risk-free investment of those net assets. This concept of risk capital can be applied 
to the financing, capital budgeting, and risk management decisions of financial firms. In 
this study, we applied this concept to estimate risk capital that is required for insurers 
who wrote catastrophe insurance policies and to compare the amount of risk capital each 
period for two 1-period contracts and a 2-period contract. The major advantage of using 
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this concept of risk capital to estimate risk capital lies in that we can avoid determining 
the credit risk appropriate for comparing of insurance policies with different time scales. 
For insurers who issues catastrophe insurance, net assets are simply premiums collected 
minus the potential loss. Premiums are determined at the inception of the contract based 
on the expected loss if the price is actuarially fair, whereas the potential loss is set to 
follow a distribution with mean and variance. In this case, the risk capital can be 
expressed as the value of a European call option on the potential loss with exercise price 
equal to the premium. 
3.6.5.1 Assumptions  
1. L1 and L2 are prior belief about the loss distributions of period 1 and period 2. 
Specifically, they follow a normal distribution with parameters (μ1,σ) and (μ2,σ), 
respectively. 
2. There exists potential default risk for insurers when realized losses exceed 
premiums  
3. The 2-period contract binds insurers to provide and policyholders to purchase 
catastrophe insurance in the beginning of period 2 at a pre-determined price  
4. In the second 1-period contract, the price of catastrophe insurance can change 
based on the posterior belief about the loss distribution of period 2, which is 
affected by both the realized loss in period 1 and the prior belief about the losses  
5. Posterior loss distribution of period 2 conditional on the realized loss of period 
1,   ,~| 212 NRN NLL , will be derived based on an updated process. If the realized 
loss of period 1 turns out to be greater (less) than the mean of the prior loss 
distribution of period 1, the mean of the posterior loss in period 2 will be adjusted 
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upward (downward) for the amount proportional to the discrepancy between the 
realized loss and the mean of the prior loss. More specifically, 
  0,1122  wLw RN  . For simplicity, the updated process only changes 
the expected loss but not the standard deviation 
6. Insurance premiums are actuarially fair and are determined prior to the realization 
of losses in each period. Thus, P1=μ1, P2=μ2, NNP 22   
7. Risk capital is reflected in the price of the call option, which is available in capital 
markets for the insurer to hedge against the potential risk 
3.6.5.2 Nature of Risk for Two 1-period Contracts and a 2-period Contract  
    In two 1-period catastrophe insurance policies, the premium of period 2 can be 
adjusted upward or downward based on the realized losses of period 1. The only risk is 
default risk when losses surpass premiums in each period. In contrast, in a 2-period 
catastrophe insurance policy, the premium is fixed in the beginning of period 1. The risk 
stems both from the catastrophe losses exceeding the premiums (default risk) and from 
the market-adjusted premiums exceeding the pre-determined premium (premium risk). 
The discrepancy of the nature of risk between two 1-period contracts and a 2-period 
contract leads to different amount of risk capital being reserved for different terms of 
insurance contracts.  
3.6.5.3 Risk Capital for Two 1-period Contracts  
    In order to hedge the default risk, the insurer can purchase an option that payoff when 
the realized loss exceeds the premium they collected. When this situation occurs, the 
insurer will be indemnified for the difference between the realized loss and the premium 
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and avoid default on the claims. Risk capital to cover losses in period 1 is determined by 
the value of the call option with payoff   11 PL .    2111  PLES Q  , where 
EQ[.] represents the expected value under risk-neutral probability, whereas risk capital to 
cover losses in period 2 given the realized loss in period 1 is determined by the value of 
the call option with payoff    212 | PLL RN .    2| 2122  PLLES RNQN , where 
 11222   RN LwP . Please refer to section 3.12 for the derivations. 
3.6.5.4 Risk Capital for a 2-period Contract 
    Assume the fixed premium predetermined at the beginning of period 1 is PLT. The 
premium should be equal to the average of the expected losses in period 1 and period 2, 
i.e., 
2
21  LTP .  
  If the realized loss of period 1 turns out to be greater than the prior expectation, market 
premiums in period 2 will adjust upward. Insurers who wrote a 2-period contract can not 
change the premium at period 2, creating higher risk for the existing policyholders. 
Consequently, the insurers have to provide additional risk capital in period 1 to protect 
this possible incremental loss. The additional risk capital for insurers is equivalent to the 
option price with payoff (P2-PLT)+, which option buyer pays to obtain the right to exercise 
the option if it turns out to be in-the-money (P2>PLT). The option value can be derived as 
w units of call option with underlying RL1  and strike price P1 as follows. 
       2112   wPLEwPPE RQLTQ
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    In period 1, policyholders care about not only the default risk but also the premium 
risk, both of which will be triggered by the realized loss higher than anticipated in period 
1. Risk capital to cover losses in period 1 is thus determined 
by      21211   wPPESS LTQLT . 
If the realized loss does not exceed the anticipated loss, the premium in period 2 should 
be less than the fixed premium. In this case, risk capital to cover the loss in period 2 is 
determined solely by the value of the call option on default risk in period 2. The call 
option has payoff   212 | PLL RN .    2| 2122  PLLES RNQN , where 
 11222   RN LwP  
3.6.5.5 Comparison of Risk Capital  
    A comparison of risk capital in period 1 for two 1-period contracts and a 2-period 
contract indicates that a 2-period contract requires more capital than a 1-period contract. 
The additional risk capital comes from the fact that policyholders in a 2-period contract 
face premium risk, which does not exist in a 1-period contract. In an annual-renewal 
contract, premiums can be adjusted based on the incoming realized losses in each period; 
however, in a long term contract, premiums are fixed in the inception of the contract and 
can not adjust upward even in the presence of rising trend of catastrophic losses. If the 
insurers purchase an option with payoff    LTPP2 in a 2-period contract, when the 
premiums in period 2 increases due to the high realized loss in period 1, insurers will be 
compensated for  LTPP 2  for the option of hedging premium risk. Consequently, the 
insurers will hold   22 PPPP LTLT   in the beginning of period 2. By purchasing this 
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option, insurers who wrote a 2-period contract will have the same payoff structure as 
those who wrote two 1-period contracts in the beginning the period 2, which makes 1-
period and 2-period contracts comparable. 
3.6.5.6 Example 
    An insurer provides periodically-renewal coverage for 2 periods: 
 L1~N(μ1, σ1)  L2~N(μ2, σ2)  μ1= 1,000       μ2=1,000       σ1= σ2= 500  
Assuming insurance is priced at an actuarially fair rate.  
P1=1,000    P2=1,000 
Risk capital in period 1= (L1-P1)+= 0.4 σ1 = 200  
Risk capital in period 2= (L2-P2)+= 0.4 σ2 = 200  
    Now suppose the insurer provides long term coverage for 2 periods and wants to 
determine risk capital in each period.  
Updated premium in period 2 is determined by P’2= wL1+(1-w) μ2 
Suppose w=0.3,  
P’2= 0.3 L1+(0.7) 1,000 = 0.3L1+700 
Option for hedging premium risk of coverage in period 2  
= (P’2-PLT)+ = w*(L1-P1)+ = (0.3) (0.4) σ1 = 60  
Risk capital in period 2= (L2-P2)+ = 0.4 σ2 = 200  
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Risk capital in period 1= (L1-P1)+ + (P’2-PLT)+ = 0.4 σ1+ (0.3) (0.4) σ1  = 200+60 = 260  
    The principal difference between risk capital of a 1-period contract and a 2-period 
contract lies in the option for hedging premium risk of coverage in period 2. This 
example explicitly illustrates the additional premium risk faced by policyholders of a 2-
period contract compared to two 1-period contracts.  
    There exists offsetting effects for insurers to extend the term of contracts. On one hand, 
a longer term insurance contract encourages policyholders to invest on mitigations. Loss 
distributions will diminish to some extent after mitigations being implemented. On the 
other hand, a longer term contract increases risk capital required to be reserved in each 
period.  In the above example, assume that a 2-period contract induces policyholders to 
implement mitigation measures, which reduce m proportion of the expected loss while an 
annual-renewal contract does not incentivize mitigation measures. The optimal level of 
mitigation such that 1-period and 2-period contracts are comparable can be determined by 
the proportion of expected loss being reduced, m*. The risk capital in period 1 for a 2-
period contract should be 260*(1-m*) while the risk capital in period 1 for a 1-period 
contract should be 200. Thus, m*=23.08%. If a 2-period contract can induce mitigation 
such that the expected loss are reduced for more than 23.08%, insurers would like to 
promote 2-period contract rather than 1-period contract due to the less risk capital 
required. Based on the loss data for the wood-frame building in St. Lucia, expected loss 
will reduce at least 27.74% in the presence of mitigation measures. In this case, insurers 
are willing to issue a 2-period contract. In addition, there are other savings to the insurer 
from a 2-period contract—marketing costs and transaction costs associated with renewing 
the 1-year policy. 
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3.7 Conclusions 
    The impact of climate change on catastrophic risk has recently been the focus of 
researchers with a variety of backgrounds. In this study, I construct a simple catastrophic 
risk model with potential climate change, quantify the impact of potential climate change 
and associated uncertainties on catastrophic risk for longer timescales, conduct benefit-
cost analysis of mitigation in reducing catastrophic losses with and without climate 
change, and estimate annual premiums for short-term and long-term catastrophe 
insurance under different scenarios. In particular, three research questions have been 
raised and potential answers to them have been proposed as follows. 
    First, will insurance market still function well given the distribution changes implied 
by climate change? In a regime of climate change, the catastrophic loss distributions are 
not well-defined since the impact of climate change on catastrophic losses is changing 
over time along with a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity. Specifically, uncertainties 
with respect to the timing of climate change and the impact of climate change on 
potential losses have to be taken into account in the catastrophic risk model. In addition, 
climate change also leads to higher correlations and cumulative effect on inter-temporal 
losses, which in turn create a fatter-tail loss distribution. These climate-induced statistical 
properties could jeopardize the originally well-functioned insurance market, giving rise to 
higher premiums, increasing risk capital required, and depress the supply or even the 
availability of insurance.     
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    Second, how does optimal mitigation change with climate change for a longer time 
scale? Benefit-cost analyses on the implementation of mitigation measures have been 
conducted both by simulations and by using hurricane losses in St Lucia, respectively. 
The simulation results indicate that the optimal mitigation level will rise with people’s 
concern about the future (in terms of a lower discount rate or a longer time scale) while 
the empirical results suggest that homeowners will have more incentive to invest on 
mitigation in the presence of climate change and for longer time scales. Moreover, for the 
hurricane risk in St. Lucia, mitigation is empirically found to completely offset the 
impact of climate change. 
    Finally, what can we say about long term versus short term insurance contracts 
regarding the impact of cost of capital and Bayesian-updated serial correlations on risk 
capitals and premiums? Based on theoretical model I constructed, as cost of capital is 
taken into account, annual premiums increase with terms of the contract, whereas, after 
considering Bayesian-updated serial correlation on catastrophic losses, the volatility of 
aggregate losses rises compared to the case of no serial correlation. If the posterior 
expected loss will be adjusted based on the realized losses in the past periods, the risk 
capital in the sense of Merton and Perold (1993) has been proven to be greater for a 2-
period contract than a 1-period contract due to the additional premium risk borne by the 
insurer. However, longer term contracts incentivize mitigation measures and reduce 
marketing and renewal transaction costs. The appropriate terms of insurance contract 
coupled with other risk transfer instruments can be determined by balancing the trade-off. 
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3.8 Future Research on Long Term Insurance 
    Potential climate change will create challenges in catastrophic risk management. The 
consequences can be limited if we implement effective mitigation measures and design 
appropriate risk sharing arrangements in advance. Mitigation measures have been shown 
to effectively reduce losses for all parties involved even with potential climate change. 
Longer term insurance contracts can incentivize mitigation measures75 but will increase 
risk capital required and premiums due to the increased uncertainty regarding future 
losses for longer time scales. Future research would compare long term insurance 
contracts for various periods with an annual renewal contract with and without mitigation 
with different scenarios regarding climate change include the case of no climate change.  
    The case of no climate change will be deemed as the benchmark, the trade-off of long 
term contracts and annual renewal ones will involve the benefits of mitigation measures 
and the extra costs associated with holding reserve capital. A longer term insurance 
contract encourages policyholders to implement mitigation measures, but it raises risk 
capital and the cost of capital. How can one determine the appropriate terms of insurance 
contract to balance the trade-off between short term and long term contracts? Annual 
insurance premiums can be used as the criteria. Mitigation reduces the catastrophic loss 
and also the premium while higher cost of capital pushes up the premium. In order to 
conduct this analysis, we need empirical estimates of cost of capital by insurers as well as 
amount of risk capital reserved by insurers as a function of catastrophic losses and 
                                                            
75 Based on Kunreuther, H. and Michel-Kerjan, E., 2009, At War with the Weather: Managing Large-Scale 
Risks in a New Era of Catastrophes, MIT Press 
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contract length; we also need to estimate the extent to which catastrophic losses can be 
reduced by different mitigation measures.  
    With potential climate change, similar trade-offs between a longer term contract and an 
annual renewal contract need to be analyzed. Climate change may reinforce both the 
benefit and the cost of longer term contracts by raising the returns from mitigation, and 
by increasing the amount of reserve capital. How will the reduction (increase) of annual 
premiums due to mitigations (cost of capital) change with potential climate change for 
different time scales? In addition to applying loss data to create EP curves with and 
without mitigation for the risk-prone regions, we will also estimate the impact of climate 
change on catastrophic losses (such as storm activities regarding hurricane risk or sea 
level rise regarding flood risk). This impact can be measured based on the catastrophic 
loss event table provided by Willis Re, which provides the event type, the rate of 
occurrence, the expected loss, the independent volatility, the correlated volatility, and risk 
exposures.  
    In this study, a simple two-period model was constructed to illustrate the additional 
risk capital required for a two-period contract compared with a one-period contract. I also 
calculated the minimal level of mitigation stimulated by a two-period contract such that 
two one-period contracts are comparable to a two-period contact in terms of risk capital. 
If we would like to apply this approach to evaluate the trade-off between mitigation 
measures and the length of contracts, more challenges will appear. First, it will be 
difficult to estimate catastrophic loss distributions with reliable parameters for each 
period, especially with potential climate change. Second, even if we can approximately 
estimate the loss distribution each period, it is unlikely that losses over time are 
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independent. With correlated losses, risk capital cannot be measured by the value of a call 
options with a simply form of payoff. For example, the payoff of a call option to hedge 
against premium risk in period one for a three-period model may depend on the 
correlated realized losses in the first two periods. More advanced option pricing 
techniques may be required to solve the problem. Third, if the losses over time are 
assumed to be independent and stable, the weights placed on the realized loss in the 
previous periods are unlikely to be constant. People tend to over-adjust large losses and 
under-adjust small losses. This behavior will further raise the risk capital for hedging 
against premium risk. In order to capture the effect of this behavior on the weights, an 
experimental study would be more suitable than from the empirical data.      
 
Appendix 
3.9 Statistics of Exact Losses with Potential Climate Change 
The aggregate loss can be presented as two components, the aggregate loss prior to 
climate change and the aggregate loss posterior to climate change, i.e., 21
~~~ LLL  . 
1
~L  denotes the aggregate loss prior to climate change and is the sum of annual losses 
before the occurrence of climate change, i.e., 



1
1,1
~~
i
iLL , where 


 pyprobabilitwith
pyprobabilitwith
Li 10
1~
1,    for i = 1,…,τ 
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2
~L  represents the aggregate loss posterior to climate change and is the sum of annual 
losses after the occurrence of climate change, i.e., 


T
j
jLL
1
2,2
~~

, where 
 

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
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L
j
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2,

 for  j = τ+1,…,T 
With the above settings, the conditional aggregate loss prior to climate change follows 
Binominal distribution, i.e.,  pBinL
i
i ,~|
~
1
1, 


, whereas the conditional aggregate loss 
after climate change can not be identified. Nonetheless, the conditional expected loss is 
derived as follows. 
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By LHospital Rule, as 0a  ,    
2
11111 
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a
ap T . In equation (3.8), 
the second term approaches 
2
1Tp  while the first term does not depend on a and 
equates 
2
1Tp , thus the expected aggregate loss approaches pT  , which verifies the 
fact that if no climate change, a=0,   pTLEpTBinL  ~),(~~ .  
Moreover, the conditional moment generating functions of the two components of the 
aggregate losses are given by these two equations: 
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Thus, the moment generating function of the aggregate loss can be written as follows: 
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We can verify that the expected loss can be derived by differentiating the log of the 
moment generating function of the aggregate loss with respect to the parameter θ at the 
value with θ=0.  
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Nevertheless, higher moments are much harder to be obtained compared with the 
expected value since the procedures involve differentiation of a product with up to T 
terms.  
By Double Expectation Theorem, the variance of the aggregate loss can be expressed as 
this formula:       |~|~)~( LEVarLVarELVar                                        (3.13) 
 |~LE  has been obtained in equation (3.8). Therefore, the second term in equation 
(3.13) can be derived as follows.  
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In order to derive the first term of equation (3.13), having the value of  |~LVar  is the 
requirement. Since the independence between 1
~L and 2
~L given the timing of climate 
change τ,       |~|~|~ 21 LVarLVarLVar  .                                             (3.15)    
   ppLVar  1|~1   can be easily deduced by discovering that  pBinL ,~|~1  . 
However, the functional form of the first term of equation (3.15) is difficult to obtain. 
Since  |~2LE  has been known in equation (3.8), we decompose the variance into two 
components:       22222 |~|~|~  LELELVar  .                                         (3.16) 
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We have no clue to derive the second term of RHS in equation (3.17) and set it to be A. 
In sum, variance of loss is given as follows.  
      |~|~)~( LEVarLVarELVar   
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3.10 Chernoff Bounds  
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The Chernoff bound equates the minimal value of the RHS in equation (3.19), which are 
derived by finding the optimal positive θ. For example, the Chernoff bound (0.6207) of 
the exceedance probability with threshold of 1 in Table 3.2.1 is determined by setting 
T=20, p=0.01, a=0.05, and searching for the optimal θ=0.9911>0.  
 
3.11 Pattern of Annual Insurance Premium when Losses Are Correlated 
over Time 
1. Assume Lt follows a T-variate unspecified distribution with parameters (μ, σ, ρ) 
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2. Lt is autoregressive (AR(1)) and stationary  
Lt=c+φLt-1+εt, εt~N(0,σ2), |φ|<1 
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3.12 The Comparison of Volatilities with no Bayesian-updated 
Correlated Process and with Bayesian-updated Correlated Process  
1. No growing trend for catastrophic losses 
(1) No Bayesian-updated serial correlation 
TtLL tt ,,2,1,0    
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(2) With Bayesian-updated serial correlation 
  tttt LEL  1 ,    2,0~t  
     1211 1   ttttt LEwLwLE  
Tt ,,2,1   
=> t
t
i
it wLL   

1
1
0  
This result can be proved by mathematical induction. 
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101  LL
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Comparing the values of (3.22) and (3.23) indicates that 
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1
2
1
2  , with 
equality only when T=1.  
As we apply variance in the presence of Bayesian-updated serial correlation to price 
insurance premium, annual premiums will increase with longer timescales. This result 
can be verified by obtaining the derivative of the volatility with respect to the timescale.  
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. Taking Bayesian-updated serial 
correlation into account leads the annual catastrophic insurance premiums show an 
increasing pattern even if we do not aggregate the capital reserves for each year.  
2. With growing trend for catastrophic losses 
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=>The same with the case of no growing tend for catastrophic losses 
  143
(2) With Bayesian-updated serial correlation 
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Thus, by mathematical induction,     tttt waaLL 
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A Comparison of the values between (3.24) and (3.25) indicates that 
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2  , with equality only when T=1.  
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3.13 Derivation of Risk Capital for Two One-period Contracts 
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Table 1.1: Fair Values of Indemnity-based, PCS-index, and Hybrid-trigger CAT bonds and Their 
Differences in Case (1) 07.0,05.0,02.0  iiia   
Threshold 0.2 0.6 1 1.6 2 
Correlation Panel A: Value of Indemnity-based CAT Bond (VI) 
0.1 21.9717 22.2245 22.3302 22.3844 22.4011 
0.5 21.9792 22.2316 22.3245 22.3838 22.3989 
1 21.9711 22.2292 22.3275 22.3846 22.402 
 Panel B: Value of PCS-index CAT Bond (VPCS) 
0.1 22.189 22.3809 22.4126 22.4244 22.4277 
0.5 22.1878 22.3764 22.4126 22.425 22.4283 
1 22.1844 22.3794 22.4131 22.4246 22.4279 
 Panel C: Value of Hybrid-trigger CAT Bond (VH) 
0.1 21.9102 22.1515 22.2647 22.3491 22.3763 
0.5 21.9157 22.1568 22.2663 22.3454 22.371 
1 21.9085 22.1479 22.2655 22.3508 22.3762 
 Panel D: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VPCS) 
0.1 -0.2173 -0.1564 -0.0824 -0.04 -0.0266 
0.5 -0.2086 -0.1448 -0.0881 -0.0412 -0.0294 
1 -0.2133 -0.1502 -0.0856 -0.04 -0.0259 
 Panel E: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VH) 
0.1 0.0615 0.073 0.0655 0.0353 0.0248 
0.5 0.0635 0.0748 0.0582 0.0384 0.0279 
1 0.0626 0.0813 0.062 0.0338 0.0258 
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Table 1.2: Fair Values of Indemnity-based, PCS-index, and Hybrid-trigger CAT bonds and Their 
Differences in Case (2) 08.0,05.0,07.0  iiia   
Threshold 0.2 0.6 1 1.6 2 
Correlation Panel A: Value of Indemnity-based CAT Bond (VI) 
0.1 21.9601 22.2224 22.3234 22.3848 22.4029 
0.5 21.9535 22.225 22.3204 22.382 22.4001 
1 21.957 22.2202 22.324 22.3832 22.3996 
 Panel B: Value of PCS-index CAT Bond (VPCS) 
0.1 21.8933 22.1404 22.2601 22.3425 22.3727 
0.5 21.8878 22.1391 22.2582 22.3379 22.3689 
1 21.8906 22.1402 22.2592 22.3436 22.3711 
 Panel C: Value of Hybrid-trigger CAT Bond (VH) 
0.1 21.8737 22.1053 22.2294 22.3222 22.3577 
0.5 21.8666 22.1083 22.2351 22.3183 22.3531 
1 21.8731 22.1077 22.2324 22.3256 22.3565 
 Panel D: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VPCS) 
0.1 0.0668 0.082 0.0633 0.0423 0.0302 
0.5 0.0657 0.0859 0.0622 0.0441 0.0312 
1 0.0664 0.08 0.0648 0.0396 0.0285 
 Panel E: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VH) 
0.1 0.0864 0.1171 0.094 0.0626 0.0452 
0.5 0.0869 0.1167 0.0853 0.0637 0.047 
1 0.0839 0.1125 0.0916 0.0576 0.0431 
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Table 1.3: Fair Values of Indemnity-based, Model-based, and Hybrid-trigger CAT bonds and Their 
Differences in Case (3)  08.0,05.0,8.1,2 21  ii   
Threshold 0.2 0.6 1 1.6 2 
Correlation Panel A: Value of Indemnity-based CAT Bond (VI) 
0.1 21.96 22.2255 22.3315 22.3847 22.4029 
0.5 21.9551 22.229 22.328 22.3827 22.3989 
1 21.9557 22.2222 22.3251 22.3854 22.401 
 Panel B: Value of Model-based CAT Bond (VM) 
0.1 21.9099 22.1599 22.2768 22.3486 22.3752 
0.5 21.9062 22.1696 22.279 22.3543 22.3782 
1 21.9052 22.1589 22.273 22.3529 22.3792 
 Panel C: Value of Hybrid-trigger CAT Bond (VH) 
0.1 21.8743 22.1138 22.2362 22.3273 22.3591 
0.5 21.8735 22.1075 22.2403 22.3273 22.3554 
1 21.8711 22.1093 22.2311 22.3215 22.3566 
 Panel D: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VM) 
0.1 0.0501 0.0656 0.0547 0.0361 0.0277 
0.5 0.0489 0.0594 0.049 0.0284 0.0207 
1 0.0505 0.0633 0.0521 0.0325 0.0218 
 Panel E: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VH) 
0.1 0.0857 0.1117 0.0953 0.0574 0.0438 
0.5 0.0816 0.1215 0.0877 0.0554 0.0435 
1 0.0846 0.1129 0.094 0.0639 0.0444 
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Table 1.4: Fair Values of Indemnity-based, Model-based, and Hybrid-trigger CAT bonds and Their 
Differences in Case (4)  02.0,05.0,2.2,2 21  ii   
Threshold 0.2 0.6 1 1.6 2 
Correlation Panel A: Value of Indemnity-based CAT Bond (VI) 
0.1 21.9505 22.2176 22.3185 22.3777 22.3992 
0.5 21.9472 22.2316 22.3278 22.385 22.4029 
1 21.9516 22.2212 22.3206 22.3813 22.399 
 Panel B: Value of Model-based CAT Bond (VM) 
0.1 22.1247 22.349 22.3991 22.421 22.4249 
0.5 22.1222 22.355 22.4042 22.422 22.4259 
1 22.1321 22.3509 22.4005 22.4192 22.4241 
 Panel C: Value of Hybrid-trigger CAT Bond (VH) 
0.1 22.1735 22.3721 22.4115 22.425 22.4271 
0.5 22.1896 22.3781 22.4135 22.4259 22.4277 
1 22.1791 22.3749 22.4112 22.4233 22.4267 
 Panel D: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VM) 
0.1 -0.1742 -0.1314 -0.0806 -0.0433 -0.0257 
0.5 -0.175 -0.1234 -0.0764 -0.037 -0.023 
1 -0.1805 -0.1297 -0.0799 -0.0379 -0.0251 
 Panel E: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VH) 
0.1 -0.223 -0.1545 -0.093 -0.0473 -0.0279 
0.5 -0.2424 -0.1465 -0.0857 -0.0409 -0.0248 
1 -0.2275 -0.1537 -0.0906 -0.042 -0.0277 
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Table 1.5: Fair Values of Indemnity-based, Model-based, and Hybrid-trigger CAT bonds and Their 
Differences in Case (5)  02.0,05.0,8.1,2 21  ii   
Threshold 0.2 0.6 1 1.6 2 
Correlation Panel A: Value of Indemnity-based CAT Bond (VI) 
0.1 21.9555 22.2282 22.3217 22.3821 22.4 
0.5 21.962 22.2231 22.328 22.3829 22.4018 
1 21.9633 22.2217 22.3239 22.3815 22.4008 
 Panel B: Value of Model-based CAT Bond (VM) 
0.1 22.2369 22.3996 22.422 22.4288 22.4293 
0.5 22.2356 22.3908 22.419 22.4265 22.4289 
1 22.2276 22.3938 22.4179 22.427 22.4284 
 Panel C: Value of Hybrid-trigger CAT Bond (VH) 
0.1 22.1852 22.3756 22.4113 22.4244 22.4275 
0.5 22.1807 22.3769 22.4115 22.4245 22.4277 
1 22.1804 22.3742 22.4119 22.4235 22.427 
 Panel D: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VM) 
0.1 -0.2814 -0.1714 -0.1003 -0.0467 -0.0293 
0.5 -0.2736 -0.1677 -0.091 -0.0436 -0.0271 
1 -0.2643 -0.1721 -0.094 -0.0455 -0.0276 
 Panel E: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VH) 
0.1 -0.2297 -0.1474 -0.0896 -0.0423 -0.0275 
0.5 -0.2187 -0.1538 -0.0835 -0.0416 -0.0259 
1 -0.2171 -0.1525 -0.088 -0.042 -0.0262 
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Table 1.6: Fair Values of Indemnity-based, Model-based, and Hybrid-trigger CAT bonds and Their 
Differences in Case (6)  08.0,05.0,2.2,2 21  ii   
Threshold 0.2 0.6 1 1.6 2 
Correlation Panel A: Value of Indemnity-based CAT Bond (VI) 
0.1 21.9503 22.2226 22.3194 22.3805 22.3971 
0.5 21.9624 22.2267 22.3232 22.3848 22.3996 
1 21.9468 22.2094 22.3159 22.3809 22.4002 
 Panel B: Value of Model-based CAT Bond (VM) 
0.1 21.848 22.054 22.1836 22.289 22.3273 
0.5 21.8503 22.0608 22.1838 22.2879 22.3258 
1 21.8401 22.0498 22.1728 22.2794 22.3181 
 Panel C: Value of Hybrid-trigger CAT Bond (VH) 
0.1 21.8671 22.1066 22.2324 22.3198 22.3537 
0.5 21.8789 22.1153 22.237 22.3212 22.3556 
1 21.8642 22.0986 22.221 22.3145 22.3517 
 Panel D: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VM) 
0.1 0.1023 0.1686 0.1358 0.0915 0.0698 
0.5 0.1121 0.1659 0.1394 0.0969 0.0738 
1 0.1067 0.1596 0.1431 0.1015 0.0821 
 Panel E: Difference of the Values of CAT Bonds (VI-VH) 
0.1 0.0832 0.116 0.087 0.0607 0.0434 
0.5 0.0835 0.1114 0.0862 0.0636 0.044 
1 0.0826 0.1108 0.0949 0.0664 0.0485 
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Table 2.1: Statistics of Premiums and Losses of 2009 Top 25 Companies in Property and Casualty 
Insurance Industry. This table shows the statistics of premiums and losses of 2009 top 25 companies in 
property and casualty insurance industry, collected by NAIC (National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners). The ratios of losses to premiums are 59.27% and 60.94%, based on different definitions 
of losses. The former is defined by direct losses incurred divided by direct premiums earned while the latter 
is defined by the sum of direct losses incurred and direct defense and cost containment expenses incurred 
divided by direct premium earned.  
Source: http://www.naic.org/research_home.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
  153
 
Table 3.1: Climate Change Effect on the Statistics of the Simulated Losses 
p=0.01,T=20, L=1 Simulated Exact Simulated Exact  
Climate change factor (a) 0 0 0.05 0.05 %change 
Expected value 0.2018 0.2 0.2428 0.2422 20.32% 
Standard deviation  0.4482 0.445 0.5465  21.93% 
Skewness 2.2029 2.2024 2.2903  3.97% 
Kurtosis 7.7498 7.7505 8.2858  6.92% 
VaR (95%) 1 1 1.3829  38.29% 
VaR (97.5%) 1 1 1.6533  65.33% 
VaR (99%) 2 2 2.3314  16.57% 
ES (95%) 1.3754 1.3581 1.8622  35.39% 
ES (97.5%) 1.7508 1.7163 2.2166  26.60% 
ES (99%) 2.107 2.1048 2.7279  29.47% 
Prob(Loss>1.0) 0.0177 0.0169 0.1663 0.6207 839.55% 
Prob(Loss>1.5) 0.0177 0.0169 0.0416 0.3554 135.03% 
Prob(Loss>2.0) 0.001 0.001 0.0165 0.1859 1550.00% 
Prob(Loss>2.5) 0.001 0.001 0.0072 0.0915 620.00% 
Prob(Loss>3.0) 0.0001 0 0.0014 0.043 1300.00% 
The exceedance probabilities of the loss with climate change can not be derived directly; thus the Chernoff 
bounds are derived for the thresholds indicated in the table.  
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Table 3.2: Impact of Climate Change Uncertainty on the Statistics of the Simulated Losses 
p=0.01,T=20, L=1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Climate change uncertainty 0.05 0.025~0.075 0.0~0.1 (2)-(1) (3)-(1) 
Expected value 0.2428 0.2443 0.2483 0.62% 2.27% 
Standard deviation  0.5465 0.5523 0.562 1.06% 2.84% 
Skewness 2.2903 2.3246 2.331 1.50% 1.78% 
Kurtosisness 8.2858 8.5483 8.5564 3.17% 3.27% 
VaR (95%) 1.3829 1.4019 1.4406 1.37% 4.17% 
VaR (97.5%) 1.6533 1.6986 1.69 2.74% 2.22% 
VaR (99%) 2.3314 2.3478 2.3539 0.70% 0.97% 
ES (95%) 1.8622 1.8963 1.9482 1.83% 4.62% 
ES (97.5%) 2.2166 2.2529 2.302 1.64% 3.85% 
ES (99%) 2.7279 2.7808 2.8221 1.94% 3.45% 
Prob(Loss>1.00) 0.1663 0.1821 0.1824 9.50% 9.68% 
Prob(Loss>2.00) 0.0165 0.0166 0.0164 0.61% -0.61% 
Prob(Loss>3.00) 0.0014 0.002 0.0022 42.86% 57.14% 
Prob(Loss>4.00) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 100.00% 200.00% 
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Table 3.3: Time Scale and Cost/Benefit of Optimal Mitigation 
Discount Rate=0% 
Time Scale 1 2 5 10 15 20 
optimal mitigation levels 0 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.5 0.5 
TC with optimal mitigation  0.0102 0.0228 0.0557 0.105 0.1467 0.1846 
benefit from optimal mitigation 0 0.0095 0.0275 0.0701 0.147 0.21 
optimal mitigation cost 0 0.0028 0.0099 0.0195 0.0563 0.0563 
net benefit from optimal mitigation 0 0.0067 0.0176 0.0505 0.0908 0.1537 
TC with no mitigation  0.0102 0.0296 0.0733 0.1555 0.2375 0.3383 
RNB from optimal mitigation 0.00% 22.71% 23.96% 32.49% 38.21% 45.44% 
Discount Rate=5% 
Time Scale 1 5 6 10 15 20 
optimal mitigation levels 0 0 0.05 0.15 0.35 0.35 
TC with optimal mitigation  0.0097 0.0462 0.0535 0.0828 0.1097 0.1268 
benefit from optimal mitigation 0 0 0.0041 0.014 0.0466 0.0621 
optimal mitigation cost 0 0 0.0028 0.0099 0.0319 0.0319 
net benefit from optimal mitigation 0 0 0.0014 0.0041 0.0147 0.0302 
TC with no mitigation  0.0097 0.0462 0.0548 0.0869 0.1244 0.1569 
RNB from optimal mitigation 0.00% 0.00% 2.49% 4.73% 11.80% 19.23% 
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Table 3.4: Total Cost with No Mitigation No Climate Change, with Optimal Mitigation No Climate 
Change, with No Mitigation with Climate Change, with Optimal Mitigation and Climate Change for 
Different Discount Rates 
Time Scale 1 5 10 15 20 
Discount Rate=0%      
TC with no mitigation no CC 0.0102 0.0729 0.1523 0.2237 0.2991 
TC with optimal mitigation no CC 0.0102 0.0509 0.0966 0.1316 0.1573 
TC with no mitigation with CC 0.0102 0.0733 0.1555 0.2375 0.3383 
TC with optimal mitigation with CC 0.0102 0.0557 0.1050 0.1467 0.1846 
Discount Rate=5%      
TC with no mitigation no CC 0.0094 0.0443 0.0793 0.1094 0.1329 
TC with optimal mitigation no CC 0.0094 0.0443 0.0770 0.0996 0.1141 
TC with no mitigation with CC 0.0097 0.0462 0.0869 0.1244 0.1569 
TC with optimal mitigation with CC 0.0097 0.0462 0.0828 0.1097 0.1268 
 
Table 3.5: Climate Change Effect, Mitigation Effect, and Aggregate Effect for Different Discount Rates 
Time Scale 1 5 10 15 20 
Discount Rate=0%      
Climate Change Effect  0.00% 0.55% 2.10% 6.17% 13.11% 
Mitigation Effect  0.00% -24.01% -32.48% -38.23% -45.43% 
Aggregate Effect 0.00% -23.59% -31.06% -34.42% -38.28% 
Discount Rate=5% 
Climate Change Effect  3.19% 4.29% 9.58% 13.71% 18.06% 
Mitigation Effect  0.00% 0.00% -4.72% -11.82% -19.18% 
Aggregate Effect 3.19% 4.29% 4.41% 0.27% -4.59% 
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Table 3.6: Statistics of Simulated Losses for 
Different Climate Change Factors (a) with No 
Mitigation, T=20 
Table 3.7: Statistics of Simulated Losses for 
Different Climate Change Factors (a) with Roof 
Mitigation (A), T=20 
a 0 0.05 0.1 a 0 0.05 0.1 
Expected Value 0.83 1.01 1.28 Expected Value 0.61 0.74 0.95 
Std 0.51 0.63 0.84 Std  0.41 0.50 0.67 
Skewness 0.86 0.92 1.05 Skewness 1.05 1.12 1.25 
Kurtosis 3.81 3.98 4.31 Kurtosis 4.28 4.54 4.95 
VaR (95%) 1.78 2.18 2.89 VaR (95%) 1.39 1.71 2.26 
VaR (97.5%) 2.01 2.48 3.31 VaR (97.5%) 1.59 1.97 2.63 
VaR (99%) 2.29 2.84 3.81 VaR (99%) 1.84 2.27 3.09 
ES (95%) 2.10 2.59 3.47 ES (95%) 1.67 2.06 2.76 
ES (97.5%) 2.31 2.86 3.85 ES (97.5%) 1.86 2.30 3.10 
ES (99%) 2.59 3.21 4.33 ES (99%) 2.09 2.59 3.51 
Prob(Loss>0.5) 0.69 0.77 0.82 Prob(Loss>0.5) 0.52 0.61 0.72 
Prob(Loss>1) 0.32 0.44 0.56 Prob(Loss>1) 0.16 0.26 0.39 
Prob(Loss>1.5) 0.10 0.20 0.35 Prob(Loss>1.5) 0.03 0.08 0.18 
Prob(Loss>2) 0.02 0.07 0.18 Prob(Loss>2) 0.01 0.02 0.08 
Prob(Loss>2.5) 0.01 0.02 0.09 Prob(Loss>2.5) 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Prob(Loss>3) 0.00 0.01 0.04 Prob(Loss>3) 0.00 0.00 0.01 
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Table 3.8: Benefit/Cost of Different Mitigation Measures and Different Time Horizons for Wood 
Frame Building in Canaries in the Absence of Climate Change (“a”=0.00) 
Time scale 1 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Benefit from Mitigation (Reduction in Expected Loss)  
Roof Mitigation (A) 0.0103 0.0544 0.0649 0.0768 0.0857 0.0986 0.1071 
Opening Mitigation (B) 0.0119 0.0638 0.0786 0.09 0.1005 0.1144 0.1284 
Roof & Opening (AB) 0.0198 0.1001 0.1211 0.1409 0.1607 0.1815 0.2014 
Mitigation Cost                
Roof Mitigation (A) 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 
Opening Mitigation (B) 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 
Roof & Opening (AB) 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 
Benefit-Cost Ratio                
Roof Mitigation (A) 0.1120 0.5913 0.7054 0.8348 0.9315 1.0717 1.1641 
Opening Mitigation (B) 0.1771 0.9494 1.1696 1.3393 1.4955 1.7024 1.9107 
Roof & Opening (AB) 0.1244 0.6288 0.7607 0.8851 1.0094 1.1401 1.2651 
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Table 3.9: Benefit/Cost of Different Mitigation Measures and Different Time Horizons for Wood 
Frame Building in Canaries in the Absence of Climate Change (“a”=0.05) 
Time scale 1 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Benefit from Mitigation (Reduction in Expected Loss)  
Roof Mitigation (A) 0.0113 0.0585 0.0664 0.0802 0.0934 0.1037 0.1171 
Opening Mitigation (B) 0.0126 0.0677 0.0792 0.0949 0.1093 0.1246 0.1376 
Roof & Opening (AB) 0.0199 0.1066 0.1255 0.1492 0.172 0.1963 0.2161 
Mitigation Cost                
Roof Mitigation (A) 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 
Opening Mitigation (B) 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 0.0672 
Roof & Opening (AB) 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 0.1592 
Benefit-Cost Ratio                
Roof Mitigation (A) 0.1228 0.6359 0.7217 0.8717 1.0152 1.1272 1.2728 
Opening Mitigation (B) 0.1875 1.0074 1.1786 1.4122 1.6265 1.8542 2.0476 
Roof & Opening (AB) 0.1250 0.6696 0.7883 0.9372 1.0804 1.2330 1.3574 
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Table 3.10: Statistics for Wood Frame Building in Canaries in St Lucia for Different Settings of “a” 
a 0.05 0~0.1 0.06 a 0.05 0~0.1 0.06 
Expected value 1.0055 1.0291 1.0506 Prob(Loss>1.5) 0.2008 0.2141 0.226 
Std  0.6254 0.6488 0.6534 Prob(Loss>1.75) 0.1214 0.1398 0.1426 
Skewness 0.8905 0.9386 0.8964 Prob(Loss>2) 0.0749 0.0877 0.0861 
Kurtosis 3.8287 4.0259 3.8889 Prob(Loss>2.25) 0.0416 0.0534 0.0541 
VaR (95%) 2.1823 2.2521 2.2768 Prob(Loss>2.5) 0.0243 0.0316 0.0303 
VaR (97.5%) 2.5791 2.559 2.6949 Prob(Loss>2.75) 0.0121 0.0177 0.0164 
VaR (99%) 2.4815 2.938 2.5813 Prob(Loss>3) 0.0063 0.0073 0.0088 
ES (95%) 2.8437 2.6757 2.9788 Prob(Loss>3.25) 0.0029 0.004 0.0051 
ES (97.5%) 2.8225 2.9614 2.9626 Prob(Loss>3.5) 0.0013 0.0021 0.0025 
ES (99%) 3.165 3.3229 3.3348 Prob(Loss>3.75) 0.0007 0.0011 0.001 
Prob(Loss>0.25) 0.9128 0.8839 0.9226 Prob(Loss>4) 0.0002 0.0006 0.0005 
Prob(Loss>0.5) 0.7586 0.7451 0.7795 Prob(Loss>4.25) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 
Prob(Loss>0.75) 0.6092 0.5904 0.6187 Prob(Loss>4.5) 0 0.0002 0.0001 
Prob(Loss>1) 0.4382 0.4413 0.4589 Prob(Loss>4.75) 0 0.0001 0.0001 
Prob(Loss>1.25) 0.3106 0.3145 0.338 Prob(Loss>5) 0 0 0 
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Table 3.11: Statistics of Variability in Storm Activities over Successive 5-year Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistic 
All 
Named 
Storms
Cat 3 – 5 
hurricanes 
mean 6% 12% 
95th percentile 38% 85% 
65th percentile 16% 22% 
50th percentile 5% 3% 
35th percentile -2% -12% 
5th percentile -24% -42% 
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Table 3.12: Percentiles of Frequency of Storm Activities, Expected Loss, Volatility of Loss, and Estimates 
of Climate Change Factor 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Present-
Day Values at (s-tau)=5    
   5% 35% 50% 65% 95% 
Frequency of all named storms 
relative to present-day 1 0.76 0.98 1.05 1.16 1.38 
Frequency of intense storms relative 
to present-day 1 0.58 0.88 1.03 1.22 1.85 
expected loss over next 5 years 3376.64 2165.14 3086.28 3500.9 4050.61 5707.1 
standard deviation of loss 9297.99 7325.63 8794.68 9412.44 10116.8 12026.9 
Growth rate of losses (over 5 years)  0 -8.50% -1.78% 0.73% 3.71% 11.07% 
Growth rate of standard deviation 
(over 5 years) 0 -4.66% -1.11% 0.24% 1.70% 5.28% 
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Table 3.13: Probabilities of the Occurrence of Climate Change 
P 0.1848 
P 0.1479 
P 0.2129 
P 0.2309 
P 0.2235 
 
 
Table 3.14: The Distribution of “a” transformed from Five Climate Scenarios 
a -0.085 -0.0178 0.0073 0.0371 0.1107 
Prob(a) 0.2 0.225 0.15 0.225 0.2 
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Table 3.15: Statistics, Tail Probabilities, and Annual Insurance Premiums for 5-Year Losses in Different 
Models 
Models Potential Growth Model Lognormal Loss Model 
 a_step a_linear a_expo 
present-
day loss 
present-
day loss 
5 potential 
climate 
scenarios 
    Fit_EPs Fit_E(L)&σ(L) 
Time horizon 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Expected losses 16,570 16,620 16,630 16,080 16,990 18,150 
Standard 
deviation 21,360 21,360 21,370 16,760 21,010 21,200 
Skewness 2.1675 2.1456 2.1454 4.0065 6.215 5.0327 
Kurtosis 8.4176 8.2913 8.2396 44.9702 124.6626 67.9487 
VaR (95%) 64,210 64,180 64,190 45,510 51,750 53,830 
VaR (97.5%) 77,850 77,850 77,980 58,360 68,780 70,450 
VaR (99%) 93,780 93,120 93,750 78,550 96,580 98,600 
ES(95%) 83,030 82,800 82,950 67,580 82,000 83,850 
ES(97.5%) 95,640 95,220 95,490 83,940 104,860 106,760 
ES(99%) 111,730 111,190 111,520 110,060 142,710 144,090 
Prob(Loss>0.25) 0.2094 0.2115 0.2115 0.1877 0.1941 0.2271 
Prob(Loss>0.5) 0.0916 0.0925 0.0923 0.0389 0.0529 0.0593 
Prob(Loss>0.75) 0.0287 0.0287 0.0287 0.0113 0.0191 0.021 
Prob(Loss>1) 0.007 0.0068 0.0071 0.0046 0.0089 0.0097 
Prob(Loss>1.25) 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.0048 0.0049 
Prob(Loss>1.5) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.001 0.0026 0.0028 
Prob(Loss>1.75) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.0016 0.0018 
Prob(Loss>2) 0 0 0 0.0003 0.0011 0.0012 
Annual Premium $5,482.89 $5,498.33 $5,500.39 $4,734.06 $5,347.47 $5,641.83 
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Table 3.16: Statistics and Percentiles for 1-Year Lognormal Losses under Different Assumptions 
 Empirical Data 
present-day 
loss present-day loss 
potential climate 
scenarios 
  Fit_EPs Fit_ E(L)&σ(L) Fit_ E(L)&σ(L) 
Time horizon 1 1 1 1 
Expected losses 3,377 3,200 3,310 3,640 
Standard deviation 9,298 7,300 8,930 9,520 
Skewness  7.66 11.83 12.05 
Kurtosis  133.93 334.85 386.25 
Percentile (50%) 0 0 0 120 
Percentile (80%) 2,090 4,710 4,410 4,970 
Percentile (90%) 6,910 8,970 8,890 9,800 
Percentile (95%) 20,900 14,390 15,130 16,390 
Percentile (98%) 41,230 23,840 26,160 28,440 
Percentile (99%) 53,150 32,990 37,820 40,360 
Percenitle (99.5%) 62,780 43,670 52,510 55,040 
Percenitle (99.6%) 65,140 47,510 58,360 60,960 
Percentile (99.8%) 72,290 60,540 77,130 80,700 
Percentile (99.9%) 77,110 74,150 95,600 105,980 
Percentile (99.98%) 80,480 138,130 173,940 183,120 
Percentile (99.99%) 87,520 175,230 232,220 226,980 
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Table 3.17: Statistics, Tail Probabilities, and Annual Insurance Premiums for 5-Year Losses for 
Different Scenarios in Potential Growth Model 
 UCS BCS MLS WCS 
Time horizon 5 5 5 5 
Expected losses 16,630 15,590 16,460 17,940 
Standard deviation 21,370 20,040 21,210 22,920 
Skewness 2.1454 2.1744 2.1714 2.1227 
Kurtosis 8.2396 8.5168 8.4269 8.2139 
VaR (95%) 64,190 59,770 63,610 68,950 
VaR (97.5%) 77,980 73,670 77,580 83,230 
VaR (99%) 93,750 88,930 93,110 98,710 
ES(95%) 82,950 78,160 82,510 88,450 
ES(97.5%) 95,490 90,290 95,090 101,500 
ES(99%) 111,520 105,150 111,170 118,830 
Prob(Loss>0.25) 0.2115 0.1978 0.2079 0.2271 
Prob(Loss>0.5) 0.0923 0.0783 0.0901 0.107 
Prob(Loss>0.75) 0.0287 0.0229 0.0281 0.0372 
Prob(Loss>1) 0.0071 0.0049 0.0066 0.0094 
Prob(Loss>1.25) 0.0018 0.0012 0.0019 0.0028 
Prob(Loss>1.5) 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0008 
Prob(Loss>1.75) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
Prob(Loss>2) 0 0 0 0.0001 
Annual Premium $5,500.39 $5,090.87 $5,438.29 $6,001.71 
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Table 3.18: Statistics, Tail Probabilities, and Annual Insurance Premiums for 5-Year Losses for 
Different Scenarios in Lognormal Loss Model 
 UCS BCS MLS WCS 
Time horizon 5 5 5 5 
Expected losses 18,150 10,770 17,420 28,420 
Standard deviation 21,200 16,010 20,620 26,760 
Skewness 5.0327 7.2403 4.6747 3.0625 
Kurtosis 67.9487 119.0596 52.2188 26.1296 
VaR (95%) 53,830 35,090 52,310 76,900 
VaR (97.5%) 70,450 48,750 68,910 96,190 
VaR (99%) 98,600 71,900 96,370 125,940 
ES(95%) 83,850 60,830 81,840 108,990 
ES(97.5%) 106,760 80,620 104,260 132,750 
ES(99%) 144,090 114,450 140,640 169,180 
Prob(Loss>0.25) 0.2271 0.0946 0.2045 0.4268 
Prob(Loss>0.5) 0.0593 0.0233 0.0571 0.147 
Prob(Loss>0.75) 0.021 0.0092 0.0192 0.0542 
Prob(Loss>1) 0.0097 $0.00 0.0089 0.0224 
Prob(Loss>1.25) 0.0049 0.0026 0.0048 0.0101 
Prob(Loss>1.5) 0.0028 0.0014 0.0025 0.0053 
Prob(Loss>1.75) 0.0018 0.0008 0.0015 0.003 
Prob(Loss>2) 0.0012 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 
Annual Premium $5,641.83 $3,514.83 $5,426.73 $8,975.05 
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Table 3.19 Annual Premiums of Catastrophe Insurance with and without Cost of Capital and Equivalent 
Cost of Capital in the Absence of Climate Change (a=0) 
 
 
  
Table 3.20 Annual Premiums of Catastrophe Insurance with and without Cost of Capital and Equivalent 
Cost of Capital in the Presence of Climate Change (a=0.019) 
 
 
 
Terms of 
contracts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Annual 
premium 
(no CoC) $48,300 $46,600 $44,900 $44,700 $44,500 $44,300 $44,200 $43,600 $43,800 $43,600 
Annual 
premium 
(with CoC) $48,300 $50,100 $50,400 $51,800 $52,900 $53,900 $54,800 $55,000 $56,100 $56,700 
Equivalent 
cost of capital 2.00% 1.56% 1.54% 1.32% 1.18% 1.09% 1.01% 1.02% 0.92% 0.93% 
Terms of 
contracts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Annual 
premium 
(no CoC) $48,100 $46,500 $45,400 $45,600 $45,200 $44,900 $45,000 $44,900 $44,900 $45,100 
Annual 
premium 
(with CoC) $48,100 $50,000 $50,900 $52,700 $53,700 $54,500 $55,700 $56,500 $57,500 $58,500 
Equivalent 
cost of capital 2.00% 1.56% 1.42% 1.14% 1.04% 0.98% 0.86% 0.81% 0.74% 0.67% 
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Figure 1: Economic and Insured Losses from Natural Catastrophes Worldwide, 1950-2007  
(in U.S.$ billon indexed to 2007) 
 
Source: Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, At War with the Weather (2009) - data from Munich Re 
  
 
Figure 2: Worldwide Insured Losses from Catastrophes, 1970-2008 
(Property and business interruption (BI); in U.S.$ billon indexed to 2007, except 2008 which is current) 
 
Source: Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, At War with the Weather (2009) - data from Swiss Re and 
Insurance Information Institute 
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Figure 1.1: Areas where Relative Basis Risk for the Hybrid Trigger Compared with PCS-index Trigger 
a=0.2, Shaded Areas: BRH<BRPCS; Light Areas: BRH>=BRPCS
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Figure 1.2: Areas where Relative Basis Risk for the Hybrid Trigger Compared with Model-based Trigger 
Shaded Areas: BRH<BRM; Light Areas: BRH>=BRM
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Figure 1.3: Areas where Relative Basis Risk for the Hybrid Trigger Compared with Model-based Trigger 
Shaded Areas: BRH<BRM; Light Areas: BRH>=BRM
Lhat,i/Li
L h
at
/L
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
45 degree line
 
Figure 1.4: VI-VPCS for Case (1)                                        Figure 1.5: VI-VH for Case (1) 
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Figure 1.6: VI-VPCS for Case (2)                                             Figure 1.7: VI-VH for Case (2) 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
0.5
1
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Threshold
Difference between Values of Indemnity-based CAT bonds and PCS-index CAT bonds
Correlation
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
0.5
1
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Threshold
Difference between Values of Indemnity-based CAT bonds and Hybrid-trigger CAT bonds
Correlation
 
  172
Figure 1.8: VI in Case (3)                                             Figure 1.9: VM in Case (3) 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
0.5
1
21.9
22
22.1
22.2
22.3
22.4
22.5
Threshold
Value of Indemnity-based CAT bonds
Correlation
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
0.5
1
21.9
22
22.1
22.2
22.3
22.4
22.5
Threshold
Value of Model-based CAT bonds
Correlation
 
Figure 1.10: VH in Case (3)                                           Figure 1.11: VPCS in Case (3) 
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Figure 1.12: VI-VM in Case (3)                                         Figure 1.13: VI-VH in Case (3) 
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Figure 1.14: VI-VM in Case (4)                                          Figure 1.15: VI-VH in Case (4) 
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Figure 1.16: VI-VM in Case (5)                                        Figure 1.17: VI-VH in Case (5) 
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Figure 1.18: VI-VM in Case (6)                                          Figure 1.19: VI-VH in Case (6) 
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Figure 1.20: Areas where Relative Basis Risk for the Hybrid Trigger Compared with PCS-index Trigger 
a=0.2, Shaded Areas: BRH<BRPCS; Light Areas: BRH>=BRPCS
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Figure 1.21: Areas where Relative Basis Risk for the Hybrid Trigger Compared with Model-based Trigger 
Shaded Areas: BRH<BRM; Light Areas: BRH>=BRM
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Figure 2.1: Cash Flows of Traditional Insurance Policyholders 
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Figure 2.2: Cash Flows of Parimutuel Participants 
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Figure 2.3: The Comparisons of the Expected Utilities for a Hedger between HuRLOs and 
Traditional Insurance in Four Cases. These diagrams show the comparisons of the expected utilities for 
a hedger between HuRLOs and traditional insurance in four cases: Palm Beach using forecast-based 
probability, Palm Beach using market-based probability, Monroe using forecast-based probability, and 
Monroe using market-based probability. For the same case, the left hand side exhibits the HuRLOs, and the 
right hand side demonstrates the corresponding traditional insurance. The vertical axes are the expected 
utility. The horizontal axis is the amount stake the individual would place (x) in HuRLOs while it is the 
proportion of insurance relative to full insurance (α) in traditional insurance. On the right hand side, α=1 
represents the individual being fully-insured and c denotes the equivalent transaction cost in traditional 
insurance contract relative to the corresponding HuRLOs. The expected utility of the individual in 
traditional insurance will move downward with higher transaction costs. The upper curve constrains the 
individual to be fully-insured while the lower curve allows the individual to be partially-insured. 
Transaction costs in HuRLOs are assumed to be 0% for each stake the individual placed.  
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Figure 3.1 EPs for Different Climate Change Factors 
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Figure 3.2                                                                        Figure 3.3 
EP Curves for Different Settings on the Uncertainty of Climate Change Factor 
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  Figure 3.4: Total Costs Caused by Catastrophe v.s. Mitigation Levels 
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Figure 3.5                                                                    Figure 3.6 
EP Curves for Wood Frame Building in Canaries with No Mitigation, T=20 
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Figure 3.7                                                                         Figure 3.8 
EP Curves for Wood Frame Building in Canaries with Opening Mitigation (B), T=20 
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Figure 3.9                                                         Figure 3.10 
EP Curves for Wood Frame Building in Canaries with Different Mitigations
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EP Curves for Wood Frame Building in Canaries with Different Mitigations
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 Figure 3.11                                                         Figure 3.12 
EP Curves for Wood Frame Building in Canaries with Different Mitigations
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 Figure 3.13                                                         Figure 3.14  
Benefit-Cost Ratio for Wood Frame Building in Canaries (a=0, discount rate=0)
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Figure 3.15 
EP Curves for Wood Frame Building in Canaries with No Climate Change No 
Mitigation and with Cliamte Change Different Mitigations,T=20,discount rate=0
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Figure 3.16                                                                     
EP Curves for Wood Frame Building in Canaries, T=20
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Figure 3.17 
EP Curves for Wood Frame Building in Canaries 
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Figure 3.18                                                                  
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Figure 3.19 
  
Figure 3.20                                                    
  
Figure 3.21 
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Figure 3.22: A Simple Model that Estimates the Probability and Level of Storm Activity Rate Based on 
Historical Storm Activity Rate 
 
 
 
Figure 3.23 
5-yr Analysis of the Number of Named Storms
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Figure 3.24 
5-yr Analysis of the Number of Cat 3 - 5 Storms
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Figure 3.25                                                       Figure 3.26 
Annual Premiums of Cat Insurance for a House with Value of $1,000,000 (a=0%)
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Figure 3.27: Chernoff Bounds versus Thresholds for Various Time Horizons 
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